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VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR., 1904-1986
IN MEMORIAM
TO
VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.
1904-1986
BY JOHN PHILLIP LINN*
In dedicating this issue of the Denver University Law Review to the
memory of Vance R. Dittman, Jr., professor emeritus of law at the Uni-
versity of Denver, the students of the College of Law pay tribute to a
beloved teacher and an extraordinary human being.
Professor Dittman joined the faculty in 1941, soon after his mar-
riage to Catherine Pierson, whom he had first met when they were stu-
dents at Yale. It was a time, as his colleague, Thompson G. Marsh,
reminds us, when it was believed that law students should be taught by
well-educated lawyers who had years of successful law practice. Dean
Roger Henry Wolcott was delighted to receive Vance to the law faculty.
After graduating from Yale College in 1925 and from Yale Law
School in 1927, and practicing law with distinction for fourteen years in
New York and as a partner in the Denver firm of Enos, Dittman, Sher-
man and Morrato, Mr. Dittman was eminently qualified for the academic
life he had chosen. However, his teaching career was soon suspended
when he enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve for duty throughout World
War II.
In the fall of 1945, Dean James F. Price welcomed the return of
Professor Dittman to the classroom, to the University, and to the legal
community. From that point, Vance enjoyed twenty-four uninterrupted
years of service as "a lawyer's law professor." His principal subjects
were contracts, evidence, civil and federal procedure. But he taught
much more. He was appointed chairman of the department of business
law in the College of Business Administration and was selected to teach
legal aspects of education in the University's Department of Education.
The University of Denver Law School had been the first American
law school to establish a clinical education program as an integral part of
the curriculum of legal education. In 1947 Vance revitalized the Legal
Aid Clinic program, which he described as "the laboratory in which stu-
dents apply the theory of the classroom and come to appreciate the defi-
ciencies of pure theory." His students interviewed clients and witnesses,
researched the law of their cases after thorough factual investigation,
drafted pleadings and other documents, and represented indigent per-
sons in civil matters.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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The next year, Vance developed practice court programs to permit
junior and senior law students to represent, without fee, indigent clients
in criminal cases before justices of the peace and municipal courts.
Under his directorship the practice programs attracted the interest of
law schools, their students, and others across the country.
Indeed, in 1951, LIFE Magazine devoted four pages of its prestigi-
ous publication exclusively to a grand larceny trial conducted by two
University of Denver law student counsel in a Denver court. With such
training available to them, it was understandable that University of Den-
ver students had little concern for the traditional appellate "moot court"
cases in the classroom. Dean Gordon Johnston extolled the importance
of Professor Dittman's exceptional contributions to legal education.
The course offerings of Professor Dittman were never merely les-
sons in substantive and adjective law. He gave to each lawyer-in-train-
ing an enduring example of confidence, integrity, civility, industry and
commitment in the practice of law. His deep, rich voice captured the
attention and stirred the imagination of all as he advanced theoretical
and pragmatic inquiry.
Ability to entertain every point of view, to reconcile apparently in-
tractable positions, and reach reasonable resolution of difficult problems
made Vance an invaluable member of the law faculty and the University
family. As president of the University Faculty Senate, and as a member
of that august body, he worked fervently, as have many others, together
with the University Trustees, to improve the financial foundation of the
institution he dearly loved, and to reach for excellence in all of its
undertakings.
He participated in conceiving, raising funds for, and dedicating the
University of Denver Law Center that, when occupied in 1961, fulfilled
the dreams of so many for so long within the University and the local bar
associations. He remained ever conscious of the job of each law teacher
to maintain close relations with the practicing bar.
Recognized as Colorado's outstanding authority on civil procedure,
Vance was commissioned to produce a three-volume work in that area
for the West Publishing Company. He collaborated with Dean Harold
Hurst on a book devoted to procedural due process. Among his other
many published works were SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, and CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL AND AP-
PELLATE PROCEDURE, in which he was joined by Professor Karl P.
Warden.
On the occasion of his retirement in 1969, Vance could look back-
ward over more than a quarter of a century of personal achievements
within the University. Dean Robert B. Yegge acknowledged with grati-
tude his superlative service. But Vance was genuinely modest about his
accomplishments. He preferred to look forward to truly golden years
with Catherine in their lovely mountain home, Sky Meadow, in Indian
Hills, west of Denver.
The Dittmans' deep love of nature had taken them to Sky Meadow
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in 1950. A large and aged cottonwood tree nearby greeted them each
time they returned from the city to the peaceful and inspiring refuge of
Sky Meadow. There, Catherine pursued her interest in painting. Vance
wrote his comprehensive three-volume work on civil procedure and
commenced a hobby of weaving in preparation for retirement. They
shared the blessing of great music and literature and the spiritual en-
richment of nature's wonders.
In 1970, Vance learned of a movement to stage the 1976 Winter
Olympics in Colorado. The influential organizers of that movement
were viewed by Vance and other naturalists as reckless invaders of the
environment who would permanently change Colorado for the worse.
Although Vance had retired from teaching, he had not retired from his
duties as a citizen. The first organization formed to oppose the Olympic
plan was called Protect Our Mountain Environment, headed by Vance.
The anti-Olympic movement led to an overwhelming statewide vote in
1972 against staging the Winter Games in Colorado.
While continuing to be active in other zoning and environmental
matters, Vance and Catherine turned to their intended retirement activi-
ties. Catherine began writing and sculpting truly lovely works of art.
Vance's weaving was exhibited in juried shows at the Denver Art Mu-
seum, and his beautiful speaking voice provided readings for the blind.
They gave each other gifts of new trees to enhance the natural environ-
ment of Sky Meadow. Their personal, artistic and intellectual interests
made retirement a very agreeable time.
In his final years, as his strength ebbed away slowly, Vance appreci-
ated how generously fortune had smiled upon him. He had employed
his talents in the worthiest activities. He had experienced a full life uni-
fied by intellectual pursuits and meaningful achievements.
During the evening of one of his final days, while hospitalized and
totally unaware of anyone or anything about him, Vance aroused from
his coma to speak as he had so many times before to so many students.
He spoke eloquently, with fluency and clear enunciation, of virtue, mo-
rality, self-worth, prudence, temperance, justice, patriotism, industry
and more. He spoke for hours into the night. It was his valedictory.
Only once thereafter did he recognize his darling Catherine. When
she last left his side at the hospital she felt the end was near. When she
returned to Sky Meadow that evening, the great old cottonwood pro-
vided no greeting. During the day it had fallen to the ground. Early the
next morning, word came that Vance had passed away. It was August
23, 1986. Vance was 82.
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Recent advances in medical technology have made it possible to
keep people "alive" even when all consciousness has been lost and there
is virtually no hope of recovery.I Similarly, technology is prolonging the
lives of people who are terminally ill, in great pain, but still conscious.
Medical technology is available which causes tremendous pain, offers no
real hope of a normal life, and merely prolongs the process of dying for
a matter of days, or even months. 2 More people are choosing to forego
such needless pain and opting not to be kept "alive" if they reach a
"persistent vegetative state."3 Natural death, or "death with dignity,"
has become an important concept. For these reasons the concept of a
"living will" has become very popular.
4
The term "living will" is a misnomer. The documents described by
that term are not wills. Nor do they have to do with living, but with
death. Nevertheless, because of the general popularity of the term, it
will be used in this article. Basically, a living will is a document executed
by a competent person in which he or she declares that under certain
specified medical circumstances, the declarant is not to be kept alive by
"extraordinary" or "heroic" means. 5 The contents and effectiveness of
a living will vary from state to state depending on the particular legisla-
* Professor of Law, University of Denver. B.A. Smith College (1963);J.D. Univer-
sity of Michigan (1966).
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 1 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
2. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afftd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980).
3. CONCERN FOR DYING, A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE LIVING WILL, 1 (1983).
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 139-40. A letter dated July 24, 1984
from Abigail Van Buren to Charles R. Adams, III stated: "Every time the Living Will is
mentioned in my column the response from readers is overwhelming. My mail triples
from 10,000 letters a week to 30,000! In fact, this is by far the most popular issue in my
column to date and keeps gathering momentum." Adams & Adams, An Overview of Geor-
gia's Living Will Lgislalion, 36 MERCER L. REV. 45, 46 n.5 (1984).
5. The sample "living will" distributed by Concern For Dying, 250 West 57th Street,
New York, N.Y., 10107, to thousands of people across the country is as follows:
To My Family, My Physician, My Lawyer and All Others Whom It May Concern
Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and old age - it is the
one certainty of life. If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions
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tion or common law of each jurisdiction. The Colorado Medical Treat-
ment Decision Act,6 which became effective on May 9, 1985, is designed
to recognize the efficacy of a particular form of living will in some very
limited circumstances which are specified in the Act.
This article will first set forth the facts of three illustrative cases in
which use of a living will might have been appropriate. Next, it will dis-
cuss the provisions of the Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act as
they pertain to living wills and as they compare to provisions of similar
legislation in other jurisdictions. This article will then suggest how
other, existing legislation in Colorado may be used to help insure that a
person retains his right to determine when extraordinary medical treat-
ment shall cease. 7 Finally, proposals will be made for ways in which fu-
ture legislation might be drafted to accomplish more fully the widely-
recognized need which laymen are presently trying to meet by execution
for my own future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes and
directions, while I am still of sound mind.
If at such a time the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable
expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct
that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means or
"heroic measures". I do, however, ask that medication be mercifully adminis-
tered to me to alleviate suffering even though this may shorten my remaining life.
This statement is made after careful consideration and is in accordance with
my strong convictions and beliefs. I want the wishes and directions here ex-
pressed carried out to the extent permitted by law. Insofar as they are not legally
enforceable, I hope that those to whom this Will is addressed will regard them-
selves as morally bound by these provisions.
(Optional specific provisions to be made in this space - see other side)
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (optional)
I hereby designate to serve as my attorney-in-
fact or the purpose of making medical treatment decisions. This power of attor-
ney shall remain effective in the event that I become incompetent or otherwise
unable to make such decisions for myself.
Optional Notarization: Signed
"Sworn and subscribed to Date




copies of this request have been given to
(Optional) My Living Will is registered with Concern for Dying (No. ).
There is a real problem on the meaning of "extraordinary" or "heroic." A respirator
is by no means unusual treatment today. Certainly treating pneumonia with antibiotics is
not "extraordinary" in most situations. Yet the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, at 191-92, in
discussing care appropriate for a patient in a persistent vegetative state, with no hope of
recovery, states:
Most of these patients periodically aspirate food or saliva into their lungs, which,
combined with inactivity, often leads to pneumonia. Some physicians treat all
such pneumonias with antibiotics; others leave them untreated; still others do
whatever the family prefers. Though the administration of antibiotics for suscep-
tible infections should not be so automatic a response by care givers and families
that it is beyond critical scrutiny in each case, either treating or not treating pneu-
monia in permanently unconscious patients remains morally acceptable, since at
this time the additional expense of lengthened survival does not seem
prohibitive.
6. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter Act].
7. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
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of a variety of living wills. 8
II. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Three cases serve to illustrate the problems that arise in the absence
of a living will. First, is the well-known case of Karen Ann Quinlan.9 At
the outset, it should be recognized that current medical evidence is clear
that there is virtually no chance for return to independent intellectual
function after a person has been unconscious for a continuous period of
one month.' 0 On April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan was brought, un-
conscious, in a coma, to the hospital. She was attached to a respirator,
which was required for her breathing. I Although two-thirds of patients
who are supported by a respirator for at least six hours while in a coma
are dead within a month, about six percent remain indefinitely in a "per-
sistent vegetative state." 12 Karen Ann Quinlan was one of those in-
cluded within the six percent. On September 12, 1975,13 five months
after Karen Ann had become unconscious, Karen Ann's father sought
8. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
9. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub noma. Garger v. NewJersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976), modified, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (a court can
admit into evidence prior statements made by the now-incapacitated person involved in
the decision).
10. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 459-60, containing Letter from Dr. Fred
Plum (Anne Parrish Titzell Professor Neurology, Cornell University Medical College; Neu-
rologist-in-Chief, The New York Hospital, New York, N.Y.) to Dr. Joanne Lynn regarding
reliability of prognosis for permanently unconscious patients (Dec. 22, 1981). The letter
stated:
1. Prognosis in permanently unconscious patients varies somewhat according to
the nature of the underlying disease. In patients with traumatic brain damage,
especially younger patients, a small number, perhaps 5%, can recover from such
states lasting as long as 4-6 weeks. If complete unconsciousness lasts for longer
than that period, I know of no evidence of a subject who has improved beyond
the level of severe disability, and very few of the latter exist.
2. In ischemic brain injury, good recovery after a period of complete uncon-
sciousness longer than two weeks is very rare, and longer than one month proba-
bly does not occur in more than a fraction of 1%. Even those few in whom late
evidence of cognitive awareness has reappeared had to be classified as having a
severe disability both from the standpoint of physical and intellectual residual. I
know of no example of such a patient who has returned to what can be considered
independent intellectual or motor function. Wakefulness, of course, in the sense
of having sleep and wake cycles, returns in almost all these subjects.
3. In conditions such as brain tumor, Alzheimer's disease, or other progressive
dementias, loss of consciousness for a period lasting as long as one month dic-
tates a hopeless prognosis. I suppose it is conceivable that such a patient could
be overmedicated for a period of that duration, but I know of no example either
by direct contact or anecdotal report of such a patient who has ever recovered any
measure of cognition when all consciousness had been lost for a continuous pe-
riod of 30 days or more.
In my experience, a major problem in this area lies with poor medical diag-
nosis. Many patients who are severely disoriented, agitated, or locked-in are
sometimes called unconscious by physicians. The statements above, of course,
can only apply when the diagnosis is secure.
11. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654.
12. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 172-73. "About 12%, typically those
whose coma was due to drug intoxication, made a good to moderate recovery, and about
an equal number were left with severe disability, though they regained consciousness." Id.
at 173 n.5.
13. J. QUINLAN, J. QUINLAN & P. BATTELLE, KAREN ANN, THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR
STORY, 142 (1977) [hereinafter KAREN ANN].
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court appointment as her guardian for the purpose of having her re-
moved from the respirator. Eventually, on March 31, 1976, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted his request.'
4
Authorization from the court, however, had no impact on Karen
Ann's doctor. As stated by the Quinlans:
When, some six weeks after the New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion authorizing the discontinuance of the respirator for
Karen Quinlan, the family asked her attending physician, Dr.
RobertJ. Morse, why the respirator care was still being contin-
ued, Dr. Morse explained, "I have tried to explain to you, I am
following medical protocol." When asked how long he would
keep her on the respirator if she could not successfully be
weaned, Dr. Morse replied, "For as long as it takes.
Forever." 
1 5
In May, 1976, Karen Ann was successfully weaned from the respira-
tor. 16 She continued to live until June 11, 1985,17 remaining in a "per-
sistent vegetative state," with virtually no chance for regaining
independent intellectual function.
The second illustrative case is that of Abe Perlmutter, a 73-year-old
victim of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease), who in
1978 won the legal right to be removed from life support apparatus and
allowed to die a natural death.' 8 Mr. Perlmutter's condition had be-
come hopeless, but he remained conscious and was destined to continue
to suffer great pain until his eventual death. He was incapable of move-
ment, unable to breathe without a respirator, and unable to speak with-
out extreme effort. Mr. Perlmutter repeatedly asked to be removed
from the life support apparatus and allowed to die. His family and phy-
sician concurred with his decision, but the request was not granted be-
cause of the fear of hospital personnel that possible criminal and civil
liability might result.19
Mr. Perlmutter then filed suit requesting that he be allowed to re-
fuse further medical treatment. Eventually, the trial court and the Flor-
ida District Court of Appeals2 0 ruled in favor of Mr. Perlmutter. The
District Court of Appeals declared that "because Abe Perlmutter has a
right to refuse treatment in the first instance, he has a concomitant right
to discontinue it."''z  The court concluded that:
when .. .public policy interests are weighed against the rights
of Mr. Perlmutter, the latter must and should prevail. Abe Perl-
14. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
15. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 183 n.31 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 171 n.1.
17. Vitiello, Death with Dignity in Mississippi? An Analysis of Mississippi's Natural Death Act,
54 Miss. L.J. 459, 490 n.213 (1984).
18. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980).
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 163.
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mutter should be allowed to make his choice to die with dig-
nity, notwithstanding over a dozen legislative failures in this
state to adopt suitable legislation in this field. It is all very con-
venient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that
there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability
and no possible trespass on medical eithics. However, it is
quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and
against his competent will, thus inflicting never ending physical
torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially sus-
pended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades
the patient's constitutional right of privacy, removes his free-
dom of choice and invades his right [of self-determination]. 22
This decision was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in 1980, after
Mr. Perlmutter had been removed from the respirator and had died.2 3
The final illustrative case is that ofJohn and Clyde Forrest. On July
3, 1986, John Forrest was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to life in prison for the death of his father, Clyde. Clyde had
been terminally ill, with severe respiratory and cardiopulmonary
problems. On Christmas Eve of 1985 John shot his father to death,
claiming to have done so solely to end Clyde's prolonged, hopeless suf-
fering. For purposes of this article, we will assume that John's motives
were exactly as he stated. Commenting on the case, the North Carolina
prosecuting attorney said, "killing someone to put them out of their
misery is not a legal, justified excuse to kill someone under North Caro-
lina law."1
2 4
John's solution for Clyde's problem was inappropriate and illegal.
But the problem of Clyde Forrest's continued suffering and pain, with
no hope of recovery, is a problem that confronts many families. It is a
problem that must be confronted by the legal system, and one that must
be solved in a way appropriate for the majority of families who lack the
sophistication and wealth 25 to undertake the prolonged litigation re-
quired in the Quinlan and Perlmutter cases.
III. COLORADO MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION ACT COMPARED TO
ACTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In Colorado, the legislature has begun to address the problem of
22. Id. at 164.
23. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
24. Son Who Killed Father To End His Pain Gets Life, Denver Post, July 4, 1986, at 6A,
col. 1.
25. Although most prolonged litigation requires substantial sums of money, the Quin-
lan case did not. When Joseph Quinlan, on August 6, 1975, first visited the Legal Aid
Office in Dover, NewJersey, seeking assistance for his 2 1-year-old daughter who was "un-
employed," he met a remarkable young Attorney, Paul Armstrong, who had recently re-
ceived his J.D. from Notre Dame. Ultimately, Paul Armstrong decided to resign from his
job at Legal Aid to represent the Quinlans. While struggling through law school Paul had
promised himself "that if he could ever do something to help someone out - or help
society" he would never let money interfere. KAREN ANN, supra note 13, at 123-35. When
Paul met with Joe Quinlan to say that he would agree to take the case he said, "Joe, if you
and Julie wish to repose your trust in me, I would be honored to represent you - but
there will be no fee." Id.
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artificially prolonging the dying process by enactment of the Colorado
Medical Treatment Decision Act.26 At the outset, it is important to note
that in Colorado the use of the particular statutory form is not
mandatory. The Act specifically provides that such a declaration "may,
but need not be" in the form suggested in the statute.2 7 Thus, unlike
California 2 8 and Georgia, 29 for example, Colorado does not require that
the particular statutory form be used. In Colorado, the statutory form is
merely a sample of one acceptable form of living will.
There are good and bad aspects to the flexibility permitted under
Colorado law. The declarant, within limits, 30 may tailor the form to
meet his or her specific needs and desires. For example, if a person
wanted to increase the time period of continued incompetence from
forty-eight hours to six weeks, he or she could presumably do so.
3 1 Sim-
ilarly, if a person wanted to specify a particular list of doctors who
should be consulted in the face of terminal illness and incapacity, that
should be acceptable. 32 In addition, a person might want to spell out in
more detail just which life-sustaining procedures he or she would con-
sider acceptable or unacceptable. 3 3 Colorado permits a fair degree of
individual modification of the suggested form to meet the goals of the
particular declarant. One added benefit of this flexibility may be that a
declarant who is allowed to modify the suggested form to meet his or
her own needs may give the entire matter more careful consideration
than would be the case if he or she merely filled in the blanks in a stan-
dard form. Such heightened consideration is certainly desirable.
In California3 4 and Georgia, 3 5 by contrast, the authorized statutory
living will forms are mandatory - the exact statutory form must be used
or the statutory recognition of the document is unavailable. Individual
modifications will cause the form to be ineffective. The California Natu-
26. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1985).
27. Id. at § 15-18-104(3).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986); see the detailed require-
ments for a printed form of a durable power of attorney for health care authorized for
distribution in California after January 1, 1986. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 2444, 2432-33 (West
Supp. 1986). The California Natural Death Act was the first such Act adopted in the
United States.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
30. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-103, -104, -107, -112 (Supp. 1985).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-107 (Supp. 1985) provides that " [i]f no action to chal-
lenge the validity of a declaration has been filed within forty-eight consecutive hours after
the certification is made by the physicians, the attending physician shall then withdraw or
withhold all life-sustaining procedures pursuant to the terms of the declaration." It seems
clear that the legislature did not intend to allow that life-sustaining procedures be with-
drawn in less than 48 hours.
32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(3) (Supp. 1985).
33. There are arguments for and against specificity. Specificity assists doctors and
family in clarifying exactly which treatments, under what circumstances, would be refused
by the declarant. Because the meaning of terms such as "extraordinary" or "heroic" may
vary from case to case, or from time to time, or from one doctor to another, more specific
details of the declarant's wishes would be helpful. Yet too much specificity may be harm-
ful, by tending to make the declarant's choices very rigid and not responsive to later
changes in medical technology, medical techniques, etc.
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986).
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
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ral Death Act, for example, provides that the declaration "shall be in the
following form."' 36 There are two major benefits from the rigidity re-
quired by the California and Georgia statutes. First, a declaration in the
required statutory form will undoubtedly comply with the terms of the
statute and will be effective if properly executed. There is no danger of
individual modification causing the declaration, or living will, to request
something not permitted by statute, thereby threatening the validity of
the declaration. If people are content merely to fill in the blanks in a
standard form,3 7 the living will should be effective - whether or not it is
exactly consistent with the declarant's own wishes in the matter.
The second benefit to the California and Georgia rigidity, which is
also an argument against Colorado's flexibility, is that doctors will read-
ily be able to determine the validity of a declaration executed in stan-
dard form. Once the patient is allowed to vary the terms of the form,
the doctor is put in the unfortunate position of being required to inter-
pret state law. A physician, presumably trained only as an expert in
medicine, should not be required to render a legal opinion as to whether
or not a particular individualized form complies with the applicable stat-
ute. To impose such an obligation on physicians might have the unin-
tended, unforeseen consequence of causing physicians to refuse to
comply with individualized declarations until the validity of each one
had been tested in court. A legal climate which in practice leads to liti-
gation of a high percentage of living wills is unacceptable - for both
emotional and financial reasons.
Perhaps the best statute might be one which specifically lists the
provisions which might be changed by the individual - resulting in a
document similar to the real estate forms now used in Colorado.3 8 Such
forms would be easily recognizable by doctors, clearly valid under the
statute, and yet adaptable to the choices of the individual.
A. Requirements for Execution
Under the Colorado Act the declaration must be executed by a com-
petent adult - a person eighteen years of age or older 39 - and must be
executed before two witnesses, who must both be present at the time of
the execution.40 The Act precludes certain individuals from acting as a
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
37. Based on the number of cases litigated in which people have incorrectly filled in a
regular will form, one cannot help but wonder if a statutorily required living will form will
be entirely effective. Nevertheless, California seems to favor mandatory forms. See, e.g.,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6241 (West Supp. 1986) which permits a testator to establish a fairly
complex testamentary trust, if he fills in the blanks exactly as directed.
38. See the standard forms promulgated by the Colorado Real Estate Commission,
found in the 1986 COLORADO REAL ESTATE MANUAL, ch. 26. The legislature should provide
a list of the specific areas in which the statutory form might be changed to suit the interests
of each particular declarant. Changes would not be allowed in other areas. This concept
was suggested by Frank McAleer, Denver University Law Review.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(1), (4) (Supp. 1985).
40. Id. at § 15-18-106(1).
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witness. Those individuals are the attending physician, 4 1 employees of
the physician or the health care facility, 42 fellow patients, 43 persons hav-
ing a claim against the estate of the declarant, 44 and persons believing
that they will be entitled to a portion of the estate upon death.
45
The statute is unclear whether it excludes as an acceptable witness a
spouse who would take nothing under the will then in existence, would
take nothing as an heir at law because all property will pass under the
will, but has a right to an elective share. 4 6 Perhaps such a spouse would
be excluded as "a person who has a claim against the estate at the time
the declaration is executed."'4 7 This point should be clarified. Because
the suggested form in the Act has a standard attestation clause and a
standard clause for notarization, both should be included, although
Judge Field Benton, of the Denver Probate Court, has stated that since
the form is "a permissive exemplar ... [the] attestation clause and nota-
rial verification . . . seemingly are not obligatory elements of de-
clarations."
4 8
As with a regular will, if the declarant is physically unable to sign the
declaration, it may be signed by some other person for him, in his pres-
ence and at his direction. 4 9 The person who signs the living will for a
physicially incapacitated declarant is subject to the same exclusionary
provisions applicable to witnesses for the living will. 50 There is no spe-
cific statutory provision that the one who signs a living will for a declar-
ant cannot also be a witness. Certainly, however, the use of three
qualified persons in such a situation should be standard practice.
The requirements for witnessing a living will are much stricter in
Colorado than are the requirements for witnessing a regular will. When
a person executes a regular will in Colorado, disposing of all his worldly
goods, the witnesses need not be present at the same time, need not see
the testator actually sign the will, need not be present when the testator
signs the will, 5 1 and may be major beneficiaries - or even a sole benefi-
ciary52 - under the will. In Colorado, the witnesses to a "regular will"
need not be the least bit disinterested. A regular will need not be nota-
rized, 53 which may or may not set it apart from a living will.
41. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(a), 106(1).
42. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(b), 106(1).
43. Id. at § 15-18-106(2).
44. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(c), 106(1).
45. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(l)(d), 106(1).
46. Id. at §§ 15-11-201, 202.
47. Id. at § 15-18-105(1)(c).
48. Benton, The New Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, 14 COLO. LAw. 1190, 1196
(1985) (emphasis added).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-105(1) (Supp. 1985).
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 15-11-502.
52. Id. at § 15-11-505(2).
53. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1973) provides for the signature of two witnesses,
which is mandatory for all wills except holographic wills. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-504
(Supp. 1985), allowing the self-proving affidavit executed before a notary, clearly makes
use of that technique optional.
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It is, of course, most appropriate to have stricter requirements for a
living will than for a regular will. Certainly a person's life is far more
important to him than his property, and strict requirements for execu-
tion of a living will may serve both to ensure the validity of the docu-
ment and to impress upon the declarant the importance of the
declaration being signed. Many states, however, provide for the same
formality of execution for both documents.
54
B. When Does a Living Will Become Applicable?
A living will may be enacted with authorization to become applica-
ble only when the declarant "is in a terminal condition and either un-
conscious or otherwise incompetent to decide whether any medical
procedure or intervention should be accepted or rejected."' 5 5 "Termi-
nal condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible condition for
which the administration of life-sustaining procedures will serve only to
postpone the moment of death." 56 This definition of a terminal condi-
tion would have applied in the above-referenced case of Abe Perlmut-
ter,5 7 and if he had previously executed a living will, it would have
become applicable after Abe Perlmutter had lost consciousness. Would
it, however, have covered the case of Abe Perlmutter after he had lost
the ability to communicate, but had still not become unconscious or in-
competent? Probably not. The Act requires that the declarant be both in
a terminal condition and unconscious, 5 8 assuming he or she had previ-
ously executed a living will.
Would the statutory requirement that the declarant be in a terminal
condition be met by a person in the situation of Karen Ann Quinlan if
she had executed a declaration while she was competent? Probably not.
The longest survival on record for a person in a "persistent vegetative
state" like Karen Ann Quinlan's is thirty-seven years. 5 9 Persons in that
state do not die from the vegetative state itself, but from other complica-
tions. 60 It might be rather difficult to argue that someone who might
"live" for an additional thirty-seven years was really in the terminal con-
54. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110'/2 703(3)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) which pro-
vides that "[a] document described in subsection (a) of this Section is not valid unless it
has been executed with the same formalities as required of a valid will pursuant to the
Probate Act of 1975" (emphasis added).
55. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1985).
56. Id. at § 15-18-103(10).
57. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1985) provides "that life-sustaining pro-
cedures [may] be withheld or withdrawn if ... [the patient] is in a terminal condition and
either unconscious or otherwise incompetent to decide .... (emphasis added).
59. According to the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note I, at 177 n.16, "[tihe long-
est case of coma on record is that of Elaine Esposito, who never recovered consciousness
after receiving general anesthesia for surgery on August 6, 1941. She died 37 years and
111 days later . ... "
60. "[C]omplications of their debilitated state, such as infections . . . are more often
lethal when antibiotics are not provided." Id. at 186. The Judicial Council of the Ameri-
can Medical Association in 1982 said that "[w]here a terminally ill patient's coma is beyond
doubt irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diag-
nosis, all means of life support may be discontinued." Id.
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dition required by the statute. If a life expectancy of up to thirty-seven
years can constitute a "terminal condition," then the term is essentially
meaningless.
Would the Colorado Act be of use in a situation exactly like that of
the Quinlan case - where the comatose person had not executed a dec-
laration and her relatives were seeking to terminate useless medical
treatment? Clearly not. The Colorado Act is applicable only to declara-
tions made by competent adults for themselves. 6 1 It does not provide
any guidance or protection for persons in the position of Karen Ann
Quinlan's father. Would the Colorado Act change the result in the case
ofJohn and Clyde Forrest, mentioned above?6 2 Definitely not. The Act
clearly states that "nothing in this article shall be construed ... as con-
doning, authorizing, or approving euthanasia or mercy killing, nor as
permitting any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life, ex-
cept to permit natural death as provided in this article."
'6 3
The California Natural Death Act64 would be even less helpful.
"Terminal condition" in the California Act is defined as "an incurable
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of the appli-
cation of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judg-
ment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the pa-
tient."' 65 Treatment of a person in such condition may be stopped only
"when death is imminent regardless of treatment." 66 In a survey made
of California doctors one year after adoption of the California Natural
Death Act, 67 forty-six percent of doctors considered death imminent
only if it would occur within twenty-four hours. 68 More than eighty per-
cent of the doctors surveyed considered death imminent only if it would
occur within one week. 69 If the California statute is interpreted by the
great majority of the California doctors to be applicable only in situa-
tions in which the patient is expected to die within one week - whether
or not treatment is provided - the statute may be of marginal utility.
Legislation which may serve to allow a person to shorten his dying pro-
cess by one week is not dramatically helpful.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(9) (Supp. 1985).
62. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-112(1).
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West. Supp. 1986).
65. Id. at § 7187(0 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at § 7187(c).
67. Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31
STAN. L. REV. 913, 925 & n.66 (1979). A questionnaire was mailed to 920 physicians, of
whom 284 responded.
68. Id. at 933.
69. Id. at 933 n.92. The cumulative percentage of doctors who would consider death
as imminent was as follows:
If within 24 hours or less 45.9%
one week or less 83.4%
two weeks or less 91.5%
one month or less 96.1%
six months or less 100.0%
Id.
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The California Natural Death Act would not have been useful in
either of the Perlmutter or Quinlan cases. Death simply was not "immi-
nent" for Abe Perlmutter or Karen Ann Quinlan. Nor would John For-
rest's act have been protected in California. California, 70 like Colorado
and many other states, 7 1 specifically prohibits mercy killings.
In fact, there is only a remote chance that anyone will be able to
benefit by the extensive provisions of the California Natural Death Act.
Under section 7188 of the California Act, the declaration can be exe-
cuted only after at least fourteen days have passed since the declarant
was notified that he or she had a terminal condition. 7 2 When the statu-
tory definition of terminal condition, "incurable condition . . . which,
regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would . . .
produce death," '73 is combined with the statutory definition of life-sus-
taining procedures, "any medical procedure . . . which . . . would serve
only to artificially prolong the moment of death and where ... death is
imminent, ' ' 74 it appears that the only people who might benefit from the
California Natural Death Act are those who surprise their doctors by
continuing to live, and remain conscious and competent more than four-
teen days after death was determined to be imminent. Fortunately, Col-
orado and many other states have not included provisions allowing
execution of a living will only after the patient has been informed of a
terminal condition.
75
If a declarant is pregnant at the time the declaration otherwise
would become applicable, Colorado, like many other states, provides for
suspension of the applicability of the declaration. The Colorado Act
provides that:
In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient known to the
attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall
be made as to whether the fetus is viable and could with a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty develop into live birth with
continued application of life-sustaining procedures. If such is
the case, the declaration shall be given no force or effect.
76
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West Supp. 1986). "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any af-
firmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process
of dying as provided in this chapter."
71. 63 Del. Laws. c. 386 Sec. 3; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110/2, 709(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.11 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1 1(b) (1985); W.
VA. CODE § 16-30-10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.11(6) (West Supp. 1986).
72. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1986), which provides
that the physician must determine that "the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14
days prior to executing or re-executing the directive."
73. Id. at § 7187(f).
74. Id. at § 7187(c).
75. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l101/2,
701-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 to -4 (1985 & Supp. 1986); see
also The Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28-101 to -109 (1985), which
substantially enacted a proposal made by students in the Yale Law School Legislative Serv-
ices Program, and did not include any provision that the declaration could only be exe-
cuted after the declarant had been informed of a terminal condition. Vitiello, supra note
17, at 468.
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (Supp. 1985). Recently, in Georgia, a brain-
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C. How Long Is A Living Will Applicable?
Colorado has avoided an unfortunate renewal requirement con-
tained in other state statutes. California, 7 7 for example, requires that a
declaration, though properly executed, must be reexecuted every five
years to remain valid. In 1986, both Wisconsin 78 and Georgia 79 deleted
their reexecution requirements. California provides that a declaration
continues to remain valid, even after the five years, if the declarant has
become comatose or incapable of communicating with the physician
while the declaration is valid.8 0 Georgia allows a declaration prepared
with the old standard of seven years' duration to be extended indefi-
nitely by lining through and initialing the paragraph containing the
seven-year limit.8 ' Wisconsin permits a declaration to remain valid if
the declarant becomes incompetent.
8 2
Because of the ease with which a declaration can be revoked,8 3 the
requirement of periodic reexecution seems unnecessary and might de-
prive a person of the benefits of a living will just when the document is
most needed. In Colorado, a living will remains applicable until revoked
by the declarant.8 4 To deprive a person of the provisions of his or her
living will simply because he or she forgets to renew the will exactly on
time is unwise. A more reasonable approach is to follow the lead of
regular wills which, of course, do not require periodic reexecution.
D. What Directions May Be Included in a Living Will?
Under the Colorado Act, "[a]ny competent adult may execute a
declaration directing that life-sustaining procedures be withheld or with-
drawn if, at some future time, he is in a terminal condition and either
unconscious or otherwise incompetent to decide whether any medical
procedure or intervention should be accepted or rejected." 8 5 Under the
Colorado Act, however, a person is not permitted to direct that nourish-
ment or pain killers be withheld. 86 Because nourishment may not be
withheld in Colorado, a person in the condition of Karen Ann Quinlan
might continue to "live" for ten years - or thirty-seven years - after
she had been weaned from the respirator, even though the person had
previously executed the strongest declaration permitted under Colorado
dead pregnant woman was kept alive until the fetus could be delivered. The woman's
husband wanted the respirator turned off. The putative father of the child opposed that
act. The child was delivered, but died the next day. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1986, at 14
col. 6.
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1986).
78. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West Supp. 1986).
79. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-3(b), 31-32-6 (Supp. 1986).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1986).
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6(b) (Supp. 1986).
82. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2) (Supp. 1986).
83. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
84. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (Supp. 1985).
85. Id. at § 15-18-104(1).
86. Id. at § 15-18-103(7).
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law. 8
7
Florida, 88 Georgia,8 9 Illinois, 90 and Wisconsin 9 ' follow the same
pattern as Colorado and specifically provide that no declaration can au-
thorize the withholding of nourishment. Under the Natural Death Acts
of California9 2 and West Virginia,9 3 however, nourishment evidently
may be withheld, in an appropriate case, if so directed by the declarant.
Both acts provide that the term "life-sustaining procedure" does not in-
clude "the administration of medication or the performance of any med-
ical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain." ' 94
The unpleasant option of allowing a person to direct that nourish-
ment be withheld if he or she is terminally ill and unconscious must be
weighed against the equally unpleasant alternative of, in effect, requir-
ing a person to "live" in a permanently vegetative state for ten - or
thirty-seven - years. States have simply reached different conclusions
on this very difficult point. Perhaps the question of nourishment is an
area which might better be left to the discretion of the person involved.
In those states in which use of the statutory form is not mandatory,
should not a competent adult who is executing his or her own living will
be permitted to specify what should be done about medical treatment,
including nourishment, if the person is someday in a persistent vegeta-
tive state similar to that in which Karen Ann Quinlan lived for so many
years? When a person is unconscious and has no chance of regaining
cognitive functions, it is difficult to believe that the state has an overrid-
ing interest in keeping the person "alive" - despite the tremendous
emotional and financial burden which may thereby be imposed on the
person's family. Whether the intravenous or nasal tubes contain nour-




88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986).
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(A) (1985).
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 702(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (Supp. 1986).
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1986).
93. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(6) (1985).
94. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7 187(c) (West Supp. 1986).
95. According to the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION:
Most patients with permanent unconsciousness cannot be sustained for long
without an array of increasingly artificial feeding interventions - nasogastric
tubes, gastrostomy tubes, or intravenous nutrition. Since permanently uncon-
scious patients will never be aware of nutrition, the only benefit to the patient of
providing such increasingly burdensome interventions is sustaining the body to
allow for a remote possibility of recovery. ...
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 190 (footnote omitted).
The awkward posture and lack of motion of unconscious patients often lead
to pressure sores, and skin lesions are a major complication .... After a pro-
longed period of paralysis, joints become fixed, and limbs and fingers become
irreversibly flexed. If vigorous intervention is maintained for a few months, the
patient's body can become fairly rigid in a position that is most accommodating to
hygiene and skin care, which is an acceptable goal of simplifying nursing care. ...
Id. at 191.
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E. What Is The Revocation Procedure for a Living Will?
The Colorado revocation procedure is fairly typical. 9 6 A declara-
tion "may be revoked by the declarant orally, in writing, or by burning,
tearing, cancelling, obliterating, or destroying said declaration. ' '9 7 The
Georgia statute includes an interesting provision allowing revocation
"by any verbal or nonverbal expression" 98 by a declarant "without re-
gard to his mental state or competency." 9 9 Under the Georgia provi-
sion, a reflex motion by a comatose person may be interpreted to revoke
permanently a declaration which the person had executed and re-exe-
cuted several times during the previous thirty-five years of competent
decision-making. All states, however, rightfully attempt to make revoca-
tion of living wills as easy as possible because of the irreversible conse-
quences of implementation of the terms of a living will.
There are significant differences in the statutory patterns. Nevada
evidently requires that the revocation be made only by a declarant who
is mentally competent.10 0 Delaware requires that an oral revocation be
made before two witnesses at or over the age of eighteen.' 0 ' Illinois
0 2
and West Virginia 10 3 require that an oral revocation be made before a
witness at or over the age of eighteen who signs and dates a written
confirmation of the revocation. West Virginia specifically provides that
the declarant need not be mentally competent when he or she makes the
oral revocation.' 0 4 Illinois, like Colorado, is silent on whether or not
mental competence is required for an effective revocation.
10 5
Multiple copies of the declaration can be executed so that everyone
who may be involved in the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures may have a copy of the declaration. 106 But in light of
the common provisions that a declaration may be revoked by "burning,
tearing, or obliterating," it would seem dangerous to have more than
one original copy of a declaration in existence. Too many "regular" will
cases have been litigated on the issue of whether or not revocation of
one duplicate original effectively revokes the entire will. 107 Such litiga-
tion should be legislatively precluded from living wills. Perhaps Wiscon-
sin has reached the best solution to the problem of duplicate originals
96. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1 10'/2, 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (Supp. 1985).
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a)(3) (1985).
99. Id. at § 31-32-5(a).
100. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.620(1) (Michie 1986).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2504(a)(2) (1983) applies without regard to declarant's
mental capacity.
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 705(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
103. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(3) (1985).
104. Id. at § 16-30-4(a).
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101A, 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
106. Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
99, 127 (1982).
107. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tong, 619 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1980) (entire will revoked);
In re Estate of Shane, 572 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1977) (missing duplicate created presumption
of revocation).
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by providing that "[o]nly the original declaration is a valid
instrument." 108
Even without the problem of duplicate originals, problems may
arise whenever an instrument may be revoked by "burning, tearing, or
destroying" the instrument. Because physical destruction of the will
need not take place in front of witnesses, there will be possible questions
as to who actually tore the document - the declarant, or perhaps a child
of the declarant who did not agree with the document's provisions. Sim-
ilarly, where mental capacity is a requirement for revocation, when the
declaration is simply found, torn in half, beside the bed of a declarant
who has recently lost mental competence, there will be an issue as to
whether destruction of the will took place before or after the declarant
lost mental consciousness. Problems will also arise for those people
whose mental competence may come and go at different times during
the day. Nevertheless, despite the many problems which may arise when
statutes permit a declaration to be revoked by an unwitnessed act, it is
best to be very liberal in accepting as valid any act which might have been
intended by the declarant to be a valid revocation.
Nearly all states provide that either a revocation is not effective until
the physician knows about it, 1° 9 or that a physician is not criminally or
civilly liable for acting in compliance with a declaration in the absence of
actual notice of revocation. 110 Colorado follows the latter pattern, by
stating that "[a]ny physician may act in compliance with such a declara-
tion in the absence of actual notice of revocation .. 1.. "I II
F. What Protection Does a Statutorily Authorized Living Will Provide for
Health Care Professionals Who Act in Compliance With its
Directions?
In both the Quinlan and Perlmutter situations, the reason the medi-
cal personnel refused to comply with the wishes of the families or pa-
tients without a court order was that they were afraid of being sued,
108. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(2) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). Mississippi may also
have "solved" the problem by a very controversial provision requiring that a declaration
befiled with the bureau of vital statistics. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(2) (Supp. 1985).
According to one commentator:
The first problem is that few people will be aware of that requirement. Many
people secure living wills from national organizations, and execute them without
knowledge of local law. Undoubtedly, many Mississippians have done so. How-
ever, Mississippi's filing requirement is unique. Even within the state, it would
appear that the filing requirement has not been widely publicized. Thus, it is
probable that mnany more people execute noncomplying than complying
documents.
Vitiello, supra note 17, at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Vitiello found that immediately
after a bar presentation on the Mississippi Act, only three out of twenty-two lawyers who
had attended the presentation realized that there was a filing requirement. Id. at n. 193.
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.06 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a)(2), (3) (1985);
W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(2), (3) (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.05(l)(c) (Supp. 1986).
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189(b) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2504(b) (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 705(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
111. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-1 10(l)(a) (Supp. 1985).
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either civilly or criminally, for the deaths of the patients.' 12 While such
suits, in fact, are very rare,' 13 the fear is nevertheless understandable.
Not one of the statutes studied provides full protection for a doctor
who orders termination of life-sustaining procedures for a qualified pa-
tient. Under each statute, the doctor must either act in compliance with
the statute,1 4 act in good faith and pursuant to reasonable stan-
dards,' 15 or act in compliance with a declaration which appears on its
face to have been properly executed in compliance with the statute.116
As indicated above,"1 7 when a doctor is asked to determine whether or
not a declaration, appearing on its face to have been properly executed,
is in compliance with the statute, he or she is being asked to make a legal
conclusion for which he or she has not been trained.
If the doctor is protected only if he or she acts "in good faith and
pursuant to reasonable medical standards," 118 he or she has virtually no
protection from suit. The basis for nearly every medical malpractice suit
is simply that the doctor failed to act in accordance with reasonable
medical standards. 1 9 What those standards are varies from place to
place and from time to time. Only litigation finally determines whether
or not a particular doctor's actions complied with reasonable medical
standards. So statutes with provisions like Illinois ' 20 and West Vir-
ginia's,121 requiring compliance with reasonable medical standards, of-
fer no real protection for a doctor who obeys the provisions of a living
will.
If the doctor does not withhold or withdraw life-sustaining proce-
dures as directed, he or she may also be sued. On September 18, 1985,
the New York Times reported on what was believed to be the first such
trial in the nation.122 The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District
had ordered reinstatement of a $1.26 million damage suit against a doc-
112. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (1976); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
113. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 154. In fact, judicial review or action of
any type is rare.
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7
(1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1) (Supp. 1986).
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10/2, 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.10(1), (2) (West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a)(1985).
116. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-110(1) (Supp. 1985).
117. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
118. See W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (1985); see also supra note 115.
119. The statutes listed in note 115, supra, may provide adequate protection against
criminal prosecution - certainly in all but the most extraordinary cases.
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
121. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (1985).
122. Doctor on Trial in "Right to Die" Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at A17, col. 1.
Additionally, when relatives are asked to consent to medical procedures, there may be
interesting problems as to which relative should prevail in the event of a conflict. For
example, in Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technol-
ogy and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 804-05 (1980), the author
recounts the story of
a man injured by gunshot wounds in New York City. While he lay critically
wounded in desperate need of an operation, the hospital dealt with two women,
each claiming to be the patient's wife. One consented to the operation and the
other refused. The hospital was unwilling to proceed with the operation because
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tor for refusing to withdraw a patient from a respirator - on the basis
that "a patient had a right to consent to treatment and.., if consent was
not given, a battery had been committed."'
2 3
The friction caused by the current evolution of the law in this area is
being felt by doctors, patients, and families alike. It is time for the law to
provide the necessary framework within which individual rights of all
parties may be properly protected. A doctor, like any other human be-
ing, has a personal moral, ethical, or religious code of behavior. What
happens if a doctor, because of his or her own personal ethical beliefs, is
unwilling to participate in withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures? 12 4 Many statutes have made some provision for such a
contingency. 125 The provisions vary significantly. Colorado, for exam-
of the controversy and the lack of unanimous consent. Only after the hospital
filed a petition with the state Supreme Court did the consent become unanimous.
(footnote omitted).
123. N.Y. Times, supra note 122, discussing Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App.
3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
124. Idaho is one state that evidently has no specific statutory provision on what to do
when a particular doctor refuses to participate. Comment, supra note 106, at 117.
Every few months there are new accounts of court cases involving uncon-
scious patients, which usually arise when a hospital or physician refuses to stop a
life-sustaining therapy that family members feel should be halted. Although no
data have been published on this issue, it is probably unusual for a family and
physician to disagree. The family's wishes about the care of a permanently un-
conscious patient are probably determinative in most situations when the family
has a strong preference. The supportive care that is usually given is probably less
than fully aggressive care: permanently unconscious patients are unlikely to be
admitted to an intensive care unit or to be resuscitated if cardiac arrest occurs.
Most of these patients, however, are probably given such measures as basic hy-
giene and artificial nutrition.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
125. In California, if a patient survives for the required 14 days after notification of
terminal illness, and then properly executes a directive, the directive is by no means bind-
ing on the patient's physician. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1986)
provides that in such circumstances:
No physician, and no licensed health professional acting under the direction of a
physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable forfailing to effectuate the directive
... A failure by a physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient
pursuant to this division shall constitute unprofessional conduct if the physician re-
fuses to make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary steps, to
effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who will effectuate
the directive of the qualified patient.
(Emphasis added). If a California patient had executed a directive, but had not re-
executed it 14 days after being told that he or she was in a terminal condition, then the
directive could be used by the physician only as some evidence of the patient's intent, with
no civil or criminal penalty on the part of the physician, for failing to effectuate the direc-
tive - and not even any mention that such conduct might constitute unprofessional con-
duct. Id. at § 7191(c).
Georgia law provides that:
No person shall be civilly liable for failing or refusing in good faith to effectu-
ate the living will .... The attending physician who fails or refuses to comply
with the declaration ... shall endeavor to advise promptly the next of kin or legal
guardian of the declarant . . . . The attending physician shall thereafter at the
election of the next of kin or the legal guardian of the declarant:
(1) Make a good faith attempt to effect the transfer of the qualified patient
to another physician who will effectuate the declaration of the pa-
tient; or
(2) Permit the next of kin or legal guardian to obtain another physician
who will effectuate the declaration of the patient.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (1985) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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pie, provides that:
An attending physician who refuses to comply with the terms of
a declaration valid on its face shall transfer the care of the de-
clarant to another physician who is willing to comply with the
declaration. Refusal of an attending physician to comply with
the declaration and failure to transfer the care of the declarant
to another physician shall constitute unprofessinal conduct as
defined in section 12-36-117, C.R.S.
12 6
Colorado thus provides clear instructions for the physician who is faced
with a personal, ethical dilemma and a clear penalty if those instructions
are not followed. Florida law, on the other hand, merely states that:
"An attending physician who refuses to comply with the declaration of a
qualified patient, or the treatment decision of a person designated to
make the decision by the declarant in his declaration or pursuant to sec-
tion 765.07 shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to an-
other physician." 127 A directive, without a penalty provision, may prove
to be of little value in a difficult situation.
Some states, such as Illinois, place the burden on the patient's fam-
ily. The Illinois Living Will Act provides that:
An attending physician who, because of his or her personal
beliefs or conscience, is unable to comply with the declaration
pursuant to this Act shall, without delay, make the necessary
arrangements to effect the transfer of the qualified patient, and
the appropriate medical records that qualify said patient to an-
other physician who has been identified by the qualified patient
or by the family of the qualified patient, for effectuation of the
qualified patient's declaration.
12 8
Placing the burden of "physician shopping" on the family of a terminally
ill patient seems particularly inhumane. Not only will the family already
be under tremendous emotional pressure, 129 but in nearly every case,
the family will also have no idea how to find a doctor who will comply
with the terms of the living will. Additionally, one or more family mem-
bers may not agree with the directives of the living will. One reason
people execute a living will in the first place is to spare their families
from having to make such decisions.
Within the medical profession, it will certainly be known which phy-
sicians are willing to comply with the terms of a living will. Thus, the
Colorado provision, requiring the physician to transfer the patient to a
physician who will comply with the directive, seems by far the best
provision.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(5) (Supp. 1985).
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West 1986).
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 706(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
129. See KAREN ANN, supra note 13, for a good description of the emotional pressures
on one family going through the process of attempting to have a family member removed
from a respirator.
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G. What are the Penalties for Forgery, Destruction, or Concealment of a
Living Will or of a Revocation of a Living Will?
Illegal acts involved in execution or revocation of a living will may
result in an unauthorized death.' 3 0 Colorado provides that a person
who forges a declaration is guilty of a class four felony if the forged
declaration is not acted upon. 13' If the forged declaration is acted upon,
resulting in death, the crime is increased to a class two felony. 1 32 Will-
fully concealing or destroying a declaration is a class one misde-
meanor, 133  as is willfully withholding information concerning
revocation of a declaration.1 34 Because concealing the revocation of a
declaration may well lead to unauthorized death, designating such an act
as merely a class one misdemeanor seems entirely unjustified. Although
a family member, in all good faith, may conceal the declaration of an-
other, it is hard to imagine that concealing a revocation could ever be
done in good faith.
H. What is the Effect on Life Insurance and Health Care Insurance When a
Living Will is Signed?
The answer in all states seems to be that there is to be no effect on
either life insurance or health care insurance when a living will is signed.
The Colorado statute is a typical example of such a provision:
The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce-
dures from a qualified patient pursuant to this article shall not,
for any purpose, constitute a suicide or homicide. The exist-
ence of a declaration shall not affect, impair, or modify any con-
tract of life insurance or annuity or be the basis for any delay in
issuing or refusing to issue an annuity or policy of life insur-
ance or any increase of the premium therefor. No insurer or
provider of health care shall require any person to execute a
declaration as a condition of being insured for or receiving
health care services; nor shall the failure to execute a declara-
tion be the basis for any increased or additional premium for a
contract or policy for medical or health insurance.'
35
The Colorado provision is a very well-drafted provision because it pro-
hibits any effect on insurance policies.
130. Although most statutes provide that declarations are applicable only when the
patient is terminally ill, or in a terminal condition, it is nevertheless the intent of the stat-
utes to allow death to come sooner than it would have, when the terms of a declaration are
implemented. When a forged declaration is acted upon, a person who would have chosen
to have life-sustaining procedures continued as long as possible may die sooner than he or
she would have wished. Similarly, if a person in Colorado, for example, executed a decla-
ration at age twenty-five and revoked it at age sixty, any death which resulted from imple-
mentation of the declaration, because the fact of revocation had been concealed, for
example, would constitute an unauthorized death. The doctor, however, is protected un-
less he or she had actual knowledge of the revocation.
131. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(2) (Supp. 1985).
132. Id. at § 15-18-113(3).
133. Id. at § 15-18-113(1).
134. Id. at § 15-18-113(4).
135. Id. at § 15-18-111.
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I. What Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment are Recognized in the
Absence of a Living Will?
In 1914, Justice Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages."' 13 6 It also has been said that:
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first
and greatest right, which underlies all others - the right to the
inviolability of his person.., is the subject of universal acquies-
cence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skillful or eminent.., to violate, without permission,
the bodily integrity of his patient .... 137
Most living will statutes provide that the rights therein contained
are cumulative. Illinois, for example, provides that "[n]othing in this
Act shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility
which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner. In such respect the
provisions of this Act are cumulative."' 138 Yet, deciding what rights a
patient has to reject treatment, outside the living will statute, may be
most complex. Nearly every state has a law against suicide. It must be
admitted, however, that at times there seems to be a wavering and un-
clear line between suicide and intentional rejection of medical treatment
necessary to sustain life.
In the recent case of Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital,139
believed to be the first case decided in federal court on the fight to re-
ject federally provided life-sustaining procedures, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that:
[I]t is now a well-established rule of general law, as binding
upon the government as it is upon the medical profession at
large, that it is the patient, not the physician, who ultimately
decides if treatment - any treatment - is to be given ....
But while preservation of life in the abstract is no doubt a
transcendant goal for any society which values human life, the
state's interest in maintaining life must defer to the right to re-
fuse treatment of a competent, emotionally stable, but termi-
nally ill adult whose death is imminent and who is, therefore,
the best, indeed the only, true judge of how such life as remains
to him may best be spent. 140
Despite the policy of the Department of Army, which "preclude[d]
136. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). For an interesting sample medical treatment declaration, based on contract and
tort theories, see Clarke, supra note 122, at 839-41.
137. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905) (quoting from Pratt v.
Davis, 37 Chicago Leg. News 213). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed plaintiff's verdict
in Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
138. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11011,, 709(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
139. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
140. Id. at 1455-56 (emphasis added).
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the withdrawal of life support systems once placed in operation for a
patient at an Army medical facility,"' 14 1 the court ordered that the sev-
enty-one-year-old widow of an army officer, suffering from terminal can-
cer, be allowed to order that the respirator be removed and that she be
allowed to die. 142 Because the District of Columbia Natural Death Act
was not applicable to a federal facility, 14 3 Mrs. Tune was obliged to as-
sert her rights outside the context of any living will statute, and those
rights were recognized on the basis of "general law."' 144
Since the United States Attorney in the Tune case waived, prior to
trial, any right of the defendant to appeal,14 5 there has been no appeal.
The District Court opinion remains a strong, contemporary statement of
a "general law" holding that even in the absence of a living will, a com-
petent, terminally ill patient has the right to demand that life-sustaining
procedures be withdrawn.
On January 17, 1985, the NewJersey Supreme Court revised part of
the holding it made nine years earlier in Quinlan. The court held that,
although New Jersey had no Natural Death act, any evidence of state-
ments made by a patient, prior to losing mental capacity, should be
treated as significant evidence in determining whether or not withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures - including nutrition - should be permit-
ted for a permanently incompetent, unconscious patient "with no possi-
bility of returning to any sort of cognitive function."' 14 6
Thus, in the absence of any living will, any other written declara-
tion, and any specific statutory authorization, both New Jersey 14 7 and
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 14 8 have fol-
141. Id. at 1453.
142. Id. at 1456.
143. Id. at 1453 n.2.
144. Id. at 1455. The use of the term "general law" may be important. Does this mean
that the court considers its opinion part of the "general federal common law" which has
been appearing recently, mainly in environmental cases such as Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972), despite the oft-repeated statements of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)?
145. 602 F. Supp. at 1454.
146. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d, 1209, 1230 (1985).
147. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985).
148. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985). See
also Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), one of the
earliest and most important cases in the field. In Saikewicz, the court was asked to decide
whether medical treatment should be ordered for Joseph Saikewicz, a 67-year-old man
who was retarded, and had a mental age of approximately three years. He could not talk
or answer questions intelligibly, and had been living in state institutions since he was
about 12 years old, and the Belchertown State School since about age 17. On April 19,
1976, Saikewicz was diagnosed as having leukemia, for which chemotherapy would be the
usual treatment and the treatment which the majority of competent patients would choose.
Because of Saikewicz's age, there would be a 30-40 percent chance that chemotherapy
would cause remission for 2 to 13 months, but would not cure the leukemia. The evidence
was that Saikewicz would not understand the treatment, which would be painful, and that
he would have to be physically restrained for extended periods of time - 12 to 24 hours
per day for up to five days. Without treatment, Saikewicz would probably die a relatively
painless death within a matter of weeks or months. The SupremeJudicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in ruling that Saikewicz need not be subjected to chemotherapy, stated, "[wie take
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lowed and then expanded upon earlier cases that had permitted life-
sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdraw from a mentally in-
competent patient. Now oral statements may also be considered signifi-
cant in determining the treatment to be given a patient.
Clearly, the law is simultaneously developing in roughly the same
direction through both the legislative and judicial processes. Once
again the law is gradually evolving to recognize those rights that have
previously been claimed by the people. ' 4 9 Even in the absence of a liv-
ing will, people are increasingly being allowed to decline life-sustaining
procedures - either directly, if competent, or by a guardian, if
incompetent.
III. OTHER EXISTING LEGISLATION IN COLORADO WHICH MAY BE USED
TO INSURE A RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHEN MEDICAL
TREATMENT SHALL CEASE
As stated in the Colorado Act, "Colorado law has traditionally rec-
ognized the right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or
surgical treatment affecting his person."' 150 So while a person remains
competent, he or she should be able to reject medical treatment without
further statutory authorization. While competent, a person may execute
a living will to take care of some of the situations which may arise if the
person becomes incompetent. As indicated above, 15 1 there are a
number of situations in which a living will executed in compliance with
the Colorado statute simply will not be applicable. It is with those situa-
tions that we will now be primarily concerned.
A Colorado living will would not be applicable in a situation such as
Karen Ann Quinlan's where a person has reached a "persistent vegeta-
tive state," but may "live" for several years and is thus not in a terminal
condition. The Act would also not apply when a person is conscious,
but mentally incompetent. Such a person would not be allowed to exe-
cute a living will because of the statutory requirement of competence.
That person might not be able to communicate, to eat, to move, or to
breathe alone, and might be in extreme pain with no hope of recovery,
but still not be terminally ill. In such a case, the Colorado living will act
would not apply because of the requirement that the person be in a ter-
minal condition. The person may be expected to live for several years,
attached to a machine, unable to communicate, in extreme pain, but the
living will act would provide no assistance.
the view that the substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent person are the
same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-prolonging treatment." Id. at 423.
149. "The law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in every area. It must
wait until the theologians and the moral leaders and events have created some common
ground, some consensus." Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. Supp. 7, 15, 17 (1967), quoted in Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423. See also the history of
western water law, in which the doctrine of prior appropriation was first established by the
miners, and then recognized by the courts. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 734 (1968).
150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-102(l)(a) (SUpp. 1985).
151. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
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If not terminally ill, a conscious, mentally incompetent person or a
person in a "persistent vegetative state," could only refuse further medi-
cal treatment through the intervention of a third party - usually called
an agent. A legal agent is created when a competent person grants to
another person a power of attorney, authorizing the agent to have the
power and authority to act on behalf of the principal in certain mat-
ters. 152 The principal is the person who establishes the agency relation-
ship by delegating certain of the principal's own powers to the agent.
The agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal and must exercise his or
her authority in the principal's best interest.
At common law, the power of the agent ceased upon the death or
incapacity of the principal.' 5 3 In recent years, however, Colorado has
adopted legislation recognizing what is referred to as a "durable power
of attorney."' 154 A durable power may be drafted either to remain effec-
tive after the incapacity of the principal or to become effective when the
principal loses mental capacity. 15 5 Durable powers offer great promise
for persons who would choose to refuse further medical treatment if
they were in a "persistent vegetative state," or hopelessly ill, in great
pain and mentally incompetent.
Although the Colorado durable power of attorney statute does not
specifically mention the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment,
several courts have held that an incompetent person must have the same
right to refuse medical treatment as is enjoyed by a competent per-
son. 156 Thus, if a competent person would be allowed to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, then an incompetent person, acting
through a previously instructed agent, must have the same right to re-
fuse treatment. Thus, it seems wise for a person who would like to have
medical treatment rejected in some circumstances to put directives to
that effect in a durable power of attorney.
To insure compliance with his or her wishes, the principal should be
able to select the person, or succession of persons, authorized to act as
his or her agent under the durable power of attorney. The principal
should be permitted to be just as specific, or as general, as he or she
wishes with regard to the circumstances under which the agent is di-
rected to exercise the principal's right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. 15 7 A durable power of attorney may be drafted to include
power only over specific medical decisions and need not include power
over any financial affairs of the principal.
If the principal plans to use the durable power of attorney to allow
the principal to exercise his or her right to refuse medical treatment,
through the agent, then the power should also include two other provi-
152. See BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 50 (3rd ed. 1969).
153. A. Scorr, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 8 (1960).
154. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp. 1985).
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text, and supra note 148.
157. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text, for arguments for and against speci-
ficity with regard to future medical treatment.
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sions. The agent should be given the authority to hire and fire doctors
for the principal - to insure that the agent will be able to find a doctor
who will comply with the principal's directives. 158 The agent should
also be given authority to have the principal moved, under specified cir-
cumstances, to Colorado, or to some other jurisdiction with similar laws,
in case the principal becomes permanently comatose, for example, while
in another state.
159
Unfortunately, execution of a well-drafted durable power will not
guarantee that the principal's directives about medical treatment will be
honored in Colorado. Colorado law provides that a conservator, ap-
pointed to manage the assets of an incompetent person, 160 "has the
same power the principal would have had if he were not disabled or
incompetent, to revoke, suspend, or terminate all or any part of the
power of attorney or agency."' 16 1 A competent adult may nominate in
writing who his or her conservator should be if the need for a conserva-
tor should later arise. 162 A court is required only to give "considera-
tion" to appointment of the person nominated as conservator. The
court is not bound to accept as conservator the nominated person.'
63
Under current Colorado law, a conservator can revoke the best-drafted
durable power of attorney.
In summary, the Colorado legislative authorization for a durable
power of attorney provides a valuable tool for allowing a person to exer-
cise his or her right to refuse medical treatment even after he or she has
become incompetent. But the tool is not perfect and further legislation
is needed to clarify and expand its legal effect.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION IN COLORADO
To provide a truly comprehensive Medical Treatment Decision Act,
Colorado should amend its current statute and remedy the identified
shortcomings. The proposed changes are presented in their order of
importance.
In order for section 15-14-501 to better embody the legislature's
158. It has been suggested, for example, that the Quinlan case would never have arisen
if the Quinlans had simply switched doctors. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1 at 194
n.56, quoting from Bai, Around the Quinlan Case - Interview with Judge R. Muir, 1 INT'L J.
MED. 45, 55 (1979). This suggestion is supported by the following data:
a survey of 30 physicians in Napa, California, in October, 1979 ... found that 18
of the 20 physicians who responded would discontinue the respirator on a patient
with permanent vegetative state if the next-of-kin agrees. If the permanently un-
conscious patient can breathe without artificial support, 23 of 29 physicians
would stop antibiotics for pneumonia on parental request and 14 of 28 would
stop nasogastric tube feedings.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 187 n.41, referring to D. MEYERS, MEDICO-
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING, 167-68 (1981).
159. For further discussion of this point, see Marsh, Working With the New Medical Treat-
ment Decision (Living Will) Act, 15 COLO. LAW. 645. 646 (1986).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-401(3) (1973).
161. Id. at § 15-14-501 (1973) (as amended 1977).
162. Id. at § 15-14-410(l)(b) (1973).
163. Id. at § 15-14-410(1).
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intent in authorizing durable powers of attorney, the statute should be
amended in two ways. It should specifically authorize that a durable
power may be drafted to cover medical treatment decisions, and it
should specifically provide that a conservator does not have the power to
revoke any part of a durable power pertaining to medical treatment deci-
sions. If it is true that "Colorado law has traditionally recognized the
right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or surgical treat-
ment affecting his person," 164 then that right should continue to be ex-
ercisable by the person, through an agent, even when the person is
unable to assert his own rights. A person should not be denied the right
to control what happens to his or her own body just because the person
has become unconscious or incompetent.
165
The legislature should amend section 106 of the Medical Treatment
Decision Act' 6 6 to specify whether a spouse can be a witness and
whether the person who signs on behalf of declarant can also be a wit-
ness. Provisions should be made in sections 103, 104, and 107 for effec-
tuating a declaration when a person is in a "persistent vegetative state,"
even though not in a terminal condition.
16 7
The legislature should also determine what time shall be considered
to be the moment of death when a person dies as a result of withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures. Many wills disposing of property provide
that the property shall go to a certain person if he survives the testator
or if he survives the life tenant. If the actual moment of death can be
determined by when the respirator is unplugged, then the order the res-
pirators of a testator and a beneficiary, for example, are unplugged, af-
ter both are injured in a common disaster, would make a tremendous
financial difference to the various parties. The financial interests of
third parties should not be allowed to control when a respirator is
unplugged.
When a terminal condition is caused by a particular injury or event,
it would be wise to provide that the date of death for a person from
whom life-sustaining procedures are withdrawn or who would have been
eligible to have life-sustaining procedures withdrawn, shall relate back
to the moment of the injury or event. 168 Then, only the welfare of the
patient would be a factor in determining whether or not to remove a
patient from a respirator. That resolution would solve a situation like
164. d. at § 15-18-102(1)(a) (Supp. 1985).
165. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text, and supra note 148.
166. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113.
167. A current situation in Grand Junction, Colorado, demonstrates the need for
change in the Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act. Hector Rodas is a Guatemalan
immigrant. A drug overdose has left him completely paralyzed with permanent brain stem
damage. He has no health insurance and his visa has expired. He has not wavered in his
request for death over permanent incapacitation. Denver Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at B4, col.
1. On December 16, 1986, the Mesa County District Court, Judge Buss presiding, heard
the petition to appoint a guardian for him. The hearing involved two issues. Can he
choose death, even though not in a terminal condition? Is he mentally competent to make
the decision? Mesa County District Court, docket 86-PR 139.
168. See Marsh, supra note 159, at 645.
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Karen Ann Quinlan's where her incapacity was evidently caused by a
certain, though unknown,' 6 9 event on a specific day.
In the case of a terminal illness not caused by a specific injury or
event, however, it is much more difficult to determine what should be
considered the moment of death. If the patient becomes unconscious
before the respirator is removed, that occurrence would seem to be an
appropriate time to designate as the moment of death. The moment at
which a patient becomes unconscious is possibly not subject to quite as
much manipulation as when a patient is removed from a respirator. But
pain killers might cause a patient to become unconscious, and pain kill-
ers should certainly not be withheld or administered because of the fi-
nancial interests of the relatives. It may be best to attempt to deal
legislatively with only terminal conditions resulting from a particular in-
jury or event. In reality, it may be only in cases of common disaster that
there is any real likelihood of having several members of a family on
respirators at the same time.
One final proposal for legislation will be made, although it is recog-
nized to be extremely controversial. In studying the cases in which it
was determined that it would be legally appropriate to withdraw life-
sustaining procedures, it became apparent that natural death, or "death
with dignity," may in fact be a very painful process for the patient.170
Medical experts simply disagree as to the amount, and kind, of pain felt
by unconscious patients.' 7 ' Drugs can be used quite effectively to mask
pain. But they may not do so completely.
Setting aside for a moment the dictates of history, 17 2 exactly what is
169. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (1976).
170. Karen Ann Quinlan, for example, though medically diagnosed as being in a per-
sistent vegetative and "moribund" state, appeared to be feeling great pain. Phyllis Battelle,
the only journalist ever permitted to see Karen Ann, stated:
Karen's head was in constant movement, straining back and forth in an erratic,
swiveling motion - as though seeking relief from her rigid body. The eyes, still
intensely blue, roved wildly, never quite focusing, and her mouth closed and
opened in a series of grimaces that gave the impression she was soundlessly cry-
ing out in anguish .... She was attached to a series of machines and hanging
bottles by a variety of tubes: two thin ones inserted into her nostrils fed her;
another delivered antibiotics directly into her kidneys; a transparent, hoselike
tube was attached to her upper chest, sputtering and gurgling as it pumped air
from a respirator into Karen's lungs. Occasionally, she would emit a low, moan-
ing sound.
KAREN ANN, supra note 13, at 341-42.
171. In In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (1985), the court stated:
Both doctors testified that if the nasogastric tube were removed, Ms. Conroy
would die of dehydration in about a week. Dr. Davidoff believed that the result-
ing thirst could be painful but that Ms. Conroy would become unconscious long
before she died. Dr. Kazemi concurred that such a death would be painful.
Yet the court cited Saunders, "Current Views on Pain Relief and Terminal Care" in THE
THERAPY OF PAIN 215 (Swerdlow ed. 1981), to the effect that "a hospice reports complete
control of pain in over 99% of its dying patients." Id. at 1247.
172. According to one commentator:
On January 23, 1906, a euthanasia bill was introduced in the Ohio legisla-
ture. The bill provided that an individual suffering from excessive pain with no
hope of recovery, who stated before three witnesses that he wanted to die, would
be treated in a manner to help end the suffering and hasten death. The bill was
soundly defeated by [23 to 79] ....
A euthanasia bill ... was brought before the British Parliament in 1936. The
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accomplished by letting a patient from whom life-sustaining procedures
have been appropriately removed die a "natural" death? The "natural"
death permitted to a person who has been removed from a respirator is
a death caused by an inability to gasp enough air. The "natural" death
permitted to a person from whom artificial nourishment processes have
been withdrawn is death by starvation. Must society demand that a ter-
minally ill person, in great pain, be allowed to end the dying process
only by directing that the person be starved to death?
When a horse, or a dog, or a cat is so seriously injured that it has no
chance of survival, nearly every civilized person believes that the injured
horse, or dog, or cat should be "put to sleep" as promptly and painlessly
as possible. Society would not permit the owner of a terminally injured
horse to allow the horse to bleed to death, starve to death, or die of
untreated further complications such as infections.17 3 Why, then, is it
necessary for the law to refuse so adamantly to allow a competent adult
to direct that when he or she is in a hopeless, terminal condition, he or
she is simply to be "put to sleep" by medication as promptly and pain-
lessly as possible?
V. CONCLUSION
The law is in the process of evolving in order to determine appro-
priate responses to recent advances in medical technology. Both case
law and legislation have increasingly recognized situations in which a
person, or his or her agent, should be allowed to decline life-sustaining
procedures in favor of a natural death, a death with dignity. As medical
technology improves, the way in which the law continues to evolve will
be extremely important.
The law must provide a means by which a person in a painful, hope-
less situation like that suffered by Abe Perlmutter may be permitted to
direct that he or she shall be allowed to die with dignity. The law must
permit a person to direct that if he or she shall someday be determined
to be in a "permanent vegetative state" like that of Karen Ann Quinlan,
medical treatment shall cease. Families must not be subjected to the
emotional and financial burdens imposed by the type of litigation the
Quinlan family was required to pursue. And some means must be found
for a terminally ill father to be released from unbearable pain without
causing his son to be sentenced to jail for life. As law has evolved
throughout history to meet the needs of societal developments, so must
it continue to evolve today.
bill, which did not pass, included many elements of today's living wills: an adult
eligibility requirement, an incurable illness, and a form signed before two wit-
nesses. (footnotes omitted)
Comment, Natural Death Legislation in lllinois - The Illinois Living Will Act. Ill. Rev. Slat. Ch.
110, 701 to 710 (1983), 1984 S. ILL. UNiv. L.J. 465, 467.
173. See supra notes 5, 60, 95, and 171.
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THE RIGHT TO MANAGE PRIVATE PROPERTY: AN
ANALYSIS OF WHETHER INVESTOR-OWNED
UTILITIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO MANAGE
THEIR OWN BUSINESS
By RICHARD A. WESTFALL*
We have no doubt that the freedom to make use of one's own property...
whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a 'liberty' which under the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without
due process of law. I
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 100 years, our country's view of the sanctity of private
property rights has changed dramatically. From a period when private
property was protected with almost religious zeal by our Supreme
Court, we have evolved to where many facets of the institution of prop-
erty are subject to government scrutiny. The zenith of such governmen-
tal control and the correlative nadir of private prerogative is illustrated
by the regulation of this nation's investor-owned public utility industry.
Ever since the landmark decision of Munn v. Illinois,2 our country
has recognized that public utilities are subject to more onerous regula-
tion than other businesses. Writing for the Court in Munn, ChiefJustice
Waite stated that utilities are "affected with a public interest," and ac-
cordingly, the public has a greater stake in the service provided by such
businesses. 3 Because of this greater stake, the public can legislatively
impose conditions and restrictions on public utilities which are not im-
posable on other businesses. These restrictions include limits on the
prices which utilities can charge for their services.
4
Utilities are, therefore, more susceptible to government regulation
than other private companies. This fact has led to extensive state and
federal regulation covering most facets of the business. Nevertheless,
* B.S. University of Colorado (1978);J.D. University of Denver (1985); Clerk to the
Honorable Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court (1986-87); Clerk to the Honora-
ble Robert H. McWilliams, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (1985-86); former Senior Pol-
icy Analyst, Public Service Company of Colorado.
1. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
2. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
3. Id. at 126. Actually, the phrase "affected with a public interest" is borrowed from
an earlier work by Lord Hale, De Portibus Maris, noted in Munn. The public has a greater
stake in the services provided by public utilities primarily because such services are often
considered as necessities. For example, Lord Hale was concerned with such things as fer-
ries and wharfs which played an essential role in England's economy in the late 1600s
when he articulated the "affected with a public interest" principle. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126-
27.
4. Id. at 134.
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until recently, utility companies retained control over their most impor-
tant business decisions. For example, electric and gas utilities, the pri-
mary focus of this article, could choose which suppliers of coal and gas
they would do business with, what kinds of power plants they could
build, when they could build them, and what they could say to their cus-
tomers. However, a trend has emerged in recent years wherein state
regulators have tried to take these decisions away from the companies
they regulate. This development portends a major and fundamental
change in the investor-owned utility industry; a change which may have
long-term, harmful consequences.
In analyzing this new regulatory trend, there are some important
questions which must be explored. Do utility companies enjoy some le-
gally protected right to manage their own property? If so, why, and
what is the scope of such a right? Finally, if state utility commissions are
encroaching upon this right, what are the implications?
The importance of answering these questions extends far beyond
the utility industry. By seeking to determine how far state regulators can
intrude on managerial decisionmaking in the most highly regulated in-
dustry in this country, the absolute limits of state power over private
property can be better understood; and the line between what is "pri-
vate" power and what is "public" power in our society can be more
readily drawn. 5
This article will first discuss some of the regulatory practices which
initiated the concern that state regulators have usurped private decision-
making from the companies they regulate. It will then analyze whether a
right to manage exists, the scope of the right to manage, and why such a
right exists. Finally, this article will discuss some of the implications for
taking decisionmaking out of the hands of utility company managers and
placing it in the hands of state regulators.
II. THE NEW REGULATORY PHENOMENON: MANAGEMENT
BY REGULATORS
A. A Brief Historical Perspective
State utility regulation as it exists today started in 1907 when, rec-
ognizing the need for professional, continuous regulation over the natu-
ral monopolies which furnished the public with energy, water, and
telephone services, the State of Wisconsin passed legislation creating a
specialized state utility commission. 6 This statute provided a model
which was followed by the rest of the states in one form or another. 7
5. See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
6. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 34 (1964) [hereinafter
GARFIELD & LovEjoy]. It is also important to note the significant contribution of New York
which passed an act creating two public service commissions on June 6, 1907. Laws of
1907, ch. 429. Wisconsin did not enact its comprehensive public utility law until July 9,
1907. Laws of 1907, ch. 499.
7. GARFIELD & LovEjoY, supra note 6. The state public utility commission movement
spread throughout the nation so rapidly that by 1913 more than one half of the states had
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Under this statutory scheme, state utility commissions were formed and
usually consisted of between three to seven people. These commissions
set rates, implemented utility statutes by promulgating rules and regula-
tions, and insured that the service provided by utilities was adequate.8
Congress also created a federal regulatory body called the Federal
Power Commission 9 - later changed to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission' 0 - for the purpose of regulating interstate sales of
energy.
Early United States Supreme Court decisions reviewing the power
of the states to regulate utilities were strict. For example, in Smyth v.
Ames, 11 the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling holding a state
statute which fixed maximum rates for railroads as unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment. 12 In so doing, the Supreme Court
put the states on a short leash, forcing all states to comply with the "fair
value" formula 13 which was designed by the Court for computing what
rates would pass constitutional muster. This "short leash" treatment
and its accompanying "fair value" formula were later exhibited in a
number of other cases, including, The Minnesota Rate Cases, 14 Missouri ex
public utility commissions. See generally E. JONES AND T. BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES 163-90 (1932).
8. GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 6, at 32. See also Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to
Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962).
9. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1920).
10. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-95, 91 Stat. 565, 582
(1977).
11. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
12. It should be noted that Smyth resulted from a rate determination made by a state
legislature, before that state had a specialized utility commission.
The Supreme Court, after extensively surveying its caselaw decided since Munn deal-
ing with rate regulation, made, inter alia, the following conclusions:
2. A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority ot a state
enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by
railroad [or the rates of any utility for that matter] that will not admit of the car-
rier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to
the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law
and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
3. While rates for the transportation of persons and property within the
limits of a State are primarily for its determination, the question whether they are
so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such com-
pensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law,
cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the State or by regula-
tions adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of
judicial inquiry.
169 U.S. at 526.
13. Id. at 546-47. The Court stated "that the basis of all calculations as to the reason-
ableness of rates to be charged by a corporation... must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public." Id. at 546.
14. 230 U.S. 352 (1913). In this case, the Court made the following observation indi-
cating the strictness of the Supreme Court's review of state regulation of utility property:
The property of the railroad corporation has been devoted to a public use.
There is always the obligation springing from the nature of the business in which
it is engaged - which private exigency may not be permitted to ignore - that
there shall not be an exorbitant charge for the service rendered. But the State
has not seen fit to undertake the service itself; and the private property embarked
in it is not placed at the mercy of legislative caprice. It rests secure under the
1987]
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rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,15 and espe-
cially Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough.
16
This strict judicial treatment of state regulatory power yielded to a
far more flexible approach in the 1940s through some major Supreme
Court decisions which dealt with the general question of judicial review
of administrative action. The leading proponent of this change was Jus-
tice Brandeis. In a number of dissenting and concurring opinions, Jus-
tice Brandeis articulated the view that regulatory commission decisions
should be given more deference by the courts. 17 Other important com-
mentators of that period also forcefully argued that regulatory agencies
should be given more control.' 8 Thus, in what were to become
landmark decisions of the early 1940s, the Supreme Court changed its
position, ruling that regulatory agency decisions were to be given more
deference by the courts.
In Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. ,'9 ChiefJustice
Stone made the following observation:
The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the
service of any single formula or combination of formulas.
Agencies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are
free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the
constitutional protection which extends not merely to the title but to the right to
receive just compensation for the service given to the public.
Id. at 433-34.
15. 262 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1923) (The court held that "a fair return upon value of
properties devoted to public service" could not be ascertained without considering the
present cost of labor, supplies, and "[a]n honest and intelligent forecast of probable future
values made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances.").
16. 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (requiring, in effect, judicial de novo review of utility commis-
sion decision when regulated utility claims that rate regulation denies it property without
due process of law).
17. For example, in SaintJoseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936),
Justice Brandeis, concurring with the result reached by the Court involving a federal
agency ratemaking proceeding, argued that regulatory agencies should have greater
discretion:
The obstacles encountered in the case at bar and in the regulation of the
rates of the large utilities are attributable, in the main, to the Court's adherence
to the rule declared in Smyth v. Ames for determining the value of the property. In
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, I stated my
reasons for believing that the Constitution did not require the Court to adopt that
rule which so seriously impairs the power of rate-regulation. But since the deci-
sion of Smyth v. Ames is adhered to, there is the greater need of applying to cases
in which rate-regulation is alleged to be confiscatory to the rule of reason under
which the Court has sanctioned, in other cases of taking, the legislative provision
giving finality to quasi-judicial findings of value and income by administrative
tribunals.
... Congress concluded that a wealthy and litigious utility might practically
nullify rate regulation if the correctness of findings by the regulating body of the
facts as to value and income were made subject to judicial review. For that con-
clusion experience affords ample basis. I cannot believe that the Constitution,
which confers upon Congress the power of rate-regulation, denies to it power to
adopt measures indispensible to its effective exercise.
Id. at 92-93 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 488-548 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. E.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 126-54 (1938). See generally J.
Pfiffner, The Development of Administrative Regulation, 221 ANNALS 1 (1942).
19. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
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pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular
circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper
findings made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the
courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that
the limits of due process have been overstepped. If the Com-
mission's order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in
its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an
end.
20
In Natural Gas Pipeline, the Court thwarted a challenge to an interim or-
der issued by the Federal Power Commission which directed natural gas
companies to file a new schedule of rates so as to effect a decrease in
annual operating revenues. 2 1 While the Court held that no single
formula needed to be adopted and followed in order to determine fair
value, it intimated that some type of rate base was necessary and refused
to overrule the well-established "fair value" factors. Following Natural
Gas Pipeline, however, the Supreme Court decided Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 22 wherein it announced the "end result" doc-
trine, under which a regulatory agency can generally use any statutorily
acceptable means to set rates, so long as the "end result" is not unjust
or unreasonable.2 3 Hope and Natural Gas Pipeline began the era, continu-
ing until the present, in which the courts have followed a much more
deferential approach to all administrative decisionmaking.
2 4
This change in the Court's view of judicial oversight of administra-
tive decisionmaking was necessary, especially since the very purpose of
professional, specialized regulatory bodies is frustrated when the courts
are forever looking over the regulators' shoulders. But this deferential
approach to administrative action affecting regulated companies has led
to some extreme examples of state regulation of investor-owned utili-
ties. As the next section illustrates, a trend is emerging wherein state
20. Id. at 586.
21. Id. at 580.
22. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
23. Id. at 602. It should be pointed out that this "end-result" analysis applies only to
the methods used by regulatory agencies to set rates. In other words, under Hope, the
courts will not second-guess how the regulatory agencies compute what is an adequate
return to the utilities. The Hope case, however, has no relevance to the issue of how far
regulators can encroach on management decisionmaking.
24. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to overturn a
"fuel cycle" rule adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission for considering the environ-
mental impact associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and disposal, the effect of which
was to deny a license to operate a nuclear reactor to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation. Vermont Yankee is indicative of the deference accorded administrative deci-
sionmaking by the courts. Indeed,Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Vermont Yan-
kee, chided the Court of Appeals for intruding into the administrative process by stating
that "this sort of unwarranted judicial examination of perceived procedural shortcomings
of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but seriously interfere with that process pre-
scribed by Congress." Id. at 548. Rehnquist further stated that "[t]he court should.., not
stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the
agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague,
undefined public good." Id. at 549. See generally 5 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREA-
TISE §§ 29.16, 29.19 (2d ed. 1984).
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regulators are beginning to take over the management of the investor-
owned utilities they regulate - a development warranting a serious
reappraisal of the regulators' role.
B. State Regulation Today
The most troublesome major development in state utility regulation
today is what can be described as "resource-plan" regulation. The lead-
ing example of such regulation is Nevada's General Order Number 43,
which was adopted by the Nevada Public Service Commission in re-
sponse to legislation passed in 1983 entitled the Utility Resource Plan-
ning Act. 25 This regulation, in effect, makes the Nevada Commission
primarily responsible for planning future energy development in that
state, thus usurping the role of utility company management. As author-
ized by statute, Nevada's utility companies are required to submit de-
tailed energy plans to the Commission. 26 The regulation requires that
these plans reduce every future energy-supply decision to an
econometric model detailing every assumption, and requires that every
possible choice concerning future energy development be included.
2 7
The Commission has veto power over any item contained in the plan
thereby giving it the ultimate management control over the decision-
making process.
2 8
One Nevada commissioner who was primarily responsible for the
drafting of the regulation has acknowledged that this new regulatory
scheme is a radical departure from traditional utility regulation.
29
Moreover, Nevada's statutorily authorized Consumer Advocate has as-
serted that the approach inherent in this regulatory scheme has a defi-
nite ideological thrust,30 one against which many utility companies have
strenuously fought.3 1 Undoubtedly, Nevada's regulatory scheme is a
regulator-defined, predetermined approach to energy development in
25. 1983 NEV. STAT. § 5.2 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.741, 704.746, 704.75 1,
704.890 (1985)).
26. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.741 (1985).
27. For a discussion summarizing the regulation, see J. Wellinghoff & C. Mitchell, A
Modelfor Statewide Integrated Utility Resource Planning, 116 PUB. UTxL. FORT. 19, 25 (August 8,
1985).
28. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.751 (1985).
29. R. Haman-Guild, State Involvement in Utility Resource Planning: Towards Partnership,
115 PUB. UrIL. FORT. 22, 22-23 (April 18, 1985). Ms. Haman-Guild observed that:
[bIringing a regulatory body into a utility's resource planning process ... goes
against long standing traditions of utility regulation: that 'hindsight' shall govern
the process of regulatory decisionmaking, and that 'prudence' and 'reasonable-
ness' shall be decided after the fact, when regulators have access to a (theoreti-
cally) complete set of facts and information.
Id. at 22. Ms. Haman-Guild further noted that utility management in the state was con-
cerned that the legislation authorizing the regulation "preempted management's right to
make investment decisions for its stockholders .... " Id. at 23.
30. Wellinghoff& Mitchell, supra note 27, at 19. The authors mention an "emerging
public policy awareness that a least-cost energy strategy [such as that implemented by Ne-
vada] could make good business sense for public utilities." Id.
31. Wellinghoff & Mitchell, supra note 27, states that the regulatory scheme is
designed to address the so-called "soft energy path" espoused by Amory Lovins. See A.
LovINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS (1977).
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that state. There is also no doubt that Nevada's scheme removes deci-
sionmaking from utility managers in that state, and places it in the hands
of Nevada's utility commission.
Other states have adopted some form of resource-planning regula-
tion.3 2 Additionally, the trade association for the state utility commis-
sions, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, has
formally adopted a resolution calling for nationwide implementation of
Nevada-like resource plan regulation.53 The pervasive intrusion by reg-
ulators into the management of the utilities they are regulating is illus-
trated by state utility commissions that have imposed conditions on
utilities' business practices. For example, state utility commissions have
forced power companies to renegotiate their debt,3 4 omit dividends and
limit capital expenses, 35 and complete the construction of a power
plant.3 6 State regulators have even gone so far as to try to tell utility
companies what they can and cannot say to their customers, although
the Supreme Court has recently struck down such regulation.3 7 It is,
therefore, beyond dispute that this phenomenon of regulator-initiated
and controlled energy planning is a significant emerging trend in state
utility regulation.
What are the consequences of the encroachment by utility regula-
tors upon what has traditionally been management's role? Some would
argue that the investor-owned utility industry is obsolete, thereby justi-
fying what can be perceived as its political demise.3 8 But before the fun-
32. Wellinghoff & Mitchell, supra note 27 at 20-24. The article discusses resource
planning objectives similar to those of the Nevada plan incorporated by the following ju-
risdictions: the Pacific Northwest, California, Florida, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
33. Convention Resolution No. 7, NAT'L ASSN. OF REG. UTIL. COMM'RS (NARUC)
BULL. No. 2 (Jan. 14, 1985).
34. As noted in Consumer Power Company's "Interim Report to Shareholders,"
March 31, 1985, the Michigan Public Service Commission informed the Company it would
grant it a rate increase, but only after, inter alia, the company renegotiated a major portion
of its debt with its creditor banks. Moreover, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, the
Michigan Commission earlier wanted to condition any rate hike on the company's firing of
its chief executive. Departure of Consumers Power Head is Urged by State Official in Rate Case,
Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 5, col. 2.
35. The Indiana Public Service Commission told Public Service Company of Indiana
that it could write off over $2 billion invested in an abandoned nuclear plant, but only after
the company agreed to omit certain dividends and limit its capital expenses. Richards, PS
Indiana to Omit Dividends in Plan To Write Off $2.7 Billion Nuclear Plant, Wall St. J., Feb. 3,
1986, at 6, col. 2.
36. According to a bulletin by NARUC, No. 8-1983m at 19 (February 21, 1983), the
New York Public Service Commission rejected a proposal by the Long Island Lighting
Company to establish a subsidiary. The reason given was that the Commission thought
that the company's management should devote more of its attention to the completion of a
power plant then under construction.
37. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986), see infra
notes 63-74 and accompanying text. See also Consolidated Edision Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (The Supreme Court recognized that administrative
bodies empowered to regulate utilities have the authority and the duty to take actions
necessary to further the national interest in energy conservation. But when such action
suppresses free speech the Constitution requires that the restriction be no more extensive
than is necessary to serve legitimate state interests.); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
38. See generally R. MUNSON, THE POWER MAKERS 9-12 (1985). Munson goes so far as
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damental decisions concerning this country's energy future are to be
taken away from utility management and placed in the hands of state
regulators, an open and informed debate should first take place. Cen-
tral to this debate is the issue of whether utility companies have some
protected right to manage their property. For if such a right exists, it
exists for a reason. If the reason is still valid, the important decisions
affecting this country's energy future should remain in management's
hands, not state regulators'.
III. THE RIGHT To MANAGE
In Board of Regents v. Roth,3 9 the Supreme Court made the following
observation concerning the nature of property interests:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are de-
fined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law - rules or understand-
ings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of enti-
tlement to those benefits.
40
What the Constitution does provide for, however, is the protection of
these rights once they are created. For example, as noted by the quote
appearing at the beginning of this article, the "liberty" interest of using
one's own property in the manner in which he, she, or it4 1 wishes is
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
42
Specifically, in the context of the utility industry, that clause also pro-
tects utilities from being subjected to rate regulation which is
confiscatory.
43
Property rights, though, are not absolute. As announced by the
Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York, 44 at least insofar as economic reg-
ulation is concerned, the states have considerable discretion in regulat-
ing businesses when to do so promotes the public welfare. 45 Utilities
are subject to extensive regulation because of the importance of the
services they provide to the public.46 Therefore, by definition, any
to imply that utility bankruptcies would actually be advantageous to consumers: "If the
local impacts of the first utility bankruptcy are similarly tame-in other words, if the lights
stay on-regulators in other states may deny rate relief to their troubled power companies,
while consumers increase their political willingness to 'stick it to investors.' " Id. at 12.
39. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
40. Id. at 577.
41. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), the
Supreme Court announced that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
42. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
43. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942)
(unreasonably low regulation rate is confiscatory and unconstitutional). See also H. Booser,
The Constitutional Limitations on Public Utility Regulation, 67 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1963).
44. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (regulation of milk prices held to be constitutional since pro-
tection of dairy industry promoted public welfare).
45. Id. at 537.
46. In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), the
Supreme Court discussed a principle which applies with equal force today: A "sliding-
scale," of sorts, exists in the area of public regulation of private business. The greater the
[Vol. 64:1
RIGHT TO MANAGE
property rights a utility may have, including the right to manage its own
property, are subject to some regulation. The issues then become, the
extent and the manner of such regulation.
It is important to note that even the most protected forms of prop-
erty, such as a vested interest in real estate, can be taken by the state as
long as the property owner is given due process of law. 4 7 The four-
teenth amendment's protection, by its very terms, makes this proposi-
tion clear.4 8 Therefore, even if utility companies have the right to
manage their own property, this right can be taken away, so long as the
state provides the utility with due process of law. Consequently, the
burden is on the state to articulate the reason why state regulators
should be given the power to make the important decisions affecting our
energy future. 49 The degree to which the courts will scrutinize any ar-
ticulated justification given by the state for assuming the right to man-
age will, in turn, depend upon how fundamental the right to manage is
viewed by the courts.
50
public's concern in a particular business, the more regulation of that business will be toler-
ated. According to the Court:
To say that a business is clothed with a public interest, is not to determine
what regulation may be permissible in view of the private rights of the owner.
The extent to which an inn or a cab system may be regulated may differ widely
from that allowable as to a railroad or other common carrier. It is not a matter of
legislative discretion solely. It depends on the nature of the business, on the fea-
ture which touches the public, and on the abuses reasonably to be feared. To say
that a business is clothed with a public interest is not to import that the public may take over its
entire management and run it at the expense of the owner. The extent to which regulation
may reasonably go varies with different kinds of business. The regulation of rates
to avoid monopoly is one thing. The regulation of wages is another. A business
may be of such character that only the first is permissible, while another may
involve such a possible danger of monopoly on the one hand, and such disaster
from stoppage on the other, that both come within the public concern and power
of regulation.
Id. at 539 (emphasis added). It is important to note that this discussion by the Supreme
Court acknowledging the state's extensive power to regulate nevertheless expressly ex-
cepted from such power the right to "take over" management of the regulated company.
47. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (upholding Indiana statute making re-
tention of severed mineral interests in land conditioned upon filing a statement of claim
with the state).
48. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. An example of such due process is found in the statutory scheme regulating utili-
ties in Colorado. Under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101 (1973), utility companies in that
state are charged with providing service that is "adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable."
The very next statutory provision empowers the Colorado utility commission to ensure
that the utilities live up to these obligations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-102 (1973). To
correct any abuses by a Colorado utility, however, the Commission must first hold hear-
ings, and make a formal finding that the abuse exists. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-4-101, 40-2-
106 (1973). Such a finding is then subject to judicial review. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-6-115
(1973). See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 285, 411
P.2d 785, 797 (court not only has right to review but is obligated to do so), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22 (1966).
50. The degree ofjudicial review afforded today reflects the view expressed by Justice
Holmes in his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In dissenting
from the Court's opinion invalidating a statute regulating the number of hours a baker
could work, Holmes stated the following:
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word 'liberty' in the Four-
teenth Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessar-
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How fundamental is the right to manage, if it exists at all? This
question strikes at the heart of the concept of private property. Charles
Reich has described property as the tool by which society distinguishes
between public and private power.5 1 By defining a person's property
rights, the law, in effect, draws a circle around that person. 52 Within
that circle, the person has a great degree of control, and the burden is
on the state to justify any intrusion. Outside the circle, the burden is on
the person to show the authority for his actions. 53 Thus, if the state
wants to affect a protected property right, the state must show why the
public interest will benefit.
Beyond this procedural point, there is another reason for distin-
guishing between public and private power. John Locke was of the view
that the concept of private property insures the most advantageous use
of our resources. In the early stages of man's development, man is af-
forded a property right because, through his labor, resources of little
value are transformed into things of great value to himself and others.
54
As society becomes more advanced and industrialized, however, it be-
comes necessary to settle, by "compact and agreement," the property
rights of all persons in society, so as to allow for the production of goods
now taken for granted in a civilized society. 5 5 The thrust of Locke's con-
ception of property is a principle equally as valid today: preserving pri-
vate property rights leads to the greatest good for the greatest number
of people. 56 The role of government, according to Locke, is to preserve
private property. 5 7 Thus, under Locke's view, private industry is given the
responsibility for insuring the development of our material wealth, not
government.
Early decisions by the Supreme Court strongly enforced the public-
private distinction in the regulation of utilities. Perhaps the most fa-
mous articulation of this principle is found in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
ily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
Id. at 76 (HolmesJ., dissenting). Thus, underJustice Holmes's view, legislation or regula-
tion which infringes upon fundamental principles should be struck down. Application of
this view can indeed be seen today and specifically in the public-utility context. For exam-
ple, in Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986), the
Supreme Court invalidated a regulation requiring a company to include in its bills hostile
messages from an activist organization that opposed the company in proceedings before
the state utility commission. The concurrence byJustice Marshall makes it clear that one of
the major reasons the Court struck down the regulation was that the company's fundamen-
tal right of access to and use of its own property, i.e., its billing envelope, was substantially
infringed upon by the state without adequate justification. Id. at 914 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
51. C. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 771 (1964).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 129 (Everyman's Library ed. 1924).
55. Id. at 137-40.
56. It is interesting that Locke appreciated the usefulness of feedstocks and the value
they have for all of society, id. at 137-38. Perhaps the most valuable feedstock today is
electricity.
57. Id. at 187.
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Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,5 8 where Justice McReynolds
declared:
It must never be forgotten that while the State may regu-
late with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is
not the owner of the property of public utility companies, and
is not clothed with the general power of management incident
to ownership. The applicable general rule is well expressed in
State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas
and Electric Company, 291 Ill. 209, 234.
'The commission is not the financial manager of the corpo-
ration, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items
charged by the utility as operating expenses unless there is an
abuse of discretion in that regard by the corporate officers.' 59
Thus, the court distinguished the regulatory function of the states from
the ownership rights of the public utility companies. This same princi-
ple was stated with equal strength in discussing the property rights of
railroads. 60 Management is responsible for making business decisions
and regulators are responsible for insuring, that in making these deci-
sions, management does not unreasonably harm the public.6 ' More re-
cent Supreme Court decisions in the area of labor show that the Court is
still respectful of the rights of businesses to manage their own affairs. 6 2
The importance of recognizing utility companies' right to manage
cannot be understated. As evidenced by Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,63 state regulators can infringe on utilities' fundamen-
58. 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
59. Id. at 289.
60. In Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108
(1908), the Supreme Court made the following statement:
It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of their own-
ers; that while, from the public character of the work in which they are engaged,
the public has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful and efficient ser-
vice and equality between shippers and communities, yet, in no proper sense, is
the public a general manager. As said in Int. Com. Com. v. Ala. Mid. R. R. Co., 168
U.S. 144, 172, quoting from the opinion of Circuit Judge Jackson, later Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson of this Court, in Int. Com. Com. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 37,
50:
'Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust
or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate so as to give undue
preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act
to regulate commerce leaves common carriers, as they were at the common law,
free to make special rates looking to the increase of their business, to classify their
traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of com-
merce and of their own situation and relation to it, and generally to manage their
important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and
adopted in other trades and pursuits.'
Id. at 119. See also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. State R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n,
238 U.S. 340 (1915).
61. See Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. at 119.
62. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 573 n.22 (1978) (An employer may
prevent distribution of literature on his property which threatens business functions.);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976) (Employees had no first amendment right
to strike against employer located in privately-owned shopping center.); Central Hardware
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-45 (1972) (non-employee, no-solicitation rule upheld).
63. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
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tal rights64 only by asserting a substantially relevant correlation between
the compelling interest sought to be protected and the means chosen to
achieve that compelling interest.6 5 The state must make a compelling
case for taking decisionmaking away from the utilities. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., Justice Powell, expressing the view of a plurality of the
Court,6 6 held "that the Commission's order impermissibly burden[ed
the utility's] First Amendment rights because it force[d] appellant to as-
sociate with the views of other speakers, and because it select[ed] the
other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints."
67
It is important to note that one argument used by the state to justify
its regulation in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 68 was that the company had no
property interest in its own billing envelopes and thus no constitution-
ally protected right to restrict access to them.6 9 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that "[w]here, as in this case, the danger
is one that arises from a content-based grant of access to private prop-
erty, it is a danger that the government may not impose absent a com-
pelling interest."' 70 The Court found that the state's argument, that the
utility had no property right in its billing envelopes, "misperceives ...
the relevant property rights." 7 1 Chief Justice Burger noted in his con-
currence that the state could not force the company to carry the
messages of others in its "property used in the conduct of its busi-
ness." 72 Chief Justice Marshall was the most forceful of all in his view
that the state could not "redefine its common-law property rights" by
preventing the company from "deny[ing] access to its property - its
billing envelope." 7 3 In his concurring opinion, Marshall specifically rec-
ognized that as long as utility company property remains in private
hands, the state's ability to control that property is limited.
The State seizes upon appellant's status as a regulated mo-
nopoly in order to argue that the inclusion of postage and
other billing costs in the utility's rate base demonstrates that
these items 'belong' to the public, which has paid for them.
However, a consumer who purchases food in a grocery store is
'paying' for the store's rent, heat, electricity, wages, etc., but no
one would seriously argue that the consumer thereby acquires
a property interest in the store. That the utility passes on its over-
64. In Pacific Gas & Ekc. Co., both first amendment and property rights were
threatened by the state's regulation. Id.
65. 106 S. Ct. at 413.
66. Justice Powell was joined by Justice BrennanJustice O'Connor, and ChiefJustice
Burger, who wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Marshall concurred in the judg-
ment. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White and Justice Stevens joined as to Part I,
dissented. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
67. Pacific Gas &Eec. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 914.
68. The regulation at issue in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. required the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company to include the literature of a hostile activist organization, Toward Utility
Rate Normalization (TURN), in its billing envelopes.
69. Id. at 907.
70. Id. at 912.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 914 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id. at 915 (Marshall, J., concurring).
[Vol. 64:1
RIGHT TO MANAGE
head costs to ratepayers at a rate fixed by law rather than the market
cannot affect the utility's ownership of its property, nor its right to use
that property for expressive purposes. The State could have concluded
that the public interest would be best served by state ownership of utilities.
Having chosen to keep utilities in private hands, however, the State may
not arbitrarily appropriate property for the use of third parties by stating
that the public has 'paid'for the property by paying utility bills.
74
There is no doubt that utilities are highly regulated. But, as Justice Mar-
shall's comments make clear, utility company property is still private,
and the state must respect that fact.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the institution of private property is the right to
manage it, for it would do no good for a state to allow nominal owner-
ship of property while at the same time assuming control over it. A state
may decide to run the utility business itself, but it must pay the existing
owners just compensation for the taking. 75 In other words, if the state
chooses to become the general manager of utility property, it must first
become the owner. If the state wishes to do less than that, then it has to
justify any intrustion on utility management by explaining why the intru-
sion is necessary to protect the public. If it cannot do so, then the state
has no right to deprive utility companies of the right to manage their
property.7 6 These principles are the essence of due process of law.
7 7
The present utility regulatory system has many benefits. Like our
federal government, which functions as well as it does as a result of the
tension between the three branches of government, utility regulation
creates a healthy tension between regulated companies and the regula-
tory commissions. Utility companies, in order to maintain a favorable
political climate and avoid punitive regulation, are more responsive to
their customers' needs than they would be if they were government
owned. The separation of the roles of management and regulatory
oversight leads to a dynamic environment within which utility companies
are more innovative and responsive to their customers' needs. 78
Some utility managers today reportedly are welcoming greater con-
74. Id. at 915 n.l (Marshall, J. concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
75. See supra notes 47-49.
76. In a broader context, one commentator has criticized regulatory agencies for what
he describes as "regulatory activism." W. Pond, Restraining Regulatory Activism: The Proper
Scope of Public Utility Regulation, 35 AD. L. REV. 423 (1983).
77. The new justice on the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, made the following obser-
vation concerning the fundamental nature of property rights:
Surely the freedom to dispose of one's property as one pleases, for example,
is not as high an aspiration as the freedom to think or write or worship as one's
conscience dictates. On closer analysis, however, it seems to me that the differ-
ence between economic freedoms and what are generally called civil rights turns
out to be a difference of degree rather than of kind. Few of us, I suspect, would
have much difficulty choosing between the right to own property and the right to
receive a Miranda warning ....
The Nat. L.J.,June 30, 1986 at 20, col. 3.
78. From conversations with H. Peter Metzger, Manager of Public Affairs Planning,
Public Service Company of Colorado, Summer, 1986.
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trol by the regulatory commissions. Such acquiescence, however, would
indeed be a Faustain bargain that would eventually lead to a stagnant
environment wherein utility customers everywhere will end up paying
much more for much less. The institution of investor-owned utilities is
worth preserving. For those people who wish to do away with it, the
burden is on them to justify why we should eliminate it. In any event,
whatever we decide, we should do so after an honest and thoughtful
debate. We should not let the basic structure separating public and pri-
vate power silently erode without recognizing what is really happening.
OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS AND HONOR: THE
APPLICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS STRICTURES TO
HONOR CODE PROCEEDINGS AT PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
H.L. SILETS*
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society, but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is, not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion by education.
-Thomas Jefferson'
I. INTRODUCTION
Honor codes at institutions of higher learning long have been a
source of controversy. Disputes over honor codes generally involve
their supposed ineffectiveness or their lack of requisite procedural due
process as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 2 While these disputes are not new, a recent ele-
ment that has changed the tenor of debate over honor codes has been
the increased willingness of the judicial system to review honor code
proceedings and judgments.
Not until recently have the courts been willing to enter a domain
that was once the peculiar province of academicians and administrators.
Final "appellate" review of cases involving alleged honor code viola-
tions historically rested with college or university presidents. These "fi-
nal arbitors" of honor code proceedings were probably just as capable
of making biased and perfunctory decisions as they were of impartial
and fair judgments. Woodrow Wilson, for example, as president of
Princeton University, was forced to render a decision in such a case early
in this century.3 A student was expelled for violating Princeton's honor
* A.B., magna cur laude, Princeton University, 1984. J.D. candidate, Northwestern
University School of Law, 1987. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice of Profes-
sor Victor G. Rosenblum of the Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William CharlesJarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted
in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278 (1903)(emphasis added).
2. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its juridiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J.
19 85 )(quoting G. SMITH, WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED - THE LAST YEARS OF WOODROW
WILSON 28 (1964)).
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code by cheating on an exam:
[H]is mother came to plead for his reinstatement with the man
who passed upon the expulsion. She said she was undergoing
serious medical treatments and that the shock of having her
boy expelled might well bring those treatments to naught. The
answer was, 'Madam, you force me to say a hard thing, but if I
had to choose between your life or my life or anybody's life and
the good of this college, I should choose the good of the col-
lege.' But he could eat nothing at luncheon that day.
4
More recently, Princeton's honor code was reviewed and upheld by
the United States District Court of New Jersey as being fundamentally
fair, and thus, implicitly constitutional. 5 The court noted, however, that
this decision would by no means "put to rest the heated debate engen-
dered by this and other incidents where long established honor systems
have been attacked." ' 6 The court went on to say that "[p]ublic opinion
on the subject naturally runs the entire gamut from the cynical to the
reverential."
'7
Indeed, honor codes have been simultaneously attacked and
praised. For example, Millard H. Rudd, the Executive Director of the
Association of American Law Schools, recently characterized honor
codes as "a realistic preparation for the real world." 8 He also stated that
educators "have a responsibility to seek to bring out the best of people
and not to encourage the worst or to assume the worst." 9 Others, such
as author and former West Point instructor Joseph J. Ellis, have criti-
cized honor code systems, noting that "[w]e don't live in a world in
which there exists a single definition of honor any more, and it's a fool
that hangs on to the traditional standards and hopes that the world will
come around to him."' 0 Thus, the general debate over honor codes
remains heated and energetic and is not likely to subside soon.
In recent years, honor codes have become a major focus of atten-
tion both within and without the academic community I due to the in-
creasing number of suits brought by students against institutions of
higher learning 12 charging particular honor code systems with funda-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 413.
6. Id. at 415.
7. id.
8. Does the Honor System Encourage Cheating?, 8 PA. L.J. REP. 18 (1985)(emphasis in
original).
9. Id.
10. See Cheating Prompts Air Force to Halt Cadet Honor Boards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984,
at I, col. 3; see also Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J.
1985).
11. See, e.g., Princeton Is Upheld in Case Challenging Its Honor Code, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1985, at 11, col. 3; Princeton's Honor Code Challenged by Student, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at
B4, col. 1; Cheating Prompts Air Force to Halt Cadet Honor Boards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984,
at 1, col. 3; Plagiarism in the Ivy, N.J.L.J., July 1, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
12. See Thigpen, The Application of Fourteenth Amendment Norms to Private Colleges and Uni-
versities, II J. LAw & EDuc. 171, 207 (1982), wherein it is stated that "there has been a




mental unfairness13 and with violations of students' fourteenth amend-
ment rights to due process. 14 Some educators have viewed with alarm
this "specter ... of a rash of court cases challenging decisions in areas
that were once considered the educational world's peculiar province."15
Others believe that "student utilization of the peaceful processes of the
courts is in many instances to be encouraged rather than criticized."'
16
This article will argue that judicial review of honor code proceed-
ings provides a needed check on institutional actions that otherwise
might become summary, perfunctory and insufficient. This article also
will argue that judicial review is especially appropriate with regard to
honor code proceedings at private colleges and universities which, un-
like state institutions, usually are not thought to be subject to the scru-
tiny of the courts. While it may be argued that the wisdom and
experience of administrators and academicians may provide a primary
safeguard against summary dismissals and punishments, "experience
has taught ... the necessity of auxiliary precautions."' 7 In the world of
academia, therefore, one important "auxiliary precaution" can and
should be judicial enforcement of due process in honor code proceed-
ings that involve disciplinary offenses.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
In order to determine whether honor codes deprive students who
attend non-public institutions of higher education of the due process
protections of the fourteenth amendment, 18 the first stage of inquiry
should focus on whether the fourteenth amendment is applicable to the
regulations and proceedings of private colleges and universities.' 9 Pub-
lic colleges and universities, which are considered instruments of state
government, 20 are not beyond the reach of the due process requirement
13. See, e.g., Clayton, 608 F. Supp. 413; Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F.
Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981); Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302,
427 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983);Jaksa v. Regents of
Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986);
Harvey v. Palmer College of Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Univer-
sity of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
15. Perkins, The University and Due Process, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Vol. II, No. 8, 5
(Dec. 21, 1967).
16. Byse, The University and Due Process. A Somewhat Different View, 54 AM. Ass'N UNIV.
PROFESSORS BULL. 143, 147 (1968).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (A. Hamilton, J. Madison) (Nat'l Home Library
Found. ed. 1938).
18. See supra note 2.
19. See, e.g, Thigpen, supra note 12; Wilkinson and Rolapp, The Private College and Stu-
dent Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970); Comment, An Overview: The Private University and Due
Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795; Comment, A Student's Right to Hearing on Dismissalfrom a Univer-
sity, 10 STAN. L. REV. 746 (1958) [hereinafter Comment, A Student's Right]; Comment, Com-
mon Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120
(1974).
20. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (wherein the Court noted that
"[bly and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities."); see also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.)
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of the fourteenth amendment.2 1 In dealing with private universities, on
the other hand, courts have been more reluctant to extend due process
guarantees to students because of a perceived lack of state action. 22 In
fact, students at private universities not only have been treated differ-
ently from students at public universities, but, in at least one case, stu-
dents attending the same university were not granted equal protection
by the courts merely because some students were enrolled in the "pri-
vate" college of the same university, even though the two colleges were
located on the same campus and administered by the same personnel.
23
Students and legal scholars have criticized the courts' posture of
denying judicial protection to private university students in the honor
code context. 2 4 Others, however, believe that courts have extended the
state action doctrine too far, and that the fourteenth amendment should
be used only in cases involving direct governmental action.2 5 The in-
creasing commentary and awareness of the due process rights of stu-
dents at private colleges and universities has led to the development of
several theories which courts have used to apply the fourteenth amend-
ment to non-public institutions of higher education. In order to assess
fully the constitutional obligations of private colleges and universities, it
is necessary to examine these theories.
(state university), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
356 (S.D.N.Y.) (public high school), rev'don other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). In Madera, and in Dixon, the courts established that public
secondary schools and state universities come under the state action doctrine as instru-
mentalities of state government. Madera, 267 F. Supp. at 369; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156-57.
See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 543, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (1980) (citations omitted),
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982), wherein the Supreme Court of NewJersey stated that
"[a] public college or university, created or controlled by the state itself, is an arm of state
government and, thus, by definition, implicates state action."
21. The Supreme Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969), that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate." See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972). Although Tinker concentrated on the first amendment rights of students,
other courts have construed due process as equally applicable to all constitutional protec-
tions. See, e.g., Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir.)(equal protec-
tion found applicable), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1973). It also has been held that students
do not forfeit their constitutional rights by attending a state university. Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
22. See Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 995 (1976); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(per
curiam); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974);
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ.,
443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962); Swanson v. Wesley College, 402 A.2d 401 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); see also Note, Due
Process and the University Student: The Academic/Disciplinary Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. REV. 939, 940
(1977), wherein it was stated that "courts have been more reluctant to extend due process
guarantees to private university students than to public university students."
23. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. See, e.g., Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MiCH. L. REV. 393 (1971);
Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEN. L.J. 582, 612-13 (1968); Comment,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE LJ.
120, 122 (1974).
25. See G. GUNTHER, CONsTrrTUnONAL LAw, 972-1030 (1980); Note, State Action: Theo-
ries for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity. 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
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A. The State Action Requirement and the State Action Tests
In the landmark case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,2 6 the
United States Supreme Court stated that significant state involvement in
the affairs of private organizations would subject those organizations to
constitutional restrictions such as due process. Specifically, the Court
held that state action exists when
[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interde-
pendence with [the acting party] that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that ac-
count, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 7
While the Court in Burton did not explain how much state participa-
tion was necessary for state action to exist,2 8 it stated in a subsequent
decision, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,29 that Burton stood for the
proposition that any private organization was subject to fourteenth
amendment limitations whenever there was a "symbiotic relationship"
between the acting party and the state.
30
In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that state action also may exist
when the state becomes sufficiently involved in the challenged activity. 3 '
The Court suggested that in considering the state action issue, the ques-
tion is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the ... entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'3 2 The Court, therefore, rea-
soned that the plaintiff must show government involvement in the spe-
cific act at issue such that the government has effectively granted its
approval or put its weight behind the action.3 3 Yet, the government's
mere acquiescence or approval of the private action will not convert the
26. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
27. Id. at 725.
28. In Burton, plaintiffs alleged that the Wilmington Parking Authority, a state entity,
was responsible for the racially discriminatory practices of a privately owned coffee shop
located in a building owned by the Authority. Although the Delaware Supreme Court
found the discrimination to be purely private in character, the United States Supreme
Court held that the state was significantly involved in the infringement of rights protected
by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 724.
29. 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 350-56. Jackson concerned a privately owned and operated electric power
company. The plaintiff alleged a violation of due process when the utility terminated her
service without notice, hearing, or any opportunity to pay the past due amounts. The
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not sufficiently involved
in the challenged activity to convert it into state action, despite the government's delega-
tion of monopoly power to the electric company. The company, therefore, was under no
constitutional duty to observe procedural due process when terminating a customer's
service.
32. 419 U.S. at 351.
33. Id. at 357; see also Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 597
(2d Cir. 1979) (without the intimate involvement by the state in the private act, there is
insufficient nexus between state and private activity to warrant a finding of state action),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
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act into that of the government.3 4
Indeed, the government can be held responsible for a private act
only when it has compelled the act by law,3 5 or when it has "exercised
coercive power or ... provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
[government]." 3 6 In Blum v. Yaretsky,3 7 for example, the Court specifi-
cally rejected the contention that state licensing and funding converts
private action into state action:
As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises pro-
viding services that the State would not necessarily provide...
do not fall within the ambit of [the state action requirement].
That programs undertaken by the State result in substantial
funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persua-
sive than the fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrat-
ing that the State is responsible for decisions made by the
entity in the course of its business.
3 8
In addition to the previously enunciated "symbiotic relationship"
and "close nexus" tests, the Supreme Court discussed the "public func-
tion" test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 9 and again in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn.40 Under the"public function" test, government action may be
present where the function performed by a private entity is "tradition-
ally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' 4 1 The private performance
of a function that serves the public or which is "affected with a public
interest" does not suffice as a "public function" under this test. 42 The
logic of Rendell-Baker and Blum is that state contributions to otherwise
private entities, no matter how great those contributions may be, will
not of themselves transform a private actor into a state actor. Rather,
the activity must be one which is traditionally associated with
sovereignty.
43
In summary, state action may be found to exist where: (1) a private
34. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357;
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
35. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170
(1970). The Adickes Court noted that "[w]hen the State has commanded a particular result,
it has saved to itself the power to determine that result and thereby to a 'significant extent'
has 'become involved' in it." Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248
(1963)).
36. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
37. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
38. Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
39. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
40. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
41. Id. at 842 (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
42. Id. at 841;Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353-54.
43. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. The "public function" test has been applied basically in
three different situations: first, when the government, after performing a particular func-
tion, attempts to avoid its constitutional obligations by transferring the function to a pri-
vate entity, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); second, in cases involving the
exercise of powers, such as the supervision of elections that are almost always carried out
by government, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); and third, in the first amendment
context, to determine if private property is the functional equivalent of a municipality, see
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
[Vol. 64:1
HONOR CODE
entity possesses a "symbiotic relationship" with the state; (2) there ex-
ists a "close nexus" between the state and the challenged conduct; or
(3) the private actor is performing a "public function" that traditionally
has been exercised exclusively by the government. With respect to the
state action doctrine, the Supreme Court also noted in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority44 that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance." '4 5 In Burton, the Court concluded
that the racially discriminatory policies of a restaurant that leased space
in a public parking facility constituted state action after first examining
such factors as public ownership of the land and building, and public
maintenance of the building. 46 By sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances, the Court therefore determined that "[a]ddition of all these ac-
tivities, obligations and responsibilities . . . [and] the benefits mutually
conferred . . . indicates that degree of state participation and involve-
ment in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth
Amendment to condemn."
'4 7
It follows, then, that in reviewing a claim by private university stu-
dents for procedural due process protection in honor code proceedings,
a court must invoke one of the three aforementioned theories of state
action. In applying the fourteenth amendment to private colleges and
universities, Judge J. Skelly Wright has observed:
At the outset one may question whether any school or college
can ever be so 'private' as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... No one any longer doubts that education is a
matter affected with the greatest public interest. And this is
true whether it is offered by a public or private institution.
Clearly the administrators of a private college are performing a
public function. They do the work of the state, often in the
place of the state .... And, if so, are they not then agents of the
state, subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental
action ? ...48
Judge Wright's legal argument proposed that the performance of
44. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
45. Id. at 722.
46. See supra note 28.
47. 365 U.S. at 724.
48. Guillory v. Admininistrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La.),
rev'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962)(citations omitted)(footnote omitted). In Guillory, suit
was brought to compel Tulane University to admit qualified black applicants. Petitioner
claimed that because the educational function performed by the university was govern-
mental in nature, the school was thereby subject to the due process strictures of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, based upon the "public function" theory and various factors
that established an ongoing and substantial relationship between Tulane and the state of
Louisiana, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text, Judge Wright ruled that Tulane
could not continue to practice racial segregation because the exclusion of blacks contra-
vened the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Judge Wright's decision
was later overturned, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962), and on a subsequent hearing was held
to be immune from fourteenth amendment restrictions, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
See Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in Private Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 39, 50 (1967);
Thigpen, supra note 12 at 184-85.
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the educational process is, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute state
action due to its nature as a public function. Yet, it should be empha-
sized that Judge Wright's opinion in Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
University4 9 did not rest solely on a "public function" theory. Indeed,
the record in Guillory revealed a variety of factors that established an
ongoing and substantial relationship between Tulane University and the
State of Louisiana.
5 0
Under this "public function" analysis, then, it follows that as college
educations become more necessary and as private school dependence
upon government financial support increases, courts will find it corre-
spondingly more difficult to refuse to measure the private university's
actions by fourteenth amendment standards. 5 1 Used as the sole basis
for finding state action in cases involving non-public institutions of
higher learning, the "public function" theory almost uniformly has been
rejected by the courts. 52 Nevertheless, many of the courts that have re-
jected the "public function" theory have not described explicitly
whether they rejected the argument because in their opinion education
is not a public function, or rather, because although education is a pub-
lic function, it still is not sufficient for state action to exist. Regardless of
how the courts may interpret the "public function" theory, there re-
49. 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 1984)(pri-
vate universities' interdependence with state interpreted as a "symbiotic relationship"),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2018 (1985); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 958-
59 (3d Cir. 1977)(state action found where state deeply enmeshed in operations of private
university); see also Harvey v. Palmer College of Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa App.
1984) (common law imposes due process requirements that parallel the fourteenth amend-
ment). But see Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 559-60 (D.C. Cir.)(lack
of government role in university management precluded state action), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
995 (1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(no
state action found where statute authorizing funds prohibited state control over univer-
sity); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973)(outright grant of
fraction of cost of education does not make school an agent of the state); Jansen v. Emory
Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977)(constitutional due process not guaranteed by
private school bulletin dismissal procedures guaranteeing "due process"), aff'd, 579 F.2d
45 (5th Cir. 1978); Swanson v. Wesley College, Inc., 402 A.2d 401, 403 (Del. Super. Ct.
1979)(performance of a public function by private university not state action without sig-
nificant involvement in decision-making process).
52. Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977); Berrios v. Inter
American Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 942 (1976);
Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 995 (1976); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple
Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp.
494,499 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 606 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 439 F.2d 773
(4th Cir. 1971); see Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962). But see Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1984)("Provid-
ing facilities and opportunities for the pursuit of higher education is a long-recognized govern-
mental function")(emphasis added), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 796 (1985); Buckton v.
N.C.A.A., 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Mass. 1973)(Boston University, "though a private
institution, clearly performs functions governmental in nature, such as providing higher
education to and exercising substantial dominion over its students"); Belk v. Chancellor of
Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1970)("Education is a public function").
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mains little judicial authority for the proposition that education in pri-
vate institutions, particularly at the college and university level, is a
governmental function.5 3 Thus, while some courts have been willing to
find state action for purposes of applying the due process clause to pri-
vate colleges and universities; 54 traditionally, the rights accorded stu-
dents have been analyzed in terms of contractual relationships. 5 5
B. The Contract Theory of the Student-Private University Relationship
The contract theory for assessing the student-university relation-
ship presumes that by applying to a private university and paying tuition
upon admission, the student agrees to abide by university regulations,
normally specified in the university's catalogue or bulletin. 56 The stu-
dent's knowledge of and agreement to conform to the university's regu-
lations is generally implied. 5 7 Thus, under this type of analysis, the
student's rights are determined by the express and implied provisions of
the student-university contract.
58
Despite the facility of viewing the relationship of a private college or
university to its students in contractual terms, the courts have warned
against a rigid application of the law of contracts. For example, in
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University,59 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit stated that:
It is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used
and should be used in the analysis of the relationship between
plaintiff and the University .... This does not mean that 'con-
53. Perhaps the courts eventually will accept the view that in a democracy, education
is an essential undertaking for which government has a direct responsibility. As Thomas
Jefferson so eloquently noted almost two centuries ago:
Education is . . . placed among the articles of public care, not that it would be
proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private enterprise,
which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal; but a public
institution can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely called for, are yet
necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which contribute to the improve-
ment of the country, and some of them to its preservation.
T. JEFFERSON, selected writings, in THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (J.
Dewey, ed. 1940)(emphasis added). Thus, while higher education has not been viewed by
many courts as a public function, some courts have found private colleges and universities
subject to the constitutional restraints of the fourteenth amendment based on all forms of
state action.
54. See Comment, A Student's Right, supra note 19. For cases involving expulsions from
private organizations, see Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 113, 459 A.2d 680 (1983); Higgins v.
American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
55. See Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F. Supp. 802, 806 (D.N.J. 1981);
Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 658, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1305, 427 N.Y.S.2d
760, 763 (1980).
56. See, e.g.,John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924)(relation-
ship between student and private institution is purely contractual); Samson v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)(discussing implied terms of
contract between private university and student), af'd, 181 A.D. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125
(1917); see also Nordin, The Contract to Educate. Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-
University Relationship, 8J. C. & U.L. 14 (1981-82).
57. Comment, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5
WILLIAMETrE L.J. 277, 278 (1969).
58. See Comment, A Student's Right, supra note 19, at 746.
59. 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975).
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tract law' must be rigidly applied in all its aspects, nor is it so
applied even when the contract analogy is extensively
adopted.... The student-university relationship is unique, and
it should not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal
category.
60
In applying traditional contract principles to the relationship be-
tween a private college or university and its students, one court has held
that the relevant terms of the college-student contract found in a school
enrollment agreement did not apply to an expelled student because the
contract was silent as to any refund in the event of a student's dismissal.
In King v. American Academy of Dramatic Arts,6 1 the court held that a stu-
dent was not contractually bound by a provision of the Academy's en-
rollment agreement regarding the refundability of the student's tuition
because the contract merely outlined tuition refund procedures in the
event of a student's early voluntary withdrawal rather than a student's
involuntary dismissal. The court reasoned that
to the extent that the enrollment agreement would allow the
Academy to dismiss a student with legal justification and also
retain his payments ... such agreement [is] unconscionable in
the substantive sense in light of the agreement's one sidedness,
the absolute discretion it purports to give the Academy, and the
fact that a hearing was not necessary prior to dismissal.
6 2
The court's refusal to apply to a student that was expelled a school
enrollment agreement that did not mention tuition refunds in the event
of student dismissals has alerted administrators of the necessity of ex-
plicitly stating information that the school considers vital in documents
that encompass the definition of the university's contractual
obligation.
6 3
By analogy, a court, willing to demand that a private university or
college provide each student with reasonable notice regarding the re-
60. Id. at 626 (emphasis in original).
61. 102 Misc. 2d 1111, 425 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
62. Id. at 1113, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 507. See also Abrams v. Illinois Podiatric Medicine, 77
Ill. App. 3d 471, 395 N.E.2d 1061 (1979)(a statement in a private college bulletin stating
the desirability of informing a student of his progress does not create a binding obliga-
tion); Drucker v. New York Univ., 57 Misc 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Civ. 1968)(a
student was not contractually bound by a provision in a university bulletin regarding the
refundability of a registration fee because a student reasonably could not have been ex-
pected to read carefully terms buried within school application, catalogues or registration
forms), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y. App. Term 1969).
63. A number of courts have found that a single document such as a university cata-
logue or bulletin does not contain the entire definition of the university's contractual obli-
gation and have listed other sources that help define that duty. For example, in Ross v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 150 (M.D. Pa. 1978), the federal district court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania referred to the University bulletin, the "Procedures
for Graduate Students & Faculty Resolution of Graduate Student Problems," the Manual
for Graduate Students, The Constitution and By-Laws and Standing Rules of the Faculty
Senate, and "Policies and Rules for Students, 1975-1976." In Olsson v. Board of Higher
Educ., 66 A.D.2d 196, 412 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1979), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 408, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248,
402 N.E.2d 1150 (1980), the court found that a professor's statements regarding examina-
tion criteria created contractual terms. Moreover, the court in Pride v. Howard Univ., 384
A.2d 31 (D.C. 1978), found the customary disciplinary practices in force at the time of a
student's admission to be incorporated into the student-university contract.
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turn of tuition fees, should be even more insistent that the university
furnish each student the same type of reasonable notice of the standards
of conduct and academic performance that are to control his educational
career.
In summary, based upon the state action and contract theories of
the student-university relationship, courts should accord to private col-
lege and university students substantially the same procedural safe-
guards that the fourteenth amendment requires public universities to
afford their students. Reasonable notice of specific rules and fair proce-
dures, especially with regard to honor codes, will inform students pre-
cisely of their obligations and perhaps will convince them of the validity
and desirability of enforcement by a systematized and ordered
procedure.
III. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Assuming a court finds that the due process protections of the four-
teenth amendment apply to the honor code regulations and proceedings
of a private college or university, the next step is to determine whether
the particular student infraction at issue is academic or disciplinary in
nature. This determination is critical because of two United States
Supreme Court decisions that established a dichotomy between the due
process required in cases involving disciplinary dismissals and the due
process required in cases involving academic dismissals.
In Goss v. Lopez,6 4 the Court established due process guarantees ap-
plicable to students who are facing temporary disciplinary dismissal
from a public school. After finding that a temporary suspension from
high school implicates a protected interest, and recognizing that the dis-
ciplinary process is not a totally accurate, unerring process,6 5 the Court
held that a student facing temporary, disciplinary suspension "must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." 66
Three years later, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz,6 7 the Supreme
Court held that there is no requirement of even an informal hearing
when an applicant is facing dismissal for academic cause. 68 In differenti-
64. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, the question before the Court concerned the rights
of students to some kind of procedural due process before being disciplined by a ten-day
suspension for misconduct at school.
65. Id. at 579-80. The Court noted that in disciplinary proceedings school authorities
must frequently depend on the reports and advice of others, and that the nature of the
conduct involved and the factual conclusions of the school authorities are often subject to
dispute. Id. Thus, disciplinary suspensions sufficiently resemble traditional judicial and
administrative factfinding so as to require a hearing before school authorities.
66. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). A student facing temporary disciplinary suspen-
sion is entitled to "[o]ral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his side of the story." Id. at 581.
67. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
68. Id. at 90. In Horowitz, the Court was faced with a situation where a medical student
in her final year was dismissed from the school because of an unsatisfactory academic per-
formance. Without deciding the issue of the existence of a liberty or property interest, the
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ating between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and
the alleged violation by a student of valid rules of conduct, the majority
concluded that:
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary
determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and ad-
ministrative factfinding proceedings to which we have tradition-
ally attached a full-hearing requirement .... Like the decision
of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student
in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student
for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumula-
tive information and is not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.
69
The Horowitz Court distinguished Goss, which involved a disciplinary
proceeding, by finding that when disputable conduct was implicated, a
hearing would "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous ac-
tion." 70 Such a hearing, however, would not accomplish the same ob-
jective in an academic dismissal. 7 1 The Court stated that academic
judgments are more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual
questions presented in average disciplinary proceedings, 72 thus justify-
ing the differing degrees of procedural due process warranted in aca-
demic versus disciplinary suspensions.
Justice Marshall, in his separate opinion, criticized the majority's
finding in Horowitz that an academic dismissal warrants a lesser due pro-
cess standard than that required in Goss.73 Justice Marshall determined
that the dismissal, though characterized as "academic" by the majority,
was in fact conduct-related, as was the infraction in Goss,74 and con-
cluded that in cases concerning dismissal, a "reliance on labels should
not be a substitute for sensitive consideration of the procedures re-
quired by due process."
75
The Supreme Court recently reinforced its position of deference to
college or university administrators when academic dismissals are at is-
sue. In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,7 6 Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "[w]hen judges are asked to
review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one,
they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judg-
Court found that the student had been awarded at least as much due process as the four-
teenth amendment required since she had been fully informed of the faculty's dissatisfac-
tion with her clinical progress and since the ultimate decision to dismiss the student was
careful and deliberate.
69. Id. at 89-90.
70. Id. at 89 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975)).
71. Id. at 89-90.
72. Id. at 90.
73. Id. at 98-103 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 99. Justice Marshall stated that the reasons given for the student's dismissal
in Horowitz - personal hygiene and peer and patient relationships - were not at all aca-
demic. Id. at 104 n.17.
75. Id at 106.
76. 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985); see also High Court Upholds Dismissal of Medical Student, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at 15, col. 4.
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ment. ' ' 77 Justice Stevens stated that the courts were ill-equipped to
"evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are
made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions - deci-
sions that require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and
[are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or adminis-
trative decisionmaking.' "78
In Ewing, however, the Court left open the possibility that a student
who could prove that he was arbitrarily dismissed from a state univer-
sity, albeit for academic reasons, might prevail in a suit seeking redress
for a violation of his constitutional rights. The Court said that such a
suit would succeed only if the dismissal was "such a substantial depar-
ture from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty
did not exercise professional judgment." 7 9 Justice Powell, in a concur-
ring opinion, restated Justice Marshall's admonition of the Horowitz ma-
jority that judicial review of academic decisions "is rarely appropriate,
particularly where orderly administrative procedures are followed." 80
The kind of due process that will be required and the willingness of
the courts to afford judicial review, therefore, depends upon whether
the student infraction at issue is categorized as either academic or disci-
plinary. A student's violation of a school's honor code poses a special
problem since honor code violations often involve allegations of cheat-
ing.8 ' Cheating is an offense that the courts have not characterized
neatly as either "academic" or "disciplinary."
While the courts for the most part have not reached the issue of
whether to classify cheating offenses as academic or disciplinary in na-
ture, in Jaksa v. Regents of the University of Michigan,8 2 the United States
District Court for the District of Michigan determined that cheating
should be treated as a disciplinary matter.8 3 TheJaksa court held that
dismissals for cheating were similar to disciplinary dismissals in that
both categories primarily involved the resolution of factual disputes as
opposed to academic dismissals which generally concern "a judgment
[that] is by its nature more subjective and evaluative."18 4 The court rea-
soned that dismissal for cheating "requires greater procedural protec-
tion than academic dismissals since the former are more stigmatizing
than the latter, and may have a greater impact on a student's future."8 5
While this point is arguable, student dismissals for cheating, if classified
77. 106 S. Ct. at 513; see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 106 S. Ct. at 514 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm., 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983); Clayton v. Trust-
ees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1985); Bleicker v. Board of Trustees, 485
F. Supp. 1381 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
82. 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aft'd, 787 F.2d 590 (1986).
83. Id at 1248 n.2. But see Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir.
1984)(cheating on an exam considered "clearly an academic matter" by university).
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as academic, will not require even an informal hearing based upon the
Supreme Court's holding in Horowitz. Thus, if the courts wish to require
private colleges and universities to create honor codes that establish
specific rules and fair procedures, then honor code violations involving
cheating must be considered disciplinary rather than academic in order
to satisfy the mandates of Horowitz and Ewing.
The majority of cases concerning honor code proceedings at both
private and public colleges and universities implicitly recognize cheating
as a disciplinary offense, and thus, unlike an academic offense, one that
is subject to judicial scrutiny.8 6 While the courts generally have not dis-
cussed the reasons for designating cheating as a disciplinary infrac-
tion,8 7 the courts seem to look to the nature of the hearing and
punishment involved in order to determine the nature of the violation at
issue. For example, in Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton University,88 the
United States District Court of New Jersey stated that "Princeton justifi-
ably views cheating as a serious offense against the standards of its aca-
demic community which is worthy of serious punishment."8 9 The court
held that if a material breach of Princeton's disciplinary procedures
could be shown, then relief would be granted to Robert Clayton, the
Princeton student who brought action against the University for alleged
improprieties in the disciplinary proceedings that led to his suspension.
The Clayton court concluded that because "the value of [a Princeton Uni-
versity] degree is impaired by the presence of a notation of disciplinary
suspension on the academic transcript", 90 the student's interest was sub-
stantial enough to warrant judicial review of Princeton's honor code
procedures.
In general, then, the courts seemingly do not inspect the inherent
nature of the infraction in question, but rather, prefer to examine the
underlying purposes of the college or university proceeding that is at
issue. If the purposes of the proceeding are to determine whether or
not a student violated an institution's honor code, and then to discipline
the student for this infraction, the courts will treat the violation as disci-
plinary in nature, and therefore, subject to judicial review.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS TO HONOR CODE
REGULATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
Once it is determined that the fourteenth amendment's due process
protections apply to private university honor code infractions, a court
86. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Hall v. Medical College of
Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 796 (1985); see also Jones v.
Board of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 704 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.)(specifies process due), aff'g,
557 F. Supp. 263 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948 (M.D. Ala.
1985)(discusses procedural due process requirements in disciplinary cases); Clayton v.
Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F. Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981)(discusses role of court in
disciplinary proceedings).
87. But seeJaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1248 n.2.
88. 519 F. Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981).
89. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
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then must decide how to adapt the fourteenth amendment's due process
strictures to the regulations and proceedings of a school's honor code.
As the Supreme Court stated in Morrissey v. Brewer,9 1 "[o]nce it is deter-
mined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due."'92 Over thirty years ago, Justice Frankfurter discussed the ideal of
due process in terms still applicable today:
93
'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and cir-
cumstances. . . . '[Djue process' cannot be imprisoned within
the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a
profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more
particularly between the individual and government, "due pro-
cess" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of deci-
sions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic
faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instru-
ment. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate pro-
cess of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.
94
As Justice Frankfurter clearly states, the due process required by the
Constitution is only that process which is "due" in light of the circum-
stances and interests of the parties involved. The fundamental require-
ments of procedural due process are merely "notice and an opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 95 The concept of
due process does not require that every dispute between a student and a
university be resolved in the same manner or follow the judicial
model. 96 Rather, due process allows for many different methods of dis-
pute resolution as long as the method used provides reasonable notice
and a fair hearing.
9 7
The Supreme Court has articulated three factors for consideration
in determining what process is due in a particular setting: 1) the "private
interest that will be affected by the official action;" 2) the risk of "errone-
ous deprivation" of that interest by procedures currently in force,
weighed against the value of "additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards;" and 3) the "Government's interest," including the function in-
volved and the financial and administrative constraints that additional or
91. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
92. Id. at 481.
93. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)(Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
94. Id. at 162-63; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
95. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), quoted in Goss,
419 U.S. at 579; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)(time and
nature of hearing depend on appropriate accommodation of competing interests); Mackey
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)(Stewart, J., dissenting)(dimension of prior hearing varies
with nature of case); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)(due process "must be tailored
to the capacities and circumstances" of the parties involved).
96. Goss, 419 U.S. at 578 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
97. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
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substitute procedures would create. 98 The Supreme Court also has rec-
ognized that the due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment may be satisfied by something less than a trial-like proceeding. 99
In Goss v. Lopez '0 0 for example, the Court held that in order to sus-
pend a high school student for ten days, he must be "given an opportu-
nity to explain his version of the facts . . . [after being] told what he is
accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is." 10 l The Court,
however, made it clear that its holding was limited to short suspensions,
and that "[lIonger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the
school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures."'
10 2
As to the formality of the requisite hearing, the Court declared that:
The presence of attorneys or the imposition of rigid rules of
cross-examination at a hearing for a student.., would serve no
useful purpose, notwithstanding that the dismissal in question
may be of permanent duration. But an 'informal give-and-take'
between the student and the administrative body dismissing
him - and foreclosing his opportunity to gain admission at all
comparable institutions - would not unduly burden the educa-
tional process and would, at least, give the student 'the oppor-
tunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems
the proper context.'
0 3
The recommendations as to what kind of notice and hearing is re-
quired under the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment
were more explicitly set forth in the famous case of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education.'0 4 In Dixon, students were expelled from Alabama
State College for disciplinary reasons. 10 5 After holding that due process
requires a state university to give its students notice and the opportunity
to be heard, 10 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
articulated standards for the nature of the requisite notice and hearing.
The court said that a notice should "contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion."' 1 7 In
discussing the hearing requirement, the court emphasized that the facts
and circumstances surrounding each case were to be considered in de-
termining the elements required in a hearing. When misconduct rather
than academic failure is the subject of the hearing, the court said that
"something more than an informal interview with an administrative au-
98. Id. at 334-35.
99. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-84 (1975); Henson v. Honor Comm., 719
F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983).
100. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id. at 584.
103. Id., quoted in Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975).
104. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
105. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 152 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied.,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). Plaintiffs, who were black, were expelled from Alabama State Col-
lege, because they requested service at a white lunch counter in violation of Alabama law,
and they participated in several mass demonstrations.




thority" is required, due to the possible bias of witnesses and the factual
nature of the injury.10 8 Although a "full-dress judicial hearing" is not
always required and may not be desirable, the court stated that a hearing
which allows the college authorities a chance to hear "both sides in con-
siderable detail" would protect the rights of the individuals concerned.
The Dixon court further stated that "the rudiments of an adversary pro-
ceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the
college."' 0 9
While courts, in applying due process protections to honor code
proceedings, will require adequate notice and a hearing prior to student
dismissal, they remain split on the issue of the right to representation in
student disciplinary proceedings."I 0 In Henson v. Honor Committee of the
University of Virginia," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted that the right to have a student lawyer represent an
accused student at all critical stages of the honor code proceedings was
among the "impressive array of procedural protections" that a univer-
sity could afford its students. 1 2 Although other cases have held to the
contrary, 13 to allow a student accused of cheating the benefit of counsel
in formal honor code proceedings would not only offer the student pro-
tection, but it would also protect the school from lawsuits contesting the
outcome of each case on the ground that the particular honor code hear-
ing in question was fundamentally unfair, and therefore, in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Jackson warned:
Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable es-
sence of liberty .... Let it not be overlooked that due process
of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best
insurance ... against those blunders which leave lasting stains
on a system ofjustice .... The most scrupulous observance of
due process include[s] the right to know a charge, to be con-
fronted with the accuser, to cross-examine informers and to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 158-59; see also Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th
Cir.) (due process satisfied where there "was an adequate hearing on the charge with a
meaningful opportunity given to plaintiff to participate, to present his position, and to
hear the witnesses presenting the facts they had knowledge of"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898
(1975); Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970)("[P]rocedural due process
must be afforded a student on the college campus 'by way of adequate notice, definite
charge, and a hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all
necessary protective measures.' " (quoting Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d
1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969))), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972)(due process clause re-
quires representation by counsel at suspension hearings); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967)(due process clause allows for representation
by counsel at a suspension hearing), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970). But see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967)(no right to
counsel at conference relating to the suspension of a student), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968); Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(due process does not require
the presence of an attorney at a formal hearing on disciplinary transfers).
111. 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 73.
113. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1028 (1968); Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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produce evidence in one's behalf. . . . 14
A student accused of violating a school's honor code should be al-
lowed to have a spokesman represent him in honor code proceedings.
While representation at honor code hearings protects both the student
and the university, it has not been held mandatory to satisfy due process
goals of fundamental fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and various lower courts have provided a vari-
ety of legal theories and precedents upon which the judiciary can find
private colleges and universities subject to the due process strictures of
the fourteenth amendment. In the past, the courts were loathe to enter
the domain of academia, preferring instead to defer to academicians and
school administrators in both academic and disciplinary cases. With the
expanding application of the fourteenth amendment to private enter-
prises and institutions, the courts began providing a necessary check on
the disciplinary proceedings of private colleges and universities. At the
insistence of the Supreme Court, however, the lower courts have contin-
ued to defer to the judgments of the schools in cases of academic
dismissals.
Given, then, the growing willingness of the courts to hold private
institutions accountable to the fourteenth amendment's due process re-
quirement and the courts' increased willingness to review the discipli-
nary proceedings and judgments of colleges and universities, it seems
logical that the honor code judgments and proceedings of private col-
leges and universities will fall within the purview of the courts. Stu-
dents, subject to the power of one of these institutions, ask no more
than fair treatment and a right to due process in honor code proceed-
ings for alleged disciplinary violations. The requisite amount of due
process should include adequate notice and an opportunity for a reason-
able hearing prior to a student's dismissal. Although it is not mandatory
for the proper execution of the due process ideal, it is preferable to ac-
cord students the right to representation in honor code proceedings. In
effect, then, the application of the due process standards of the four-
teenth amendment to the honor code proceedings of private colleges
and universities would do no more than apply the spirit of the Constitu-
tion to institutions that most directly affect the lives of students. Thus,
from a student's perspective, this goal seems nothing less than
reasonable.
114. Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953).
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PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. HEPPS: A LOGICAL
PRODUCT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES REVOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law of defamation evolved in political surroundings
entirely different from those that nurtured the constitutional values of
free speech and press.' Because of their inherent incompatability, rec-
onciling the constitutional interests of freedom of expression with a
state's interest in protecting an individual's reputation has proven to be
a formidable task for the Supreme Court.
Before the Court drastically altered the law of defamation with its
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 libelous statements received
no protection from the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press.3 The common law protected an individual's
interest in the enjoyment and maintenance of his reputation by affording
a civil cause of action under which the publisher of a defamatory state-
ment faced a standard of strict liability.4 Regardless of his good faith
belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, the defendant incurred
liability unless he could prove that the statement was either true or
privileged.
5
This "recipient-centered" concept 6 focused on the effect that the
speech had on the receiver rather than on the conduct of the sender.
General damage was presumed, allowing a private citizen defamed by an
unprivileged communication to recover absent proof of special harm to
his reputation. 7 In addition, although falsity was an essential element to
1. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967). For a general discussion
of the historical development of defamation law see W. KEETON, B. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 111 at 771-73 (5th ed. 1984); see also ROSENBERG,
PROTECTING THE BEST MAN (1986) ("An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel").
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(public official cannot recover in a defamation action against a
media defendant absent showing of actual malice).
3. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (dictum); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Hulton
& Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 44, aff'd C.A. 20 (1910)). In the beginning of this century,
Justice Holmes applied strict liability in Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909), where the
Chicago Sunday Tribune, instead of placing the picture of a female nurse who regularly
drank whiskey, accidentally placed a picture of a nurse who did not drink whiskey in a
testimonial advertisement for Duffy's Pure Malt Whiskey. Holmes wrote:
[I]f the advertisement obviously would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an
important and respectable part of the community, liability is not a question of
majority vote. We know of no decision in which this matter is discussed upon
principle. But obviously an unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal
falsehood in order to constitute a cause of action.
Id. at 190 (quoted in C. LAWTHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 10 (1981)).
5. W. PROSSER § 113.
6. See generally Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 828 (1984) (harm to be redressed is determined by
recipient's reaction to speaker's words).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White,J., dissenting) (pre-
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the cause of action, truth was regarded as an absolute defense in civil
cases. 8 The plaintiff was, therefore, not required to prove falsity.
The common law approach to defamation maintained a reverence
for the value of an individual's reputation.9 Justice Stewart eloquently
described this recognition of an individual's interest in his reputation in
Rosenblatt v. Baer:' 0 "The right of a man to the protection of his own
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty."''
Beginning with New York Times, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the first amendment raises a barrier to the unqualified
protection of an individual's reputation. ChiefJustice Holmes captured
the essential nature of free expression in his statement that "[t]he main-
tenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system."'
2
In its struggle to accommodate the seemingly irreconcilable values
of free speech and protection of an individual's dignity from defamatory
statements, the Supreme Court has established an array of standards to
be applied in determining the constitutional protection of expressions
by organizations and individuals. These standards are based on the type
of speech and the nature of the parties. 13 However, in its quest to estab-
lish the boundaries of constitutional protection, the Court has remained
virtually silent on a crucial aspect of every defamation action - the bur-
den of proving the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement. This criti-
cal issue was addressed and resolved in the recent decision of
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.
14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Onset of the Revolution
In its 1964 decision, New York Times v. Sullivan, 15 the Supreme Court
sumption of damage was the typical scheme under state defamation law). See, e.g., James v.
Fort Worth Telegram Co., 117 S.W. 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
8. GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 351, 152 (8th ed. R. McEwen & P. Lewis 1981).
9. See B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 15-21 (1985); see generally Lovell,
The"Reception" of Defamation By the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (1962) (outlines
history of libel and slander through early England, explaining the reasons for the ultimate
division of defamation into two distinct torts).
10. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
11. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
13. See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 7 (1975) (outlining the Court's defama-
tion decisions from New York Times to Gertz).
14. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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adopted a powerful reading of the first amendment that dramatically re-
structured the law of libel. In New York Times, L. B. Sullivan, the police
commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel suit against
four Alabama clergymen and the New York Times newspaper. The al-
legedly defamatory publication, a full-page advertisement, solicited con-
tributions for "The Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South."' 16 Consisting largely of editorial
commentary about the mistreatment of Dr. King and negro student
protesters by the police and the community, the advertisement con-
tained various minor inaccuracies.
17
The trial court found in favor of Sullivan and awarded him
$500,000. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.18 The
trial court's disposition was b,,sed in part on Alabama's defamation law
that allowed the jury to presume damages once it found the libelous
statement was made of and concerning the plaintiff.' 9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding Alabama's strict liability
standard constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide sufficient
safeguards for free speech and press, at least where a public official
brings a libel action against a critic of his official conduct. 20 In such
cases, the Court held, the speaker is entitled to a constitutional privilege
that is defeasible only upon plaintiff's proof that the defendant acted
with "actual malice."'2 1 Adopting a conditional privilege originally set
forth in Coleman v. MacLennan,22 the Court added constitutional armor
to the privilege and limited its use to the "good-faith" criticism of public
officials.
Emphasizing society's need for vigorous debate on public issues,
the New York Times Court recognized that certain inaccuracies are inevi-
table in the free exchange of ideas. Some erroneous statements, there-
fore, must be constitutionally protected in order to provide the
"breathing space" essential to the survival of free expression. 23 Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected Sullivan's argument that the advertisement
should be denied first amendment protection because of its factual er-
rors, its defamatory content, or the combination of these two
16. Id. at 257.
17. Id. The advertisement stated that police had "ringed the Alabama State College
Campus" when in fact they had merely been deployed in large numbers nearby. It also
asserted that Dr. King had been arrested seven times, when in fact he had been arrested on
only four occasions.
18. New York Times v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
19. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 262.
20. Id. at 264.
21. Id. at 279-80. To prove "actual malice," the plaintiff must show that defendant
acted with "knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or [made] with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."
22. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). The Kansas Supreme Court determined that privi-
lege carries a good faith requirement and "extends to a great variety of subjects and in-
cludes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." Id. at 285. The
privilege is qualified to the extent that plaintiff must "show actual malice, or go remedi-
less." Id.
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
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elements.
24
New York Times involved the criticism of a public official in his official
capacity. The Court based its decision on the premise that punishing
seditious libel was repugnant to the first amendment value that citizens
should be allowed to openly criticize their government. 25 A noted com-
mentator, Professor Harry Kalven 2 6 predicted the expansion of this
privilege shortly after the New York Times decision. Kalven cautioned,
however, that "the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from pub-
lic official to government policy.., to matters in the public domain, like
art, seems to me to be overwhelming."
2 7
B. The Expansion of New York Times
The United States Supreme Court did in fact follow this progres-
sion. In the same year that New York Times was decided, the Court ex-
tended the revolutionary "actual malice" standard to a criminal libel
case. In Garrison v. Louisiana,28 the Court held that the Constitution
limits a state's power to impose criminal sanctions upon critics of a pub-
lic official's conduct. Again resting its decision on the foundation that
punishing seditious libel offends the first amendment, 29 the Court reit-
erated the need for free debate on public issues. Even where the utter-
ance is false, the Court observed that the constitutional protections of
free expression preclude the imposition of civil or criminal liability upon
any utterance that is not knowingly or recklessly false.30
Garrison also restated from New York Times a supporting rationale for
extending a privilege to speech critical of a public official's conduct.
The Court noted that "federal officers enjoy an absolute privilege for
defamatory publication within the scope of official duty, regardless of
the existence of malice in the sense of ill will," and that to deny critics of
official conduct a corresponding privilege "would give public servants
an unjustified preference over the public."'
'a
In a concurring opinion, Justices Douglas and Black repeated the
view they expressed in the New York Times' concurrence, that the Consti-
tution requires that the freedom to criticize official conduct be absolute,
and that by allowing the possibility of sanction for seditious libel where
the plaintiff can prove "actual malice" the decision violated the first
amendment.
3 2
The Court continued its expansion of the New York Times standard in
24. Id. at 273.
25. See id. at 276-77.
26. Kalven, a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, has been described as
New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan's "most prominent interpreter." N. ROSENBERG, supra
note 1 at 245.
27. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221.
28. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
29. Id. at 67; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 79 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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Rosenblatt v. Baer,33 by applying the "public official" designation to rela-
tively low-ranking government employees.3 4 With respect to the New
York Times standard, the Court held that the term "public official" ap-
plies to those governmental employees "who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct
of governmental affairs."
'35
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,36 the
Court went even further, extending the New York Times standard beyond
public officials to encompass "public figures" as well. Although neither
plaintiff was a public official, the Court held that they could not recover
without a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an ex-
treme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers."' 3 7 It reasoned that as
public figures involved in matters of "public interest,"'3 8 the plaintiffs
had access to adequate means of counter-argument, and thus the ability
to expose the falsity of the speech against them through public discus-
sion. 39 This policy consideration, the ability of the plaintiff to defend
his reputation, was an essential part of the Court's prior decisions re-
garding the standards necessary to protect the plaintiff. Such policy
considerations are the natural consequence of the Court's recognition
that the first amendment requires that free speech and an individual's
interest in his reputation coexist.
Butts and Walker marked the Court's departure from the govern-
mental criticism basis for consitutional protection and the inception of a
trend toward creating a privilege for speech involving "matters of public
or general interest."'40 Significantly, the Court also manifested its intent
to shift another aspect of defamation analysis. The Court stated that the
proper focus is upon the editorial process that creates the publication
and not simply upon the falsity of its content.
4 1
Dealing a nearly fatal blow to the protection of private figure plain-
tiffs defamed by the media, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.42 the Court
advanced the New York Times standard to the extremes foretold by Pro-
fessor Kalven. 4 3 George Rosenbloom, a magazine distributor, sued a
radio station which broadcasted news stories characterizing his books as
obscene and labeling him as a "smut distributor" and "girlie book ped-
33. 383 U.s. 75 (1966).
34. Id. The plaintiff, Frank Baer, supervised a county recreation area and reported to
the county commissioners.
35. Id. at 85.
36. 388 U.S. 130 (1967)(cases consolidated).
37. Id. at 155.
38. Butts was a state university's athletic director. Id. at 135-36. Walker was a retired
Army general. Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 155 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
40. 388 U.S. at 154-55.
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
43. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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dler.' ' 44 The trial court awarded Rosenbloom $250,000, 4 5 but the court
of appeals reversed.4 6 Refusing to allow Rosenbloom's non-public fig-
ure status to assume controlling significance, 4 7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited Time, Inc. v. Hill.48 In Hill, the
Court embraced the rationale that "[a] broadly defined freedom of the
press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open soci-
ety,"' 49 and applied the New York Times standard to false reporting of
"matters of public interest" in an action for invasion of privacy. 50 De-
spite the fact that the plaintiff in Hill was a private individual, the Court
accorded the defendant publisher the same constitutional privilege that
the New York Times defendants enjoyed in publishing statements con-
cerning a public official.
5 '
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the plaintiff
was not a public official or a public figure, the New York Times privilege
applied to protect the publication or broadcast of "matters of public or
general interest." 5 2 By eliminating the distinction between private and
public plaintiffs, the Court gave the media virtual "carte blanche" to
publish defamatory material, 53 due to its strong propensity to classify an
almost unlimited range of matters as "of public interest."
54
Rosenbloom represented an extreme departure from the basis on
which the New York Times privilege was originally founded and estab-
lished the "matter of public interest" standard for constitutional protec-
tion which has proven difficult to apply. 55 In its zeal to prevent press
self-censorship, the Rosenbloom plurality gave short shrift to the protec-
tion of individual reputational interests, even to the point of stating that
the first amendment protects the mass media from "[tihe very possibility
of having to engage in litigation."
'56
44. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 36.
45. Thejury originally awarded $25,000 in general damages and $725,000 in punitive
damages. The court reduced the punitive damages award to $250,000 on remittitur.
46. 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
47. Id. at 896.
48. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
49. Id. at 389.
50. Id. at 387-88.
51. However, in citing the Hill Court's refusal to distinguish the plaintiff from Sullivan
in New York Times, the Third Circuit apparently ignored the dictum in Hill acknowledging
that "[w]ere this a libel action, the distinction ... between the relative opportunities of the
public official and the private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane
and the additional state interest in the protection of the individual against damage to his
reputation would be involved." Id. at 391.
52. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
53. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 206 (1976).
54. See id. at 206-07.
55. Id. In our society, the media decide what is to be a matter of public concern, and
courts have shown scant interest in second-guessing that determination. As Justice Mar-
shall noted in his dissent, all human events are arguably within the area of "public or
general concern." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53. The quoted observation was made in response to
the suggestion of the dissenters, Justices Harlan and Marshall, that a negligence standard
and an "actual damages" limitation would strike the proper balance.
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Disturbed by this extension of the constitutional privilege to all
matters of public interest, one commentator argued that Rosenbloom ef-
fectively destroyed the common law of defamation and concluded:
"The line of cases which began with New York Times v. Sullivan has come
to an end. The courts have no where to go after the decision in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia."
'57
C. The Gertz Decision
Rosenbloom commanded the votes of only three Justices, 58 and lasted
only three years. In 1974, the Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 59
and abruptly aborted the evolution of a system in which "the great bulk
of material contained in the press-far more than merely matters rele-
vant to self-government-was subject to the Times privilege." '60 With
Gertz, the Court adopted an approach that re-established its recognition
of the reputational values without sacrificing first amendment freedoms.
Elmer Gertz, a prominent Chicago lawyer, brought a libel action
against the author and publisher of a magazine article describing him as
a communist involved in a campaign to discredit the police. 6 1 The trial
court ruled the publication libelous as a matter of law and withdrew
from the jury all issues except the measure of damages. 6 2 Although the
jury awarded Gertz $50,000, the trial court determined that the New York
Times privilege applied and entered judgment for defendants notwith-
standing the verdict. 63 The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of
Rosenbloom, holding that because the case before it involved a matter of
public interest, the New York Times standard was applicable. 64
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, rejecting Rosenbloom
because of its failure to adequately weigh the reputational interests of
private individuals against the freedoms of speech and press. 6 5 Articu-
lating a three-part formula designed to reach the proper balance of
these values, the Court held: (1) the Times standard applies to public
figures and officials but not to private figures even if those private
57. Note, The End of the Line: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 734
(1970).
58. Only Justices Brennan, Burger, and Blackmun could wholly agree that the New
York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity applied in a state civil libel action
brought by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a radio broadcast
about the individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest. Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 30-32.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 447 (1975).
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26.
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
63. Id. at 1000. The Court found insufficient evidence to show that there was actual
malice or reckless disregard for the truth. Id.
64. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972) rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The court of appeals
doubted the correctness of the trial court's finding that plaintiff was not a public figure, but
reached the same result by applying the public interest test. Id. at 805, n.8.
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47. Instead of balancing the competing interests, especially
with respect to the private plaintiff, the plurality adopted a one-sided approach favoring
the defendant.
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
figures are involved in a matter of public interest;6 6 (2) the states may
define their own standard of liability with respect to private plaintiffs "so
long as they do not impose liability without fault;" 6 7 and (3) no plaintiff
may recover punitive damages unless the Times standard of knowing or
reckless falsity is met.
68
The Gertz decision benefited private plaintiffs by overruling the
"matter of public interest" test 6 9 prescribed by Rosenbloom, thereby
firmly establishing a distinction between private and public plaintiffs.
70
But the decision also imposed an additional burden on certain classes of
private figures. While in the past a private plaintiff not involved in a
matter of public interest could recover absent a showing of fault by the
publisher, Gertz abolished strict liability with respect to all plaintiffs.
This abolition was necessary, however, in order to avoid punishing the
media for publishing material whose accuracy was reasonably verified
and that was written in a conscientious manner.
Thus, Gertz marked the Court's return to a balancing approach. The
decision protected the media by requiring all plaintiffs to prove fault, yet
accommodated the private individual's reputational interests by refusing
to apply the Times standard to those who were not public officials or
public figures. The plaintiff, Elmer Gertz, recently noted that "in the
Gertz case, [the Court] backtracked and held that private persons had to
prove fault, as defined by state law, and actual injuries, as more broadly
defined."
7 1
D. The Falsity Issue
In the years between New York Times and Gertz, the Court established
various criteria for determining liability in defamation cases, but failed
to answer a key question pertinent to every defamation case: given that
66. Id. at 343.
67. Id. at 347. The Court found this to be true at least where "the substance of the
defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent." Id. at 348 (quot-
ing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
68. Id. at 350.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. The Court found two major reasons to distinguish private plaintiffs from public
officials or figures: first, public officials and public figures have greater access to the media
and hence a more realistic opportunity to rebut false statements. Second, public figures
and officials have chosen to seek the limelight or to influence government operations and
thus have more or less "assumed the risk" of inciting adverse commentary.
71. Gertz, The Law of Libel Continues to Develop-An Introduction, 90 DICK. L. R. 539, 541
(1986). Gertz added that
at this point, the matter seemed to rest until the plurality opinion in Dun & Brad-
street v. Greenmoss Builders, in which the majority held that Gertz was confined to
matters of public concern. In other words, private individuals not involved in
matters of public concern could recover under common law rules, so that neither
fault nor malice had to be proved in order to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for utterances of no public importance. The Court concluded by stating
that all expression is not entitled to the same first amendment protection-that
there are degrees of entitlement. If the defamatory utterance concerns matters
that are purely private then it is not protected by the Gertz rule.
Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)).
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a defamatory statement must be false to be actionable, 72 who has the
burden of proving its truth or falsity? Prior to New York Times, truth,
together with privilege, was considered an absolute defense to a libel
action. 73 Once the Court introduced constitutional analysis to libel law,
however, the standards applied to determine which party had the bur-
den of proving truth or falsity became more difficult to determine.
In New York Times, the Court recognized that the defense of truth,
standing alone, was insufficient to protect free speech,74 and acknowl-
edged that some falsehoods, even those potentially defamatory, are con-
stitutionally protected. 75 Although nowhere in New York Times did the
Court expressly shift the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff,76 the
application and discussion of New York Times in subsequent decisions in-
dicates that such a shift was apparently intended.
In Garrison v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan interpreted the New York
Times rule as requiring a public plaintiff to establish falsity as well as
"actual malice." 77 Similarly, in Greenbelt Publishing Association v. Bresler,7 8
Justice Stewart, relying on New York Times, emphasized that a public
plaintiff must show that the defamatory publication was "not only false
but was uttered with actual malice."' 79 Interpreting the rule became
even more difficult after the Court's dictum in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn.80 Having stated that truth is a defense to a libel action, Justice
White concluded that the defamed public plaintiff must prove falsity and
reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
8 1
The Court's attempts to describe the constitutional privilege reflect
the confusion over the "truth or falsity" burden that existed prior to
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.8 2 With the Hepps decision, the
Court has taken a significant step toward eliminating the confusion,
placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in certain types of
defamation cases.
8 3
72. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1967).
73. See supra note 5.
74. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
75. Id. at 273.
76. The possibility of shifting the burden of proof as a means of protecting speech
was clear to Justice Brennan. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), he wrote that a
state may not place on a tax exemption applicant the burden of proving that he has not
engaged in criminal advocacy, because such a rule tended to cause self-censorship. Speiser
was cited liberally by Justice Brennan throughout New York Times, but for different pur-
poses. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 279, 285.
77. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Two commentators have observed that this burden of
proof requires a public official, at a minimum, to prove falsity. Arkin & Granquist, The
Presumption of General Damages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1490
n.58 (1968).
78. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
79. Id. at 8 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
80. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
81. Id. at 489-90 (dictum).
82. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
83. The decision placed the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in cases where
the subject matter of the defamatory speech is of "public concern" and the defendant is a
member of the mass media.
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III. PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. HEPPS
A. Facts
Maurice Hepps was the principal stockholder of General Program-
ming, Inc., which owned the trademark to a chain of "Thrifty Beverage"
stores. Boasting an innovative concept in liquor sales and distribution,
General Programming licensed and provided management and consul-
tation services to the Thrifty stores. 8 4 When a bill introduced in the
Pennsylvania Legislature threatened to effect adversely the stores'
purchasing practices, Hepps engaged the assistance of a lobbyist in or-
der to defeat the measure. 85 The lobbyist, who was reputed to have
connections with organized crime, contacted State Senator Frank Maz-
zei. Mazzei opposed the bill, which never passed.8 6 On another occa-
sion, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board suspended the Thrifty
stores' liquor licenses, alleging that the management agreements vio-
lated the liquor code.8 7 At Hepps' request, Senator Mazzei arranged a
meeting between Hepps and the Liquor Control Board's chief counsel,
Alexander Jaffurs. Jaffurs refused to attend this meeting and was dis-
charged shortly thereafter. Jaffurs publicly stated that he believed his
prosecution of Thrifty was a factor in his being fired.8 8
The defendant, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., publishes the Phila-
delphia Inquirer which published a series of five articles, authored by
defendants William Ecenbarger and William Lambert, stating that
Hepps' organization had connections with organized crime. The nature
of these articles was exemplified by one headline which read: "How
Mazzei Used Pull, Kept Beer Chain Intact."8 9 The articles alleged that
Mazzei had engaged in a clear pattern of interference with state govern-
ment on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty, and that Mazzei had several un-
derworld associates including Joseph Scalleat, whom Hepps had
engaged as a lobbyist. 90 Based on these articles, Hepps, General Pro-
gramming, Inc., and several of its franchisees that were engaged in dis-
tribution of beer and other beverages filed an action for libel in May
1976.
B. Decisions Below
Noting that a Pennsylvania statute placed the burden of proving the
truth of defamatory statements on libel defendants, 9 1 the trial court con-
84. Brief for Appellee at 2, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558
(1986) (No. 84-1491).




88. Id. at 6.
89. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 693, 695 (1977).
90. Id.
91. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(1) (1982) provides:
"In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when the
issue is properly raised: (1) The truth of the defamatory communication."
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cluded that the statute violated the federal Constitution and instructed
the jury that plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity.9 2 After a six-
week trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, holding that the statute met the Gertz fault requirement and
that fault could be proved without proving falsity.93 The court inter-
preted Gertz and subsequent cases to mean that the only restraint upon
the states mandated by the first amendment in private figure defamation
actions, was the prohibition against imposing liability without fault. Re-
jecting the trial court's instruction that plaintiff bore the burden of prov-
ing falsity, the court stated that to allow such a requirement would
"condone . .. irresponsible conduct by the media."' 94
C. The United States Supreme Court Holding
Not persuaded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's disposition,
the United States Supreme Court held that "where a newspaper pub-
lishes speech of public concern, a private figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." 9 5
Even where the plaintiff's burden is escalated by a "shield law" such as
Pennsylvania's, 96 the Court found no reason to apply a different consti-
tutional standard.
97
The Court reasoned that because it is impossible to determine
whether speech is true or false in every case, the Constitution requires
the scales to be tipped in favor of protecting true speech.9 8 To ensure
that on matters of public concern true speech is not chilled, the defend-
ant cannot be required to guarantee the truth of all of his factual asser-
tions. As a result, the common law presumption that defamatory speech
is false must yield to the first amendment policy that encourages free
debate on public issues. 9 9
The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs defamed by false statements
which they are unable to demonstrate are false will be unable to recover
under this decision. This consideration, however, is outweighed by the
need to protect free speech and tempered by the realization that placing
the burden on either party will occasionally result in injustice.' 0 0
92. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374, 377 (1984).
93. Id. at 312, 485 A.2d at 385.
94. Id. at 312, 485 A.2d at 386.
95. 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1559 (1986).
96. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No person ...
employed by any newspaper of general circulation... or any radio or television station, or
any magazine of general circulation . . . shall be required to disclose the source of any
information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial, or investi-
gation before any government unit."
97. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565.
98. Id. at 1564.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion,' 0 ' as-
serting that the Court erroneously limited its holding to media defend-
ants. Arguing that no distinction should be made with respect to the
type of defendant involved, the concurrence emphasized that the first
amendment protects all speech, and that the inherent worth of an ex-
pression does not depend on its source.102
Justices Stevens, Burger, White and Rehnquist joined in a vigorous
dissenting opinion, 10 3 arguing that the majority devalued the state's in-
terest in redressing harm to an individual's reputation. Because the
Hepps decision would have a practical effect only where the speaker
meets the Gertz fault requirement, the decision protects speech made
negligently or maliciously. Such speech does not deserve protection,
the dissent asserted, as it contributes little to the "marketplace of
ideas."'
0 4
The dissenters quoted Time, Inc. v. Firestone,'0 5 in which the Court
stated that when the publisher is at fault through malicious or careless
publication of defamatory material, the public interest in uninhibited
speech is "at its nadir" and society's need to redress such utterances is
"at its zenith."' 0 6 If the plaintiff cannot prove the falsity of statements,
the dissent reasoned that permitting the intentional and malicious publi-
cation of libelous material allows a publisher to act as a "character
assassin [with a] constitutional license to defame."' 1 7 Uncomfortable
with the deterioration of the distinction between private and public
plaintiffs, the dissent protested that Hepps was a throwback to the Rosen-
bloom era. 108
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Shift Toward a New Standard of Liability
The recurrent theme of Supreme Court defamation cases decided
since New York Times centers on the defendant's culpability. This empha-
sis on culpability is evidence of the Court's realization that because of its
antagonism toward the interests protected by the first amendment, defa-
mation is a special kind of tort. The tension between defamation and
the first amendment arises because the constitutional protection of the
tortfeasor is a pervasive issue and the sanction for defamation invades a
fundamental right.
101. Id. at 1565.
102. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1567.
105. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
106. Id. at 456.
107. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1568 n.6.
108. Id. at 1571 (criticizing the reinstitution of the "matter of public interest"
standard).
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The New York Times decision planted the seed for Hepps, both in its
realization that some falsehoods must enjoy constitutional protection 109
and in its recognition that requiring a speaker to guarantee the truth of
factual assertions leads to "self-censorship"' 10 that inhibits free speech.
Because of New York Times, the defamatory falsehood began to lose its
inherent actionability, and the conduct or intent of the speaker assumed
a paramount role in determining liability. The Hepps decision fits con-
sistently into this theme of culpability, squarely placing the burden of
proving falsity, an essential element of fault, on the plaintiff."I '
The Court's analysis of defamation liability since NewYork Times has
shifted in focus from the effect of the defamatory speech-strict liabil-
ity-to the cause of the speech-fault requirement. Mandated by the
Constitution's zealous protection of free expression, this shift pro-
ceeded without addressing the burden of proving falsity until the
Court's decision in Hepps.
With the advent of the Hepps decision, the Court has removed a sig-
nificant obfuscation from a complex and confusing area of law. The de-
cision flows logically from the rationale behind the Court's recent
defamation decisions, 1 2 particularly the Gertz abolition of strict liability
in such actions. After Gertz, the Hepps conclusion was inevitable: even a
private figure plaintiff must prove falsity in order to prevail in a defama-
tion action against the mass media.
B. The Relationship Between Fault and Falsity
Gertz established that although a private figure plaintiff need not
meet the demanding New York Times standard, he must at least show fault
on the part of the publisher of the defamatory communication.' 1 3 The
Court has also acknowledged that "demonstration that an article was
true would seem to preclude finding the publisher at fault." ' ' 4 It would
appear to follow that if fault involves the elements of carelessness and
falsity," 5 the publisher of a true statement cannot fully meet the criteria
to support a finding that he was "at fault."
This conclusion is similar to that reached by commentators Franklin
and Bussel: "Because fault with respect to falsity is the constitutional
rule, a showing of falsity in Gertz cases is the logical predicate to satisfy-
ing the constitutional test.""16 Even if one argues that such a conclu-
sion does not require that the plaintiff prove falsity as part of his prima
facie case, it is undeniable that the converse, requiring the defendant to
prove truth, offends the principle set forth in Gertz.
109. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
110. Id. at 279.
I1. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1981)
(fault consists of two elements, carelessness and falsity).
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
114. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1976).
115. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1981).
116. Franklin and Bussell, supra note 6, at 857.
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The practical effect of shifting the burden of proof is most evident
when ajury is undecided. In a close case, a presumption of falsity forces
the undecided jury to find for the plaintiff. Even if the media defendant
published a true statement, it could possibly be held liable if it were
unable to prove the statement true. Thus, the very evil Gertz sought to
extinguish, liability without fault, may ensue if the plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove falsity. 1
7
Arguing that the Gertz fault requirement already provided an ade-
quate safeguard, the Hepps dissent asserted that the decision would pre-
vent plaintiffs from recovering where they could prove fault, such as
carelessness or common law malice, but not falsity. 1 8 However, be-
cause true statements are not actionable, one must prove falsity to prove
fault. Even a carelessly or maliciously printed article enjoys constitu-
tional protection if it is true. 1 19 Furthermore, the dissent's scenario of a
vindictive publisher knowingly printing an unprovably false story to pur-
posely injure a plaintiff, 120 at the risk of career destruction and financial
ruin, seems highly speculative.
C. The Problem With Presuming Falsity
In addition to permitting liability without fault in close cases, the
presumption of falsity was rightly abolished by Hepps as an ancient relic
which has outlived its underlying justification. The presumption
originated at common law, with an approach to the concept of truth that
has been characterized as "nothing short of schizophrenic."' 2' While
most authorities agreed that falsity was a required element in a defama-
tion action, 122 the bulk of common law decisions assert that truth is
merely an affirmative defense, implying that falsity is not a prerequisite
to liability. 123 As Philadelphia Newspapers argued in its brief, there is
no particular rational connection between the presumption's proved
fact, that a defamatory statement was made, and the presumed fact that
the statement was false.
124
The plaintiffs in Hepps argued that where a man's reputation is con-
cerned, he should be "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This
117. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d at 375; see also Schauer, Language, Truth,
and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 277 (1978)
(incorrect determination may improperly deny first amendment protection).
118. 106 S. Ct. at 1566 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Cf. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1976)
(admitting that in an exceptional case, fault requirement would fail to fix liability on a
defendant who published what he believed to be false and defamatory matter that actually
proved to be true).
120. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. B. SANFORD supra note 9 at § 6.2.1. (conflicting requirements provide that a de-
famatory statement must be false for plaintiff to recover yet maintain that truth is an af-
firmative defense thereby implying that falsity is not a prerequisite to liability).
122. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4 § 116.
123. B. SANFORD, supra note 9 at § 6.2.1.
124. Brief for Appellant at 33, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1588
(1986) (No. 84-1491) (citing Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371
(6th Cir. 1981)).
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rationale supported the presumption of falsity shared by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co. 125 This view,
however, was established in the criminal context. The underlying justifi-
cation, preventing an innocent defendant from being punished if his
guilt is uncertain, hardly justifies awarding a libel plaintiff possibly stag-
gering damages if he is unable to fully convince a jury of falsity.
Shifting from the presumption of falsity, therefore, was a logical
step for the Hepps Court, and was consistent with the Gertz shift away
from presumed damages. Both changes reflect the Court's recognition
of the vital need to continue the trend away from strict liability in defa-
mation actions.
D. The Threat of Self-Censorship
The purpose of the New York Times privilege was to minimize the
threat to the media of libel judgments, 12 6 which encourage self-censor-
ship and hinder "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public
issues. 12 7 In New York Times, the Court realized that a certain number of
inaccuracies are inevitable in the free interchange of ideas and devel-
oped a principle which planted the seed for the Hepps decision. As the
New York Times Court observed: "A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so
on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to com-
parable 'self-censorship.' "128
Although the protection has since been extended beyond criticism
of official conduct, the underlying need to avoid self-censorship still ap-
plies. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Hepps, which placed the bur-
den of proving truth on the defendant, attempted to establish precisely
the type of rule proscribed by New York Times and its progeny. By virtu-
ally requiring a defendant to guarantee the truth of his assertions, the
statute clearly violated the constitutionally-based principles discussed by
the Court since New York Times. Without eliminating defamation actions
altogether, these decisions have significantly reduced the likelihood that
judges and juries, through the advice of media counsel, will prescribe
what the press may or may not publish.
E. The Uncertain Balance as to Truth or Falsity
That all defamatory statements do not readily lend themselves to an
accurate determination of their truth or falsity is an inescapable fact.
Because no "litmus paper" test for truth exists, some speech will inevita-
bly be unprovable. Conscious of our system's fallibility, the Court de-
cided that since occasional errors will occur, the Constitution requires
courts to risk denying recovery to deserving plaintiffs for unprovably
125. 441 Pa. 432, 447, 273 A.2d 899, 910 (1971) (the defense of privilege, which ne-
gates the malice requirement is not affected by the underlying presumption of falsity).
126. Anderson, supra note 60, at 425.
127. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
128. Id. at 279.
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false statements, rather than punishing media defendants for publishing
unprovable truth.129 This conclusion makes sense. In much the same
way that our system's revulsion for punishing the innocent tips the bal-
ance in favor of criminal defendants, our system's infatuation with free
speech tips the balance in favor of defamation defendants. Undeniably,
"[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in or-
der to protect speech that matters."' 3
0
Furthermore, the plaintiff in a defamation action should be in a bet-
ter position than the defendant to test the truth of a statement made
about himself. 131 While the defendant derives his information from sec-
ond-hand sources, the plaintiff necessarily knows whether a statement
made about him is true or false. Thus, it would appear that the plaintiff
has an advantage in gathering evidence to support his case. Even in
jurisdictions with a shield law in effect, this advantage is not significantly
impaired. While the plaintiff may be hindered from attacking the credi-
bility of the defendant's source, he fully retains his ability to dispute the
actual substance of the statement.'
3 2
V. CONCLUSION
New York Times brought the concept of culpability into the law of
defamation, freeing the media defendant from its compulsion to avoid
statements unflattering to public officials. Upon this foundation, the
Gertz Court extended the fault requirement to private plaintiffs, yet pro-
tected their reputational interests by refusing to require that they meet
the Times standard. The Hepps decision-constructed on the premise
that the first amendment forbids the punishment of speech, either civilly
or criminally, unless the speaker is culpable in some way-has served to
further solidify this framework. Consistent with the constitutionally
mandated shift of the Court's focus, Hepps is a logical and illuminating
product of the New York Times revolution.
Marian L. Carlson
129. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563-64.
130. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
131. Keeton, supra note 119, at i236.
132. While it may be argued that it is difficult to prove a negative, not all negatives are
difficult to prove. A detailed defamatory statement should be readily discredited. Franklin
and Bussell, supra note 6, at 860-61.
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HIDING BEHIND THE WALL: FRIEDMAN V. BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Few topics produce greater controversy than the subject of separa-
tion of church and state. At times the reasoning that can be gleaned
from establishment clause analysis serves to belie Justice Clark's obser-
vation that "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and the common
sense."' This is due in part to the sheer diversity of cases that demand
establishment clause treatment. 2 Even so, for the past fifteen years, the
Supreme Court has proposed and subsequently discarded a number of
guidelines in a vain attempt to articulate principled limits to state in-
volvement with religion.3 As a result of the Court's sacrifice of clarity
and predictability for flexibility,4 lower courts have been left with little
choice but to improvise their own measures of acceptable state action.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the Tenth Circuit
in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners5 decided that prominent dis-
play of a Christian cross on a county seal violates the principle of gov-
ernmental neutrality required by the establishment clause. Yet, in order
to reach this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit engaged in reasoning that
has aptly been described as concocting "ingenious rationalizations to
deny the obvious."'6 By declining to hear the case, the Supreme Court
squandered an opportunity to clarify the implicit inconsistencies of
Friedman, and thereby further muddied the establishment clause waters.
This comment will describe three theories that have sought to de-
fine the perimeters of state endorsement of religion, and will outline the
progression of cases concerning government display of religious sym-
bols. It will discuss Friedman and the panel decision that it overruled. It
will emphasize the valuable insights and logical shortcomings that Fried-
man offers to establishment clause analysis, and will suggest a method by
which to measure future cases of public display of religious symbols.
II. BACKGROUND
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
2. See Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Sepa-
ration or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 6-8 (1984) (cataloguing conflicting cases).
3. Although the Supreme Court continues to utilize the three-prong test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), no clear standards have emerged to assist in the
application of the Lemon test. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 14-19 (Court's changing posi-
tion due in part to inadequacy of establishment clause analysis); Smith, Some Observations on
the Establishment Clause, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 457, 465-69 (1984).
4. Committee For Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
5. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
6. Cornelius, supra note 2, at 16.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' 7 This command has two
components: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
8
The general aim of both clauses is to protect the individual's right to
religious liberty from infringement by the state.9
The legislative intent of the framers of the establishment clause
continues to be a subject of debate.10 Certainly the clause was designed
to prohibit the federal government from creating the equivalent of the
Church of England in the United States, or from favoring one religious
sect to the exclusion of others. 1 ' What is not as clear is the extent of
state involvement that the establishment clause permits. Three theories
of permissible government conduct have arisen to address that issue.
A. Three Theories of Permissible Government Conduct
1. Separation
The first school of thought advocates the theory of separation. 12
This theory is based upon a metaphor that Thomas Jefferson included in
a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, asserting that the religion
clauses created a "wall of separation between church and state.' 3 The
Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education 14 resurrected the meta-
phor from obscurity and gave it a manifesto-like interpretation.' 5 The
Court's most adamant separationist, Justice Wiley Rutledge, maintained
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The establishment clause is applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. The establishment clause and free exercise clause were intended to be "mutually
supportive," yet each works separately to protect distinct liberties. The free exercise
clause seeks to prevent government from acting in a way that intrudes upon the individ-
ual's right to exercise religious beliefs. On the other hand, the establishment clause is
meant to restrain the government from passing laws favoring a particular religion, thereby
placing indirect pressure upon citizens to adopt a particular belief as their own. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrrtrrloNAL LAw § 14-2 (1978).
9. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 673, 677 (1980); Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State. Public
Sponsorship of Religious Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
499, 502 (1986).
10. Both accommodationists and separationists point to the actions of the founding
fathers to justify their respective positions. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) (historical analysis supports
conclusion that equal aid to all religions does not violate establishment clause); A. STOKES
& L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1964) (founding fathers be-
lieved that church and state should remain completely separate).
11. See Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and
Religious School Regulation, 2 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 127-28 (1979).
12. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 11-12; Jones, Accommodationist and Separationist Ideals
in Supreme Court Establishment Clause Decisions, 28J. CHURCH & ST. 193, 194-95 (1986).
13. T. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 519 (S. Padover ed. 1943). See generally
Comment,Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Meta-
phor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645 (1978) (exhaustive treatment of "wall of separation"
metaphor).
14. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
15. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473-77 (1981). Everson underscores the
schizophrenic nature of establishment clause analysis. Even though the Court announced
its refusal to tolerate any government aid to religion, the New Jersey statute authorizing
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that the purpose of the clause "was to create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for reli-
gion."' 16 Yet even he recognized that absolute separation, while
theoretically attainable, remained a practical impossibility.' 7 Under this
approach, government may not endorse religion or nonreligion in any
way, and the only kind of financial support that the state may provide for
religious institutions is the type of aid to which all citizens are entitled.18
The most likely advocates of separationism on the Court today are Jus-
tices Brennan, l9 Marshall 20 and Stevens.21
2. Accommodation
An alternative to separationism is the theory of accommodation.
22
Its proponents begin with the assumption that the establishment clause
was designed solely to prevent the federal government from designating
a national church or from declaring illegal one of the many state reli-
gions that were then in existence. 23 Since the evils that it was designed
to prevent have disappeared, the establishment clause should be inter-
preted narrowly. Consequently, accommodationists maintain that the
purpose of the establishment clause is "to state an objective, not to write
a statute.' '24 In addition, the history of American government abounds
with examples of toleration that border on outright endorsement of reli-
gion. 25 For these reasons, accommodationists advocate the idea that the
state is free to cooperate with religions in a nondiscriminatory fashion,
even if this cooperation takes the form of financial aid. 26 Chief Justice
Burger leaves the bench as one of America's strongest advocates of the
accommodation theory. On the remainder of the Court, newly con-
firmed Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor have
indicated accommodationist leanings.
2 7
reimbursement to parents of parochial school children for the cost of school busing was
upheld.
16. Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 60-61 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Jones, supra note 12, at 202-04.
18. See Jones, supra note 12, at 194; Note, supra note 15, at 1483-84.
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Jones, supra note 12, at 199.
21. Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
22. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 13-14; Jones, supra note 12, at 195-98.
23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833)); R. CORD, supra note 10, at 213-214. At the time the
Bill of Rights was ratified, three states had established the Congregational church as their
official religion. Disestablishment occurred in Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in
1819, and in Massachusetts in 1833. Id. at 4; see also H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE
COURT 223 (4th ed. 1982) (recounting history of state religion).
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
25. For a nonexhaustive list, see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
26. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 14.
27. See Jones, supra note 12, at 199.
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
3. Strict Neutrality
Between the extremes of the separation theory and the accommoda-
tion theory lies the theory of strict neutrality. 28 This theory is derived
from the implicit tension between the religion clauses. In order to avoid
offending either the free exercise or the establishment clause, strict neu-
trality requires state action to be motivated solely by secular considera-
tions, and prohibits state action that has the effect of either benefiting or
burdening religion. The state must be "religion blind."'2 9 Contempo-
rary Supreme Court analysis tends to resemble most closely the princi-
ple of strict neutrality. As Justice White observed, "our decisions have
tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches" in
favor of a flexible model aimed at assuring constitutional neutrality.
3 0
B. The Lemon Test
The analytical paradigm for constitutional scrutiny of establishment
clause cases is embodied in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 1 There the Court ex-
amined state legislation designed to supplement the salaries of parochial
schoolteachers who taught certain secular subjects. The Court outlined
a three-part test for measuring suspect government conduct. In order
to pass constitutional muster, state action must have a valid secular pur-
pose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and must avoid fostering an excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion. 3 2 The Court held that the statutes failed to meet the
third prong of the Lemon test by entangling the state in a political dispute
28. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 12-13.
29. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6, 96
(1961); see also Bird, supra note 11, at 138-42.
30. Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Id. at 612-13. What has become known as the Lemon test is really an amalgamation
of the holdings of three cases. The requirement that state action be motivated by a valid
secular purpose was first articulated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
In that case, the Court upheld a mandatory Sunday Closing law, finding that the state was
acting to further the nonreligous goal of assuring a uniform day of rest. In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Court added the requirement that
the effect of state action must neither advance nor inhibit religion. The Court held that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring daily Bible readings in public schools had the effect of ad-
vancing religion, and therefore violated the establishment clause. Finally, the rule that
otherwise permissible state action will be invalidated if it fosters excessive entanglement
between government and religion was incorporated into establishment clause analysis in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). There the Court granted tax-exempt
status to religious institutions. The Court justified its decision by finding that denial of the
exemption would entangle the government in the affairs of religion more than the grant-
ing of the exemption. This requirement that state action not foster entanglement has two
components: administrative entanglement and political entanglement. The former com-
ponent is present when government is required to supervise religion in order to ensure
compliance with a particular statute. This was the case in Walz. The latter component is
present when governmental regulation creates a backlash from the religious community
that polarizes the community according to individual sectarian preference. See Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). For convenience,
the three requirements or "prongs" of the Lemon test are called the purpose prong, the
effect prong and the entanglement prong.
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that would divide government along religious lines.3 3 As a result of its
failure to pass all three prongs of the Lemon test, the statute was declared
unconstitutional.
3 4
Despite criticism from commentators3 5 and members of the
Court,3 6 the Lemon test remains the yardstick by which state endorse-
ment of religion is measured. Although the Court has repeated its re-
luctance to confine establishment clause analysis to the Lemon test,3 7 it
tends to apply the Lemon test almost exclusively. In only two other cases,
Larson v. Valente3 8 and Marsh v. Chambers,3 9 has the Court employed
other analytical modes. 40 Implicit in the Lemon approach is the assump-
tion that some state conduct that endorses religion will be tolerated.4 '
33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614, 622-24.
34. Id. at 625. The rule that failure to pass even one prong will lead to invalidation
was followed in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
35. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 15-19; Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The
Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094, 1122-26 (1985) (Court's anal-
ysis of establishment clause cases has "not been a model of consistency"); Note, supra note
15, at 1473.
36. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2519 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
38. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute which
placed higher registration and reporting requirements on religions that solicit more than
half of total contributions from nonmembers. Because the statute discriminated among
religions, the Court required the statute to pass a strict scrutiny test, requiring the state to
prove that the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, a bur-
den which could not be overcome. Even so, the Court also applied the Lemon test, holding
that the statute failed to satisfy the entanglement prong. Id. at 254-55.
39. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld the use of chaplains paid by state
legislatures without applying the Lemon test. The Court found that use of paid chaplains
could not be unconstitutional because the First Congress had permitted the practice at the
same time that it promulgated the establishment clause. No explanation was offered for
the Court's failure to employ the Lemon test.
40. Apart from the rationale behind the decisions in Larson and Marsh, Professor Van
Alstyne has identified an alternative to the Lemon test. Arising from the Lynch plurality
opinion, the test has been called the "any more than" test. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson 's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 770, 783-85. Under this analysis, state endorsement of religion will be tolerated un-
less the degree of intrusion upon the establishment clause is greater than that which has
been declared permissible in the past. Therefore, public display of a creche would not
violate the etablishment clause because it would not advance religion "any more than"
chaplains paid at public expense.
Such reasoning is faulty because it fails to explain how the degree of intrusion occa-
sioned by public display of a creche is comparable to that of chaplains in state legislatures.
Chief Justice Burger admitted that such comparisons are "difficult and elusive to make."
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. Even if such intrusions could be quantified in an objective way, the
practice of categorically comparing different cases without examining the reasons for their
acceptance is an exercise in legal legerdemain. Such an analysis would prevent a court
from invalidating state action that happened to advance religion less obtrusively than
whatever happened to be the most egregious example of permissible intrusion upon the
establishment clause. It simply makes no sense to divorce a fact pattern from the reasons
for its acceptance. To ignore the unique factors that make a particular act permissible is to
rob a case of its "ingenuity, subtlety, and reasoning." Note, supra note 9, at 511 n.104.
Also, this suggested test lacks any mechanism for limiting the degree of permissible gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion in future cases. As such, it is a door that can swing
open but never shut.
41. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973) (state action conferring an indirect benefit to religion is permissible).
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The limits of this assumption were left for future courts to define.
C. Government Display of Religious Symbols
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to use the
Lemon test to determine the validity of a public display of religious sym-
bols. In Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp. ,42 the Fraternal Order of Eagles
erected a three by five foot monolith which depicted the Ten Command-
ments, the Star of David, the All Seeing Eye of God, and the Christian
symbol for Christ, which also represents peace. 4 3 The court held that
the monolith did not violate the establishment clause under the Lemon
test. Noting that the Ten Commandments have secular significance as
the antecedent of the modem legal system, and that passersby were free
to ignore the display, 44 the court found that the secular purpose the
monolith was designed to serve outweighed whatever endorsing effect it
might have produced. The monolith, described as a "passive monu-
ment," 4 5 was allowed to stand.
State courts have split over the validity of public display of the
cross. 4 6 State court decisions in this area have been characterized as
demonstrating a willingness to accommodate whatever action states
choose to pursue. 47 The Supreme Court offered some insight into the
limits of permissible government endorsement of religious symbols in
Stone v. Graham.48 A Kentucky statute required the state to post the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms. In striking down the stat-
ute, the Court added two principles to purpose prong analysis. First,
courts are not required to accept whatever flimsy purpose the state ad-
vances to justify its conduct. If the purpose for acting is self-serving,
then courts are free to disregard it.4 9 Second, courts may infer an intent
to endorse religion from the mere presence of religious symbols within
the display. 50 The Court rejected the rationale applied in Anderson.
Rather than declaring that the purpose for posting the Ten Command-
ments was to recognize its historical basis for the modem legal system,
the Court found that the real purpose for posting the Ten Command-
ments was to induce children to think about and worship God, a pur-
42. 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Compare Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (large cross on
county court house lighted during Christmas season upheld), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 690
(Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) with Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d
792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (arranging city hall window blinds to light a
ten story cross on Christmas and Easter struck down). For additional cases upholding the
display of a cross, see Eugene Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558
P.2d 338 (1976) (lighted cross on mountain upheld), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977);
Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla.) (50 foot cross at city fair upheld), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 980 (1972).
47. See L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 128-32 (1984); Devins,
Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause, 27J. CHURCH & ST. 19, 27-29 (1985).
48. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id.; see Note, supra note 9, at 509.
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pose which is prohibited.
5 '
Stone partially answered the questions raised by ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce.52 In Rabun County, the state insisted that the
purpose for erecting the cross was not to endorse religion, but to pro-
mote tourism. The court, however, found that a twenty-six by thirty-five
foot illuminated cross in a Georgia state park lacked a valid secular pur-
pose. 53 The Rabun County court stated that even if it assumed the cross
had a secular purpose, the purpose prong requires more. Government,
the court maintained, may not use religious means to achieve a secular
goal when nonreligious means are available. 5 4 Since tourism could have
been promoted in a way that would not advance religion, the court held
that display of the cross was violative of the establishment clause.
This line of analysis was curiously rejected by the Supreme Court in
Lynch v. Donnelly,55 one of the Court's most recent articulations of the
limits on governmental display of religious symbols. In that case, a pri-
vate group and the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a Christmas
exhibit in a private park. Owned and maintained by the City, the exhibit
included clowns, elephants, teddy bears and Santa Claus, as well as a
nativity scene, or creche. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
holding that inclusion of the creche did not violate the establishment
clause.
56
Writing for a plurality of the Court, ChiefJustice Burger stated that,
far from requiring separation of church and state, the establishment
clause "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not mere toleration of
all religions."' 57 Accordingly, religious symbols must be examined with
one eye on the circumstances that surround the display. 58
In applying the Lemon test, the Court determined that the creche
simultaneously served to support religion and to commemorate the his-
torical origins of a secular holiday. Finding that the creche served a
valid secular purpose, the Court did not consider whether the secular
purpose actually outweighed the religious purpose.
59
In measuring the effect of the creche's display, the Court recited
prior cases which held that a benefit to religion which is merely inciden-
tal does not render the practice invalid. Then, in a dramatic departure
from orthodox effect prong analysis, the Court asserted that whatever
endorsing effect may have resulted from display of the creche would be
considered merely incidental unless the action confers a greater benefit
51. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
52. 698 F.2d 1098 (11 th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 1101.
54. Id. at 1111.
55. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). What was curious was that in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1982), the Court struck down a Massachusetts liquor law, reasoning that the
intended secular objective could be attained by other means. Yet in Lynch, the Court de-
clared such an inquiry to be "irrelevant." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.7.
56. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
57. Id. at 673.
58. Id. at 679-80.
59. Id. at 681.
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to religion than other conduct which has previously passed constitu-
tional scrutiny.60 Under this safe harbor test, the Court found that dis-
play of the creche was less of a state endorsement of religion than the
use of paid chaplains or Sunday Closing laws. Consequently, the creche
was found to have a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited
religion.
6 1
In deciding that all three prongs of the Lemon test had been met, the
Lynch majority emphasized that the context of the Christmas shopping
season served to validate inclusion of the creche in the Christmas ex-
hibit. Yet, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the very factors that vali-
dated the creche served to constrain its future applicability.
62
In her concurring opinion to the Lynch plurality, Justice O'Connor
outlined a series of refinements to the Lemon test. Where the plurality
would uphold any state action that merely asserts a valid secular pur-
pose, Justice O'Connor would impose the additional requirement that
the motivation for state action be predominantly secular. 63 Justice
O'Connor's analysis of the state's purpose would be measured under a
subjective standard, but would judge the effect of the action under an
objective test that asked whether "the practice under review in fact con-
veys a message of endorsement or disapproval" of religion.64 Under
her approach, state action having the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion would not violate the establishment clause unless it conveyed a
message that status in the political community turns on the question of
religious affiliation. 65 If believers are made to feel like insiders, or
nonbelievers are ostracized, then the action is prohibited. 66 In accord-
ance with her refinements to the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the existence of a legitimate secular purpose, together with a lesser
degree of endorsement than in other cases, produced an effect that did
not advance religion. 67 Therefore, Justice O'Connor agreed that the
60. Id. at 682-83.
61. Id. at 683. The Court also acted to restrict the scope of the entanglement prong.
The district court had found that display of the creche did not present an issue of adminis-
trative entanglement, but decided that the exhibit had fostered political fragmentation
along religious lines. In reversing the district court, the Lynch plurality held that, except in
cases concerning direct financial support of religious schools or institutions, entanglement
based upon political fragmentation should not be an independent ground for invalidating
state action. Id. at 684. Justice O'Connor agreed, stating that in no event should govern-
ment conduct be prohibited solely due to political entanglement. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980).
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that the significance of a particular holiday should not permit the Court to
employ a relaxed application of the L.emon test. Justice Brennan further argued that the
majority's finding of constitutionality is "essentially a narrow result which turns largely
upon the particular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene ap-
peared." Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying
text.
65. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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display of the creche in Lynch was permissible.
Undecided by this case was the constitutionality of either the creche
standing alone on public property6 8 or religious symbols that lack secu-
lar significance. 6 9 The holding of Lynch left open the question of the
validity of a cross on a county seal.
68. Courts have split over the validity of a creche on public property when unaccom-
panied by secular symbols. Cases holding that a creche standing alone violates the estab-
lishment clause include ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (publicly owned creche on lawn of city hall), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986) and
Burelle v. City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.H. 1984) (privately owned creche on
grounds of city hall). Holding such a display not to violate the establishment clause is
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (privately owned creche in public park),
aff'dby an equally divided court sub. nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
In Conrad v. City and County of Denver, No. 84SA313 (Colo. Sept. 8, 1986) (en
banc), the Colorado Supreme Court examined article II, section 4 of the Colorado Consti-
tution to decide the validity of a publicly owned creche surrounded by Santa, his reindeer
and elves in a colorful lighting display on the steps of the city hall during the Christmas
season. Article II, section 4, known as the preference clause, provides in part that no
religious denomination or mode of worship may be given any preference by law. The
complaint alleged that the display demonstrated a preference by the City for the Christian
religion. Because of this alleged preference, the complaint demanded that the City's con-
duct pass the strict scrutiny test set forth in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
The court declined to apply a strict scrutiny test, but agreed to examine the creche
under the Lemon test. Conrad v. City and County of Denver, No. 843A313, slip op. at 24
(Colo. Sept. 8, 1986) (Kirschbaum, J., concurring). In holding that the display of the
creche met all three prongs of the Lemon test, the court found that the purpose of the
creche's display was "to promote a feeling of good will, to depict what is commonly
thought to be the historical origins of a national holiday, and to contribute to Denver's
reputation as the city of lights." Id. at 15. The court adopted the rationale of the Lynch
plurality, deciding that in the context of the secular display, the creche did not advance
religion any more than other examples that had been upheld in the past. Id. at 16. Finally,
although it acknowledged that there was evidence of political divisiveness, the court fol-
lowed the Lynch holding that, in the absence of evidence of direct subsidy to religious
institutions, such an inquiry is irrelevant. Id. at 18. Therefore, display of the creche was
found to be constitutional.
These cases show that lower courts have generally interpreted Lynch to protect only
those creches that include secular symbols as part of the display. This serves to confirm
the cynical observation that Lynch created nothing more than a "plastic reindeer" rule.
Fin. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
69. A number of miscellaneous cases of display of religious symbols and messages
have been found to fail the Lemon test. See Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924
(3d Cir. 1980) (thirty-six foot cross on stage erected for Pope violates all three prongs),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980) (prayer
printed on state road maps violates purpose prong), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Libin
v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393 (D. Conn. 1985) (three-by- five foot lighted cross
on wall of volunteer fire department violates effect prong); ACLU v. City of St. Charles,
622 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. II1. 1985) (eighteen foot illuminated cross as part of privately
owned display on public property violates effect prong), aff'd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.
1986); Greater Houston Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(three crosses and Star of David in public park violates all three prongs), appeal dismissed,
755 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Fire Dep't, 559 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
("Keep Christ in Christmas" sign on fire house violates purpose prong). Yet in Fausto v.
Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984), a public display of a memorial to unborn chil-
dren who had perished as a result of abortions was upheld, even though it included a
drawing of a mother and child that could be construed as a depiction of the Blessed Virgin
Mary and the baby Jesus.
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III. FRIEDAV . BOARD OF COUVT" COMMISSIOA'ERS
A. Facts
The Bernalillo County seal is displayed as a circle with an outer
edge which frames the words "BERNALILLO COUNTY" and "STATE
OF NEW MEXICO" in gold. Within an inner circle directly overhead is
the motto "CON ESTA VENCEMOS" in gold against a blue sky. 70 Be-
neath that is a gold Latin 7 ' cross that occupies about half of the diame-
ter of the inner circle. The cross is trimmed in black, highlighted by
white edging and golden rays emanating from its center. Four dark blue
mountains occupy the middle ground, while the lower region is dark
green and contains eight white sheep.
Although no record remains to explain either the origin or the leg-
islative intent of the seal, it appeared on county documents as early as
1925. Since 1973, the display of the seal has been expanded to include
not only official stationery and documents, but also county motor vehi-
70. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1985) (en
bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986). In English the motto "Con Esta Vencemos"
means "With This We Conquer." Id.
71. A Latin cross has a horizontal beam which intersects the vertical beam above its
midpoint. The Bernalillo County cross is a "botonce" cross, which refers to the three
buttons at each end. For a psychological perspective of the cross, see C. JUNG, MAN AND
Ins SYMBOi.s 243-45 (1964) (elevation of horizontal beam symbolic of mankind's elevated
aspirations).
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cles and shoulder patches for the uniforms of officers of the sheriff's
department.
72
Al Friedman, an atheist and "ethnic Jew," was a social worker resid-
ing in Bernalillo County. He brought a declaratory judgment action
against the Board of County Commissioners of Bemalillo County, seek-
ing to enjoin the Board from displaying the county seal. 73 The com-
plaint alleged that the seal violated the establishment clause.
74
Specifically, Friedman contended that the county seal's prominent dis-
play of a large Latin cross, in conjunction with the motto "Con Esta
Vencemos," was an endorsement of the Christian religion that was
"anathematical" to him and other non-Christians. Friedman also per-
ceived the eight sheep depicted in the seal as symbolic of the flock of
Jesus, which had a further inhibiting effect upon him.
75
The district court disagreed with Mr. Friedman's allegations. Em-
phasizing the historical importance of Catholicism in the region, the
court held that although the cross and motto have religious significance,
the seal was not violative of the establishment clause. 76 The district
court viewed the seal as a predominantly historical symbol and declined
to require its removal. 77 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, a three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of the district court
over a strong dissent by Judge Logan. 78 However, on rehearing en
banc, the Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision in a five to two
vote, 79 holding that the effect of the seal impermissibly endorsed reli-
gion. The County was ordered to cover the seal. The County petitioned
the United States Supreme Court to decide the case, but that petition
was denied.80
B. Panel Decision
In affirming the decision of the district court that the seal did not
72. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
73. Mr. Friedman brought the action with Herald Johnson, but Mr. Johnson failed to
appear at the hearing and did not participate in the appeal. Johnson v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp. 919,921 (D.N.M. 1981), rev'd, 781 F.2d 777 (1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 2890 (1986).
74. The complaint also alleged that the seal violated the free exercise clause as well as
article II, section II of the New Mexico Constitution. Having found that the seal violated
the establishment clause, the Tenth Circuit found no need to examine the other charges.
Friedman, 781 F.2d at 780.
75. Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 921. The sheep/shepherd metaphor appears in both the
Old and New Testaments. See, e.g., Psalms 23:1 ("The Lord is my shepherd"); Matthew
25:32 (Before the Son of man "shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them
one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats.").
76. Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 924.
77. Id. at 925.
78. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1984),
vacated, 781 F.2d 777 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2890 (1986).
79. Judge Logan accomplished the herculean task of not only convincing Judges Mc-
Kay, Seymour and Moore to vacate the panel decision, but also persuading Chief Judge
Holloway to reverse himself and overrule without comment the very opinion he wrote for
the panel majority. Dissenting were Judges McWilliams and Barrett. Friedman, 781 F.2d
777.
80. 106 S.Ct. 2890 (1986). See Rocky Mtn. News, June 10, 1986, at 24, col. 5.
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violate the establishment clause, the Tenth Circuit panel applied the fa-
miliar Lemon test.8 ' First, the panel concluded that the district court did
not err when it found that the seal served a secular purpose. The inclu-
sion of the motto with the cross was found to be a "most troubling prob-
lem,"8 2 but was not enough to outweigh the secular purpose of
memorializing the cultural history of New Mexico.8 3 Second, the panel
agreed with the district court that the seal did not have a primary effect
of advancing religion. In doing so, the panel conceded that to some
extent the seal did promote religion. But, given the history of Christian
involvement in the area as well as the ordinary uses that the County
made of the seal, the panel found that whatever benefit the seal may
have conferred upon religion was insufficient to render it an official en-
dorsement of religion.8 4 Finally, the panel concluded that the seal did
not excessively entangle government and religion, either through ad-
ministrative entanglement or through political fragmentation along reli-
gious lines.8 5 Therefore, the seal passed constitutional muster.
Judge Logan strenuously dissented. His primary objection was that
the visual impact of the cross was so overpowering that it rendered the
seal an obvious endorsement of religion. 8 6 Acknowledging that a fair
analysis of the seal's validity requires consideration of the historical con-
tributions of Christianity to the area, Judge Logan nevertheless believed
the display of the cross was too prominent to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. In a frank aside, Judge Logan admitted that, like pornography,
an establishment clause violation is hard to define, but he knew it when
he saw it, and he saw it here.
8 7
C. The Tenth Circuit's En Banc Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
In overruling both the district court and the three-judge panel, the
Friedman majority adopted much ofJudge Logan's analysis from his dis-
senting opinion to the panel decision. In applying the Lemon test, the
court concluded that the seal's primary effect was to advance religion.
88
Although it did not overrule the district court's finding that the seal
served a secular purpose, the court, in a footnote, admonished the lower
court for accepting the County's justifications for the seal without re-
quiring corroborating documentation8 9 The court reasoned that the
judiciary must ensure that government acts for the reasons it purports.
81. Friedman, No. 82-1064, slip op. at 6. The majority opinion of the unpublished
panel decision appears as an appendix to the en banc decision.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 4 (Logan, J., dissenting). Judge Logan also felt that placing the seal on
police cars and uniforms violated the entanglement prong. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 3 (Logan, J., dissenting) (paraphrasingJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
88. 781 F.2d at 780-82.
89. Id. at 780 n.3.
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Likewise, the court found the district court's reasoning regarding entan-
glement to be overly accommodating toward government because even
the minimal cost involved in displaying the seal represents some
entanglement. 90
The court adopted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch
as the appropriate standard for measuring impermissible state endorse-
ment of religion. 9 1 Under this standard, state action that the average
observer perceives as an endorsement of religion is disallowed. The
court suggested that state action is similarly prohibited if the average
viewer perceives the action as having the appearance of promoting the
religion the symbol represents. 9 2 In measuring reactions to the seal, the
court considered a rabbi's testimony, as well as the hypothetical re-
sponse of a Lebanese Moslem, a Northern Irish Protestant, and a Native
American.93 At the same time, the court discounted the responses that
certain Christian and lay witnesses had to the seal, due to their familiar-
ity with and acceptance of the cross. 94 The court concluded that the seal
conveys to the average citizen the impression that the County impermis-
sibly endorsed Christianity.9 5
The court next decided that the Lynch holding did not require a
finding that the use of the seal is valid. A creche is not a cross. As the
court noted, the creche in Lynch was only displayed during the Christmas
season, while the Bernalillo County seal is seen daily. The creche was
displayed in a commercial setting, while the cross is not. The creche was
not more prominently displayed than the other secular components in
the display, while the cross is the focus of the seal. The Friedman court
held that the additions of the motto and the blaze of light served to
elevate the cross into a position of prominence that the Lynch holding
could not protect.96
The court found that placing the seal on the uniforms and vehicles
of police officers served to exacerbate the seal's endorsing effect. Rea-
soning that the average citizen could assume that any officer who wore
such an emblem must be a Christian, the court suggested that a non-
Christian might presume that such sheriffs could not treat unbelievers
fairly, and might even try to avoid traffic tickets by posing as a Chris-
tian.9 7 The effect of these assumptions, the court suggested, would be
to pressure citizens to act as Christians. Such government coercion
would be intolerable.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 781.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 782.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court stated in a footnote that the cross stands "approximately one foot
high" on the seal that appears on the door of county motor vehicles. Id. at 779 n.1. Close
scrutiny of the photograph contained in Appendix A of Friedman, however, reveals that the
cross is smaller than the side mirror assembly, which is about seven inches tall. Id. at 784
(author's estimate).
97. Id. at 782.
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Rather than holding that the display of the seal was a per se violation
of the establishment clause, the court, through dictum, stated that a
message of government endorsement might not be perceived if the dis-
play of the seal was confined to an embossed notary seal or one-color
drawing on official paper work.9 8 Since the effect of the seal, as de-
picted, constituted an establishment clause violation, the court ordered
its removal.
2. Dissenting Opinions
Two judges voted to uphold the validity of the seal, fully adopting
Chief Judge Holloway's panel decision.9 9 Writing separately, Judge
Barrett found not only that the majority failed to apply the Lemon test in
a common sense fashion, but also that the circumstances creating a vali-
dating context for the Lynch exhibit were present in the seal. 10 0 Like the
creche, the cross served a legitimate secular purpose. Therefore, Judge
Barrett maintained, the reasoning that upheld the validity of the display
of the Lynch creche must protect the Bernalillo County cross.
Judge Barrett then suggested that the County's inclusion of the
cross in its seal did not advance religion as much as other government-
sponsored conduct that had nevertheless been held to be tolerable. Ex-
amples such as prayers at public school graduations and the bailiff's cry
of "God Save the United States and This Honorable court" served to
illustrate this point.' 0 ' Judge Barrett declared that by ignoring such ex-
amples, the majority reached an anomalous result.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Friedman court reached the correct result, but employed faulty
reasoning in doing so. Its analysis echoes the words of the Lemon test
without considering what those words mean. As a result, the appropri-
ate standard for measuring public display of religious symbols remains
uncertain.
A. Secular Purpose
In declining to overrule the district court holding that the seal
served a valid secular purpose, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cor-
rectly acknowledges that religious symbols can be displayed in public
when an historical or cultural justification exists.' 0 2 Given the number
of instances in which government has attempted to cloak religious moti-
vation in secular garb,' 0 3 the court's warning to remain alert for sham
98. Id. at 781.
99. Judge McWilliams adopted ChiefJudge Holloway's panel decision in full without
further comment. Id. at 784 (McWilliams,J., dissenting). Judge Barrett also adopted Chief
Judge Holloway's panel decision in full, but expressed additional views. Id. (Barrett, J.,
dissenting).
100. Id. at 785 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 785-86 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
102. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984); see Devins, supra note 47, at 29.
103. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (actual purpose of
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purposes may be timely, but it is unnecessary in this case. The seal has
been used almost from the time of New Mexico's statehood.10 4 The ele-
ments of the seal arguably represent the most distinctive features of Ber-
nalillo County, and no evidence exists to indicate that the seal's artist
was motivated by an intent to promote religion at the County's expense.
B. Primary Effect
1. Measured by an Objective Standard
Friedman states, but fails to apply, the proper standard for measur-
ing the effect of governmental display of religious symbols. In so doing,
the court uses evidence improperly to justify its conclusion. The court
relies on Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence in stating that the effect
of the seal is to be measured by considering the perceptions of the aver-
age citizen.1 0 5 Therefore, it was not inappropriate for the court to dis-
count the testimony of the Christian witnesses, because their religious
convictions could predispose them to accept what a detached observer
would reject. But, by not similarly discounting the rabbi's testimony,
the Friedman court is guilty of tipping the scales against the seal. In addi-
tion, it is correspondingly disingenuous for the court to consider the
hypothetical reactions of Lebanese Moslems, Northern Irish Protestants,
and Native American Indians as indicative of an objective response to
the presence of the cross in the seal. It hardly bears stating that those
who wish to learn what the average person thinks should not base their
answer on the response of someone with an ax to grind. The establish-
ment clause does not define the limits of permissible state conduct by
measuring the sensibilities of its most sensitive or fastidious citizens.
10 6
2. Symbolic Benefit to Religion
Friedman advances the proposition that "[a]n implicit symbolic ben-
efit is enough" to invalidate state endorsement of religion. 10 7 An im-
plicit symbolic benefit is usually derived from the appearance that
government, by displaying a particular religious symbol, has placed its
stamp of approval on the tenets of that religion. 10 8 Thus, the court
finds that placing the seal on police cars and uniforms has the impermis-
sible effect of placing the "power, prestige and financial support" of
posting Ten Commandments was to teach children to worship God); Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (alleged purpose in erecting stage and thirty-six
foot cross for Pope of creating a "public relations bonanza" was first asserted on appeal),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
104. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
105. Id. at 781.
106. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of
Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981).
107. 781 F.2d at 781.
108. Id. at 782; see, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (statute giving
church power to veto liquor license applications gives church the appearance of govern-
mental authority); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (placing Ten Com-
mandments in grade school classrooms gives children the appearance that Christianity is
the "correct" religion).
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government behind the Catholic church.10 9 While such a statement was
true at one time, I10 it fails to recognize the Supreme Court's recent re-
treat from that position. I I I As a result of its reliance upon a rationale
that has been abandoned, Friedman seriously misstates the standard for
measuring the effect of governmental display of religious symbols.
In support of its position, Friedman purports to adopt Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch as the appropriate standard for
measuring establishment clause violations.12 Through clever editing,
the court twists the meaning ofJustice O'Connor's statement to suit its
own ends. The court stated that " '[t]he effect prong asks whether, irre-
spective of government's actual purpose, the practice . . . conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval.' "113 What Justice O'Connor
actually wrote was that "[tihe effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval."' "14 The reinsertion of the
phrase "under review in fact" serves to rebut the proposition that a
mere symbolic benefit to religion is sufficient to result in an establish-
ment clause violation. The Lynch plurality holds that the existence of de
minimis endorsement of religion is not enough to find state action uncon-
stitutional.1 5 The Lynch plurality actually assumed that display of the
creche advanced religion, yet it did not find that the display was uncon-
stitutional.1 6 For these reasons, the Friedman court's reliance on its ver-
sion of justice O'Connor's statement is misplaced.
As a second basis for finding that a symbolic benefit to religion will
cause a public display of religious symbols to be held invalid, Friedman
relies upon the rationale of two cases, Larkin v. Grendel's Den 117 and Bell
109. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 221 (1963)).
110. See supra note 108; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 40 at 771 (current attitude of the
Court is to accommodate symbiosis between church and state).
11. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(outlining way to draft silent prayer st.tute that would not violate establishment clause);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of creche); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding use of chaplains in state legislatures). See alo Note, supra
note 9, at 507-09 (bemoaning magnitude of Court's retreat since Stone and Larkin).
112. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781.
113. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
114. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Friedman's
notable omission of the phrase "under review in fact" was one ground for reversal that the
County raised in its petition to the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 15, Friedman v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
115. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (plurality) ("[O]ur precedents plainly contemplate that on
occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action."); see also
Note, Does the Wall Still Stand?: Separation of Church and State in the United States, 37 BAYLOR L.
REV. 755, 769 (1985); cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a gov-
ernment practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or
inhibition of religion."). Justice O'Connor remains faithful to toleration of de minimis en-
dorsement of religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
116. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
117. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
[Vol. 64:1
HIDING BEHIND THE WALL
v. Little Axe Independent School District. 118 It is important to note, however,
that Lynch considered and rejected the contention that display of the
creche created the same sort of symbolic benefit to religion that was
present in either Larkin 1 19 or McCollum v. Board of Education,120 a case
almost identical to Little Axe. 12 1 Lynch rejects what Friedman adopts. By
failing to explain why the Lynch rationale should be abandoned, the find-
ing of the Friedman court that the mere presence of a symbolic benefit to
religion invalidates state action is clearly erroneous.
As indicated by numerous instances of government conduct that
have passed constitutional muster, an implicit symbolic benefit to reli-
gion is not enough to prohibit state action. If the mere appearance of
government endorsement of religion was sufficient to show an establish-
ment clause violation, then "In God We Trust" could never be printed
on coins and currency, 122 paid chaplains would be barred from leading
prayers in state legislatures,t 23 and bailiffs could never announce "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court."' 124 Indeed, such a
standard would not only undermine the Friedman observation that a
black-and-white drawing of the seal could be permissible, but would also
emasculate the court's statement that " '[t]he Government may depict
objects with spiritual content, but it may not promote or give its stamp
of approval to such spiritual content.' "125
3. Not "How Often" but "How Prominently"
In distinguishing the Friedman cross from the Lynch creche, the court
failed to emphasize the factor that merits the most attention. That the
creche is displayed only once a year, while the seal is seen daily, is not an
appropriate distinction to justify upholding one while invalidating the
other. 12 6 Both symbols derive their secular significance from the history
of the events they commemorate. Certainly, the effect of state endorse-
118. 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
119. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
120. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
121. In McCollum, a "released time" program was found to violate the establishment
clause. Public school children who volunteered to participate in the program were allowed
to miss class in order to attend religious instruction while public school children who did
not participate in the program were required to undertake their secular studies elsewhere
in the building. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209. In Little Axe, the Tenth Circuit found that
holding voluntary weekly religious meetings before classes in a public grade school failed
all three prongs of the Lemon test. Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1404-06. The court held that
permitting meetings of the Son Shine Club on school grounds conveys a symbolic infer-
ence of endorsement of religion to an "impressionable student." In both cases the courts
voiced the concern that children would receive the mistaken impression that the religion
being taught was somehow the "correct" one by virtue of being taught at school.
122. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 462
F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 930 (1979).
123. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
124. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781 (quoting Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
126. But see L. PFEFFER, supra note 47, at 129 (arguing that the seasonal nature of dis-
play is a valid distinguishing factor).
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ment of religion increases with the frequency of display of the religious
symbol, but even a daily religious message can be tolerated in the
proper context. Coins contain a religious message that is seen every day
without violating the establishment clause. 127 Military cemeteries con-
tain thousands of cross-shaped grave markers, but their presence has
never been challenged. 128 The court noted in dictum that a one-color
depiction or embossed impression of the Bernalillo County seal could
pass constitutional muster. 129 These examples make it clear that gov-
ernment could display a cross on a county seal that would be seen every
day without impermissibly endorsing religion.
In cases of governmental display of religious symbols, the more im-
portant factor to consider is not how often the religious symbol is
shown, but whether the religious symbol is displayed more prominently
than the secular components that surround it. The degree of promi-
nence of government display of religious symbols can be measured in
three ways: the size of the religious symbol in relation to the secular
components; whether the focus of the display is on the religious symbol;
and whether the secular components of the display serve to return the
observer's eye to the religious symbol, thereby reinforcing the imper-
missible endorsing effect. The efficacy of this test can be shown through
its application to the display of the motto "In God We Trust" on the
American quarter. The size of the motto's type is smaller than that of
either the year of mint or the word "Liberty". The center of the coin is
occupied by Washington's silhouette, while the motto is placed off to the
lower left. Finally, none of the secular components return the ob-
server's attention to the religious message of the motto. Consequently,
the motto would not impermissibly endorse religion.
Applying the same test to the Bernalillo County seal produces a dif-
ferent result. The cross is the largest component of the seal. The center
of the seal is occupied by the cross. Rays of light emanate from its
center to spotlight the cross. Black-and-white edging creates a stark
color contrast between the cross and the blue sky background. These
factors bolster the impression that the cross is the focus of the seal. Fi-
nally, two of the seal's secular components create ambiguities that serve
to return attention to the seal. First, it is not only possible but likely that
the word "This" in the Spanish motto "With This We Conquer" refers
to the cross as the instrumentality of spiritual victory, although other
constructions are conceivable.13 0 In any event, this ambiguity creates a
question that forces a curious observer to search the seal for an answer.
This would necessarily return attention to the cross. Second, even as-
suming that the eight sheep in the seal were included for the sole pur-
127. See supra note 122.
128. But see Birdine v. Moreland, 579 F.Supp. 412, 417 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (state may erect
Latin cross or Star of David in public cemetary without violating the establishment clause).
129. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781.
130. Expert testimony at trial indicated that "This" could refer not to "the cross" but
to "the land," "the totality," "the sum," or "the history" of Bernalillo County. Record at
18-20.
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pose of representing Bernalillo County's sheep-raising heritage, it is not
surprising that someone might misconstrue the intended message by
thinking that the sheep were meant to refer to the flock of Christ. The
presence of the cross would then inadvertently further that misconcep-
tion. As with the Spanish motto, the cross would be the key to answer-
ing the question raised by the ambiguity of the sheep. Under all three
parts of the test, the cross would be considered more prominently dis-
played than the surrounding secular components, which would consti-
tute an impermissible endorsement of religion.
Although Friedman mentions these objective measures of prominent
display of the cross as factors for invalidating the seal, 13 1 the court de-
clines to end its inquiry there. In addition, the court holds that the same
result can be explained by the presence of either an implicit symbolic
benefit to religion or the mere appearance of government endorsement
of religion.' 3 2 To the extent that Friedman relies upon these additional
rationalizations, the decision defies prior case holdings, its own policy
considerations, and common sense.' 3 3 However, the holding of Fried-
man can be justified by its implicit recognition that the Bernalillo County
cross is displayed in a manner that would objectively be perceived as
being too prominent. Therefore, the court is on safe legal ground in
concluding that the seal violates the establishment clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The result in Friedman can be defended on the basis of the degree of
prominence of the display of the cross in the seal. The cross is simply
too large and displayed too prominently. But by holding that govern-
mental display of religious symbols can be banned either through the
mere appearance of a symbolic benefit to religion or through specula-
tion over hypothetical reactions of aggrieved minorities, Friedman obfus-
cates the very guidelines it adopts. As the Tenth Circuit Court once
observed, "[t]he wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliteration of all our reli-
gious traditions."' 134 Yet the broad language that Friedman embraces
could be employed in future cases to require removal of all religious
symbols from public display, which is surely not the result the court
intended. 1
3 5
131. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782.
132. Id. at 781.
133. See supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
134. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S.
879 (1973). See also Commentary, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8
OHIo N.U.L. REv. 329, 339 (1981) (establishment clause was never intended to extirpate
religion from public life).
135. If the court had intended that all seals displaying religious symbols violated the
establishment clause, then it would not have gone out of its way to show how Bernalillo
County could have permissibly included a cross in its seal. Two cases of potential litiga-
tion illustrate the problem that the Friedman court's rationale presents. The township seal
of Zion, Illinois, contains a Latin cross that occupies about one-third of the seal. The
shield-shaped emblem also shows the word "ZION," a dove holding an olive branch, a
crown, and scepter. Telephone interview with Howard Everline, Mayor of Zion, Illinois
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Friedman may be another example of newly-confirmed Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statement that silly cases make bad law.' 3 6 That the Tenth
Circuit would be disenchanted with Supreme Court pronouncements on
the establishment clause is understandable, but that does not excuse the
Friedman court from its responsibility to reconcile the result of the case
with the tests it announces. Friedman does serve as a signal that the
Tenth Circuit has abandoned the accommodationist stance it assumed in
Anderson, and that in the future, it will require the government to show
stricter adherence to the principle of religious neutrality. Whether the
guidelines announced by the Friedman decision will be warmly received
by courts in the rest of the country remains to be seen.
EdwardJ. Posselius III*
(July 28, 1986). The seal was designed by the founder of the Christian Catholic church,
who also founded the town. Both the church and the town display the seal. The town seal
appears not only on paperwork, police cars and the town water tower, but also on street
signs and the registration sticker that each automobile is required to display. Telephone
interview with Robert Sherman, local director of the American Atheists Association in Buf-
falo Grove, Illinois (July 31, 1986).
The city seal of Redlands, California, also contains a Latin cross. The multicolored
seal is divided into four quadrants, representing industry, education, agriculture, and reli-
gion. The cross hovers above a church spire in the lower right quadrant. At least ten
elements in the seal are unrelated to the cross, which is smaller than many of its secular
components. Use of the seal is confined to official documents, city limits signs, and busi-
ness cards. Redlands Daily Facts, April 30, 1986 at 1, col. 3; telephone interview with
Daniel Rodriguez, Community Services Administrator in Redlands, California (July 28,
1986).
If Friedman is interpreted as the court intended, then the Zion seal would be struck
down, while the Redlands seal would be upheld. But if Friedman is interpreted broadly,
then both seals would be held invalid.
136. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 128 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
* The author would like to thank Eric Twelker and Jude Biggs for their assistance,
especially for providing information regarding pending litigation of similar seals.
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